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Abstract
Many stakeholders are involved in complex electronic services. Individuals
release personal information to front-ends in advanced web services. However,
to what extent the acquired information is distributed and processed, what
other data is included and/or merged in user profiles, remains unclear. Much
more personal information is often released than strictly necessary. As is
well known, many authentication technologies release personal data and make
transactions linkable. Service providers can accurately profile individuals and
trade profiles with external commercial entities. Moreover, service providers
delegate their responsibilities for the data they collected to external entities
who receive these data, while consequently, individual users lose control of
their personal information. The present dissertation presents a logic based
modeling approach to inspect privacy in composite electronic services from
different viewpoints in data protection.
The first part provides the background for the major concepts on privacy
complemented by an overview of the different privacy analysis approaches
currently available.
The second part presents a logic based modeling approach for inspecting
the user privacy. First of all, the key concepts necessary to reason on
privacy in composite electronic services are identified. Examples are privacy
policies, authentication technologies; but also, the privacy preferences and
trust assumptions of users. These concepts are mapped to components of a
logic based framework supporting automated privacy inspection of composite
electronic services. The approach extracts profiles, containing a set of personal
data that can be compiled by service providers after a user has interacted with
a particular service provider. The resulting profiles constitute the input for a
qualitative privacy analysis capable of providing meaningful feedback to both
end-users and service designers. The former can select a service based on the
minimal data disclosure principle. The latter can use the framework to select
privacy-enhancing technologies and define consistent privacy policies from the
iii
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earliest design stage.
In the third part, the approach is validated on two electronic public transport
ticketing systems. The case study shows the extensibility of the framework.
The final part focuses on service provider accountability, one of the core privacy
protection principles of the upcoming European General Data Protection
Regulation. Service provider accountability refers to the obligation of data
controllers to demonstrate compliance of their data practices with the rules
and regulations. In this part, an inference model providing individuals with
global accountability guarantees of multi-component systems is introduced. It
considers different user expectations on provided evidence (i.e. log evidence)
of declared data handling practices. The feedback provided by this approach
is useful for both end-users and auditors who conduct privacy assessments on
behalf of the end-users.
Beknopte samenvatting
In deze thesis worden complexe elektronische services beschouwd waarin
personen interageren met een publieke interface. Bij deze services zijn
verschillende stakeholders betrokken die elk persoonlijke gegevens verzamelen
van diegene die de services gebruiken. Het is echter onduidelijk welke
persoonlijke gegevens er allemaal worden verspreid en verwerkt, en welke er
voor het profileren van personen worden bijgehouden. In veel gevallen worden
meer persoonlijke gegevens verzameld dan strikt noodzakelijk is. Vaak is dit
te wijten aan authenticatietechnologieën die persoonlijke gegevens vrijgeven
met als gevolg dat mogelijks verschillende service transacties met elkaar
kunnen worden gelinkt. De verzamelde gegevens zorgen ervoor dat service
providers gebruikersprofielen kunnen aanmaken die personen heel nauwkeurig
beschrijven. Deze profielen kunnen dan worden verhandeld aan externe partijen
zoals adverteerders. Bovendien delegeren service providers taken aan derde
partijen die gespecialiseerd zijn in een bepaalde deeltaak (bijv. de authenticatie
wordt verzorgd door de Facebook authenticatieservice). Het gevolg van deze
gedistribueerde services is dat personen controle verliezen over hun persoonlijke
gegevens. Het doel in deze thesis is om een privacy analyse methode te
ontwikkelen die voor zowel eindgebruikers als service designers nuttige feedback
oplevert.
In het eerste gedeelte van deze thesis worden de belangrijkste privacyconcepten
besproken en wordt een overzicht gegeven van bestaande privacy analyse
methodes.
Het tweede gedeelte in de thesis focust zich op het uitwerken van een op
logica gebaseerde methode voor het analyseren van privacy in elektronische
services. Eerst worden de concepten die cruciaal zijn voor het beschrijven van
privacy in services geïdentificeerd. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn privacy policy’s
en authenticatietechnologieën, maar ook de persoonlijke privacyvoorkeuren
en de vertrouwensperceptie van personen. Daarna worden de verschillende
componenten, waartoe de bovenvermelde concepten behoren, van een op
v
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logica gebaseerd modelleerraamwerk gedefinieerd. Het raamwerk laat toe
om automatisch te redeneren over de privacy in een gemodelleerde service.
Hiervoor worden er profielen die een individu’s persoonlijke gegevens bevat
gecompileerd. Op basis van deze profielen wordt er een privacy analyse
uitgevoerd die kwalitatieve feedback oplevert die nuttig is voor eindgebruikers
en service designers. De eindgebruikers kunnen een service selecteren op basis
van welke service het minst persoonlijke gegevens verzamelt. Service designers
kunnen het raamwerk gebruiken voor het selecteren van een geschikte privacy
verbeterende technologie (PET) en om consistente privacy policy’s te bepalen
vanaf de vroegste ontwerpfase.
In het derde gedeelte van de thesis wordt de privacy analyse methode
gevalideerd m.b.v. ticketsystemen die in publiek transport worden gebruikt.
De gevalstudie toont de uitbreidbaarheid van het modelleerraamwerk aan.
Het laatste gedeelte in de thesis focust zich op de accountability van service
providers. Accountability is één van de pijlers is van de binnenkort geratifi-
ceerde Europese Algemene Data Protectie Richtlijn voor het beschermen van
de privacy. Dit dataprotectieprincipe maakt datacontrollers verantwoordelijk
om aan te tonen dat hun datapraktijken overeenstemmen met hun privacy
policy’s en met de privacywetgeving. In dit gedeelte van de thesis wordt er
een analyse methode uitgewerkt die automatisch een overzicht genereert voor
eindgebruikers over de globale accountability garanties in een systeem. De
analyse houdt rekening met het vertrouwen van verschillende prototypische
gebruikers over het geleverde bewijs (i.e. logs) van de dataverwerkingspraktijken
van de service providers. De feedback die door deze methode wordt gegenereerd
is nuttig voor eindgebruikers en auditeurs die in opdracht van een eindgebruiker
privacy assessments uitvoeren.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
At present, web services constitute an integral part of our daily lives. Initially,
they were stand-alone applications offered by single service providers. Over
time, they have evolved to complex web mashups, where individuals interact
with a service front-end calling on underlying sub-services to perform specific
tasks. Personal information revealed by individuals via the service front-end
can be spread across multiple parties that collaborate to offer these services.
Service providers can use the collected data to profile individuals, e.g. to
offer personalized service content. Before individuals can use services, they
must first agree with the privacy policies of service providers, and give them
their explicit consent for the declared data handling practices. For example,
by giving his consent when registering, the individual grants permission to
the service provider to link his Facebook account to the service and collect
personal information from Facebook. Because privacy policies typically consist
of ambiguous declarations, individuals are left oblivious about the processing
of their personal information. Moreover, privacy policies are mere declarations
of intent and offering no guarantee of compliance with the actual data handling
practices of service providers. Users fall back on trust perceptions [158, 77, 192]
when selecting a particular web service. They are willing to release more
personal information to service providers that are trustworthy.
Service providers may inadvertently collect more personal information than
strictly necessary because of the technology used for authenticating users, such
as in the case of an individual who proves he is older than 18 using his X.509
certificate based electronic identity card. Not only does he reveal his date of
birth, but also his name, address, social security number and all other attributes
that are included in the certificate. Service providers – driven by economical
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motives – may collaborate with external parties to intentionally collect and
store more personal information than declared to accurately profile their users.
They can trade the data with external parties, such as advertisers buying the
data to spam individuals with offers. Another example are insurance companies
who can refuse individuals based on health information they collected about
them. The concerns of individuals and service providers are conflicting. It is
important for individuals to have more control over their personal information
revealed for protecting their privacy. Disclosing only the personal information
which is strictly necessary, i.e. data minimization, is one strategy to protect
an individual’s privacy. It is a key data protection principle considered by the
computer science and privacy law community.
One way to achieve minimal data disclosure are privacy-enhancing technologies
(PETs), which originate from computer science. It is an umbrella term of
cryptographic systems that assure individuals that only necessary personal
attributes are disclosed. An example of a PET is Tor [74]. It is an anonymity
network that ensures anonymity for those surfing the Internet. In a normal
setting, individuals just browse on the Internet. Typically, they are not aware
that when they access a website, they leave traces behind inherent to the
underlying TCP/IP protocol used by the HTTP(S) protocol that is used by
browsers. For example, the website can store the individual’s IP address, or
their Internet Provider can store the addresses they visit. Anonymity networks
– such as Tor – prevent this by offering an anonymous overlay channel that hides
the underlying linkable protocol data. Another example is U-Prove [139], which
is an anonymous attribute based credential technology. U-Prove credentials are
attribute containers certified by a trusted authority which support privacy-
preserving user authentication – e.g. only selected attributes are disclosed
– while offering strong authentication guarantees to service providers. For
now, PETs are not widespread in current systems; they have a steep learning
curve based on complex cryptographic operations. As a result, most system
designers have little knowledge of PETs. Moreover, data is a crucial asset in
many business models of commercial organizations, making PETs unattractive.
Nevertheless, PETs alone are not effective methods for protecting privacy
because in many cases service functionality requires that individuals reveal
parts of their personal information. In such cases, privacy regulations are
required as well.
The non-binding OECD’s privacy guidelines [138] aim at harmonizing privacy
regulations of member states and are adopted by the upcoming European
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [8]. The framework contains
recommendations on privacy principles that should be adopted by data
protection regulations of member states. Like PETs, the framework also
considers data minimization as a data protection principle. More specifically,
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it restricts data controllers, e.g. service providers, to collect only the data
that is necessary for the specified purpose. Furthermore, the framework
also includes the openness and the individual’s participation principle. The
former implies that individuals must be informed about the data handling
practices, e.g. via readily available privacy policies which contain data handling
practice declarations. The latter includes the individual’s right to access his
data. An example is Google Dashboard [10] which provides an interface to
individuals to manage the personal data that Google collected about them.
Another recommendation is accountability of data controllers, which makes
data controllers responsible for having data handling practices compliant with
regulations and for demonstrating this compliance. As electronic services
may involve multiple parties that are located in different member states,
the OECD recommends member states to restrict cross-border data flows to
countries that have sufficient privacy protection regulations. For example,
cross-border data flows from EU companies to US companies are regulated
by Safe Harbor [174, 174], which bridges the differences in data protection
regulations between EU and US. US companies can only receive data from
EU companies if they participated in the Safe Harbor program. To protect the
personal information of an individual even more, the OECD’s privacy guidelines
and EU’s GDPR add the privacy by design principle, which enforces data
controllers to build in privacy safeguards throughout the design process from
the earliest design stage, and not consider privacy as an afterthought. However,
the regulations are too high level to be useful for designers [93]. Methods
that assist designers are required that bridge the gap between regulations and
the design/development of electronic services. Service providers may advertise
their compliance with regulations towards (potential) users using privacy trust
seals [3, 1] issued by external certifying organizations. This is encouraged by
the EU’s GDPR and may have the potential to gain trust by users.
1.1 Scope and Approach
The research in this thesis considers privacy in complex electronic services
comprising a user front-end which interacts with underlying sub-services
provided by multiple parties. Each service component can collect personal
information revealed by individuals and can store it, process it, or forward it to
collaborating third-parties to profile individuals. The aforementioned scheme
is exploited by providers of many popular web services (i.e. web mashups) that
build profiles containing personal attributes of individuals that are traded with
advertisers. The data handling practices must comply with data protection
regulations such as the upcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation.
4 INTRODUCTION
The first part in the thesis addresses three objectives of the EU General Data
Protection Regulation: (a) enforcing data protection by integrating privacy
throughout the complete service design process, (b) informing individuals about
the data handling practices of the service they use, and (c) educating end-users
about the privacy risks of revealing personal information when using services.
With regard to these objectives, the first part focuses on an automated privacy
analysis approach providing qualitative feedback about the distribution of an
individual’s personal information across all involved parties. This is modeled
by means of user profiles – built by companies – which contain an individual’s
personal information. The feedback is meaningful for both end-users and
system designers as it provides information on the distribution of an individual’s
personal information and his anonymity level towards service providers. The
approach can inform end-users about which personal information can be
collected by which party. For example, the approach could be used in a
browser plug-in that informs an end-user if conflicts are found between his
personal privacy preference configuration and the disclosure of his personal
information towards a particular type of company, such as advertisers that are
not permitted to collect his name or address. In the context of service design,
the approach can be used in an automated support tool assisting designers with
their decisions. The tool could notify them in case design decisions conflict
with predefined privacy requirements, or could be used for comparing privacy
of different design alternatives.
The privacy analysis approach only considers qualitative aspects of services
at application level and abstracts away protocol specific details of lower
communication layers. For example, the IP or MAC address specific to the
TCP/IP protocol stack are not modeled by default. Nevertheless, they can be
manually added to the model. This enables to model state-of-the-art Internet
services as well as privacy-preserving applications using anonymous network
technologies such as onion routers, e.g. Tor. Furthermore, the privacy analysis
approach takes the user’s trust perceptions into account as those may influence
his behavior when using services.
The contributions in the first part of the dissertation are:
• First contribution. The key concepts that are necessary for capturing
privacy in electronic services are identified. The concepts are part of the
blueprint that is defined for modeling composite services.
• Second contribution. A logic-based framework is defined that supports
automated reasoning about privacy in composite services.
• Third contribution. Multiple query categories are defined that provide
meaningful feedback (i.e. qualitative feedback providing information on
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how the individual’s personal information is distributed across service
providers and the individual’s anonymity level towards service providers)
for both end-users and service designers.
• Fourth contribution. The privacy analysis approach is realized using a
knowledge-base system, i.e. the IDP system.
The second part of the thesis validates the privacy analysis approach presented
in the first thesis part. The contributions are:
• Fifth contribution. The approach is validated by scenarios from different
domains, namely: a travel booking service, a web shop, loyalty program
systems, and a public transport ticketing system. The wide range of
application domains demonstrates the flexibility of the approach.
The third part of the thesis focuses on service provider accountability, which
is a privacy enforcement principle part of the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation that is strongly linked with privacy by design [47]. The systems
considered comprise multiple components which all have their own privacy
policies. Because systems may have many of them, individuals are left oblivious
about the actual data handling practices. The approach in the third part aims
to provide individuals and trusted auditors who conduct privacy assessments
on behalf of individuals with a system-wide panoramic view on guarantees of
declared data handling practices.
The contributions in the third part of the thesis are:
• Sixth contribution. An inference model is realized providing individuals
with global accountability guarantees of multi-component systems. It
maps different user expectations to log evidence of declared data handling
practices.
• Seventh contribution. The approach is validated on a rail-way camera
surveillance infrastructure.
1.2 Outline
The remainder of the present thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2: Background introduces privacy in electronic services. The chapter
gives an overview of technologies that are commonly used in electronic services,
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and discusses the integration of privacy during the design of services. Different
analysis approaches related to privacy are discussed as well as reasoning systems
that can be used to automate privacy analysis. The chapter also motivates the
selection of the reasoning system.
PART I: Inspecting Privacy in Electronic Services
Chapter 3: Modeling Concepts identifies the main concepts that must be
captured in a composite service to enable reasoning on its privacy properties.
The chapter focuses on the blueprint that represents electronic services from a
privacy perspective. The blueprint is applied to a service for booking travels.
Chapter 4: Modeling Approach focuses on a logic-based framework that enables
the automated reasoning about privacy properties of composite electronic
services. It maps the concepts identified in the previous chapter to the
framework components. The framework is realized using the IDP knowledge-
base system and is applied to a web shop scenario.
Chapter 5: Queries and Feedback shows the potential of the logic-based
framework for extracting relevant privacy feedback. The chapter defines
different categories of queries that provide feedback useful (i.e. qualitative
feedback providing information on how the individual’s personal information
is distributed across service providers and the individual’s anonymity level
towards service providers) for both end-users and designers. The queries are
applied to analyze the privacy in two alternative loyalty program schemes.
PART II: Extensions and Validation
Chapter 6: Modeling Ticketing Systems in Public Transport validates the
modeling approach of the previous chapters on a novel privacy-preserving public
transport ticketing system. The chapter identifies additional concepts that are
necessary for modeling the considered ticketing systems.
PART III: Inferring Service Provider Accountability
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Chapter 7: Service Provider Accountability realizes an inference model
providing individuals with global accountability guarantees of multi-component
systems. The feedback provided by this approach is useful for both end-users
and auditors who conduct privacy assessments on behalf of the end-user. The
approach is applied to a camera surveillance scenario.
Chapter 8: General Conclusions reflect on the logic based approach for
inspecting privacy in complex electronic services and give directions for future
research.

Chapter 2
Background
The present chapter’s objective is to situate the subject of this dissertation in
the domain of privacy. The research of this thesis is explicitly positioned to
the related work. The chapter starts by defining basic terminology that is used
throughout the remainder of this text. Section 2.2 gives an overview of different
privacy related technologies used in electronic services. Section 2.3 discusses
the difficulties of the integration of privacy in the design process of services.
Next, different privacy analysis methodologies are categorized and discussed
(see Section 2.4). Section 2.5 gives an overview of different reasoning tools and
motivates the selection of the logic programming system used for the privacy
analysis approach presented in the thesis. The chapter ends with conclusions
(see Section 2.6).
2.1 Preliminaries
This section defines basic terminology that is used throughout the remainder
of this dissertation.
• Authentication [126] is a process whereby a prover and verifier are
involved. Two types of authentication can be distinguished. Entity
authentication is a protocol whereby the prover assures the verifier of
his identity and that he actually participated (i.e. liveliness property) in
the protocol. On the contrary, data authentication includes proving the
origin of the information (i.e. data origin authentication) and proving
that the information is unmodified (i.e. data integrity).
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• Personal information is a set of attributes related to an individual.
The individual’s surname, address, eye color are examples of personal
information.
• Unique identifier is a set of attributes – part of the personal information –
that can be uniquely linked to an individual, but that not necessarily
identifies him. For example, an individual’s user name of his chat account
can uniquely be linked to him, but is not sufficient to identify him.
• Personal identitifable information (PII) is a unique identifier that can be
uniquely linked to an individual and that can be used to identify him.
For example, the individual’s address and name uniquely identify him.
• Personal data is defined in the EU directive 95/46/EC as any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (i.e. data subject).
It can be considered as a synonym for PII, which is used in the US privacy
law.
• The data subject is the individual to whom personal information is linked
to.
• The data controller is the party who determines the purpose and means
of the processing of personal information.
• The data processor is the party that processes personal information on
behalf of the data controller.
• A service provider is a party that offers a service towards individuals. The
service provider can also be data controller or processor.
• Privacy has no unique definition. Gürses [92] describes privacy from the
perspective of three different privacy research paradigms. In the first
paradigm privacy as confidentiality, privacy is considered as avoiding
that an individual’s personal information leaks to the public. The
next paradigm privacy as control refers to privacy as a data subject’s
interest to control his personal information revealed to a service. Finally,
the privacy by practice paradigm defines privacy as the freedom from
unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s own identity [14].
The solutions related to this paradigm make the way how data is collected
and processed transparent. An example are privacy-awareness tools
that provide feedback to individuals to let them understand the privacy
consequences when dealing with services. The privacy analysis approach
presented in this thesis focuses on the privacy as control and privacy by
practice paradigms.
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• Data protection applies to the processing of an individual’s personal
information. Data protection provides an individual rights by imposing
obligations to data controllers for processing an individual’s personal
information. De Hert et al. [62] show that privacy and data protection are
different. They see privacy as a tool for opacity based on human rights
that protects individuals against interference by state and by private
actors, while they see data protection as a tool for transparency built
on pubic law foundations (e.g. the European General Data Protection
Regulations) that is useful between private actors.
• A privacy policy is a declaration of intent of a service provider about his
data handling practices on revealed personal information.
• A framework in this thesis refers to a well organized structure of generic
components that can be used for modeling systems.
• A model is a framework instance that represents a concrete system.
2.2 Technologies
2.2.1 Authentication Technologies
A widely used authentication method is password based authentication. Users
must enter the username of their account and prove they have knowledge
of the associated secret password. However, passwords provide no strong
authentication. More particularly, the user must remember many passwords
as for each service separate accounts are used. As a consequence, users choose
weak passwords that are easy to remember and reuse them for all their service
accounts. The downside of those passwords is that they are easy to guess by
computers and it requires little effort from hackers to capture the accounts of
users.
A more user-friendly authentication scheme is realized by Federated Identity
Management Systems. They delegate authentication to centralized authentica-
tion services provided by identity providers. The scheme reduces the amount
of accounts that must be maintained by users and delegates authentication
to third-parties that are more specialized. OpenID [147], Shibboleth [45] and
OAuth [95] are some well-known examples of federated management systems.
The service providers and identity providers between which mutual trust
relationships exist form a federation. In the federation, a user who wants
to access a service is redirected to the authentication service of the identity
provider. The latter manages his electronic identity that consists of his personal
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attributes. After the user is authenticated, the identity provider forwards the
requested attributes to the service provider after which the user is granted
access to the service. For example, a music web service can redirect the user to
Facebook to which he must authenticate. Subsequently, Facebook can forward
the user’s name, age, location and a list containing his social network friends to
the music service provider. Centralizing authentication implies privacy risks as
a single party, i.e. identity provider, can collect information of all user activities
and build highly accurate profiles of users. As a consequence, an identity
provider must be highly trusted by a user. Furthermore, users have to trust
identity providers that they only forward attributes to service providers that
are strictly necessary.
Public-key credentials are electronic attribute containers linked to the owner
via the public key included in his credential. The credentials are signed,
i.e. certified, with the private key of the issuer. During service authentication
the service verifies: (a) if the user is the credential owner by checking he has
knowledge of the private key associated with the credential’s public key, and
(b) if the credential is authentic by checking the credential’s signature using
the pubic key of the signer. Only those credentials issued by an issuer trusted
by the service provider are accepted by a service. Public-key credentials are
managed by an underlying public-key infrastructure (PKI). A commonly used
PKI is the ITU-T standard X.509, in which X.509 certificates are issued by
a certificate authority (CA). It is a hierarchical structured system based on
the property that trust is transitive. In particular, a CA at a higher level
trusts all CAs below in the hierarchy. A service provider only accepts those
certificates issued by a CA that is a descendant of a trustworthy root CA and
if certificates are not part of a certificate revocation list (CRL). Because CRLs
can grow rapidly, a more feasible way of verifying the status of certificates
is using the online certificate status protocol (OCSP). X.509 certificates are
used in the HTTPS protocol to secure communication between an end-user
and a web service. The protocol realizes two objectives. Firstly, web services
authenticate to end-users by showing their certificates and prove they have
knowledge of the private key associated with the certificate. The user is only
assured that he is communicating with the correct party if he can trust the
root CA of the certificate presented, and if the certificate chain is not revoked.
Secondly, the credential is used to setup a secure communication channel
between the end-user and the web service so that exchanged messages cannot be
intercepted by eavesdroppers. For example, a Belgian citizen can authenticate
to a Belgian governmental web service using his X.509 certificate based
electronic identity card containing his personal information. The governmental
service authenticates to the citizen by presenting its X.509 credential. A
secured session is established between both parties in case their credentials are
successfully validated. Using public-key credentials to authenticate to services
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can lead to privacy implications. All attributes, part of the credential, are
revealed to the service to which the user authenticates. Moreover, user service
transactions are linkable via the credential’s public key, which is a unique
identifier.
Authentication technologies are essential for analyzing privacy in electronic
services as they determine which personal information is revealed towards
services. The privacy analysis approach in the present thesis considers – besides
the personal information that must be revealed for the functionality of services –
also the personal information revealed due to the used authentication technology,
such as the serial number of an X.509 certificate.
2.2.2 Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Privacy policies of service providers merely contain declarations on data
handling practices. They are no guarantee that service providers act according
to what is declared. More personal information may be collected than necessary
due to the technologies used. For example, an individual who must prove his age
using an X.509 certificate based electronic identity card will also reveal his name
and address. Another example are service providers who own two databases,
splitting personal identifiable information from collected service transaction
data. However, for the functionality of the services both databases must link
the data to a unique identifier (i.e. pseudonym) that refers to an individual.
Only, strict access policies to both databases can prevent service providers
from linking transaction data to an individual’s identity. The aforementioned
examples illustrate that a privacy-by-policy approach is only effective if service
providers are well disciplined.
The above-mentioned privacy risks can be mitigated by minimizing the amount
of disclosed personal information of individuals to what strictly is necessary
for the functionality of services. Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) [176]
are cryptographic schemes enabling minimizing data disclosure while still
fulfilling the functional requirements of services in order to prevent unnecessary
processing of personal information of individuals. Different types of PETs exist:
• Anonymity networks are networks technologies that hide the linkable
information typical in commonly deployed protocols such as TCP/IP
network protocols, which exchange IP addresses that often can be linked
to individuals. Onion routers [90], such as TOR [74], are a well known
anonymity network technology. Messages sent in onion networks are
recursively enclosed in multiple encrypted communication layers and are
sent to a recipient via a chain of a priori random chosen intermediate
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network nodes. Other examples of anonymity network technologies are:
mix networks [48, 29, 58], peer-to-peer mix networks [124, 153, 52], and
Crowds [148].
• A commitment [36] is a cryptographic protocol between a prover and
verifier. The prover selects a value and commits to it without revealing
the value to the verifier. Commitments comply with the hiding property,
which implies that the verifier can only learn the committed value after
the prover opens the commitment (i.e. revealing value). The binding
property assures the verifier that the revealed value corresponds to the
originally committed value.
• A Blinded signature [49] is a cryptographic protocol by which a sender
sends a blinded message m to a signer. A drawback is that the signer
cannot be assured whether m exactly contains the desired information as
he cannot learn m. To prevent abuse, Abe et al. [12] introduce partially
blinded signatures, a variation on blinded signatures. In their scheme the
signer includes an unencrypted common validity term info that preserves
the sender’s privacy, and signs message (r,m, info).
• A zero-knowledge proof is a cryptographic protocol [82] by which a prover
convinces a verifier that he has knowledge of a secret x, without revealing
it or any other additional information to the verifier. The proof comprises
a phase in which a proof is built and a verification phase.
• Anonymous credentials are Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC) enable in-
dividuals to authenticate in a privacy-preserving way, while still providing
strong authentication towards service providers. Examples of anonymous
credential technologies are Idemix [44] and U-Prove [139] credential
technologies. Both technologies support individuals to selectively disclose
attributes or proving properties without disclosing the actual attribute
values on which the properties are based. For example, an individual
can prove, using zero-knowledge proofs, he is between twelve and
eighteen years old without revealing his birth date. The issuance of
Idemix and U-Prove credentials cannot be linked to the spending unless
unique attributes are revealed. Furthermore, Idemix credentials enable
unlinkable multiple spending. On the contrary, multiple spending a single
U-Prove credential is always linkable. These credential technologies can
be used in advanced attribute based identity management schemes [16].
ABC4Trust [5, 151] is a EU-funded research project that addresses the federa-
tion and interchangeability of privacy-preserving Attribute-Based Credentials.
An objective of the project is to define a technology agnostic architecture
for attribute-based credential systems making abstraction of the differences
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between different privacy-preserving attribute based credential systems, such
as Idemix and U-Prove. The architecture includes: (a) an issuer which issues
the credentials, (b) a user, (c) a verifier who checks if a user satisfies the access
conditions for the service, (d) a revocation authority who can revoke issued
credentials so that they are disabled, and (e) a trusted inspector (i.e. trusted
authority) who can de-anonymize users in the case misbehavior is detected.
The second objective is to provide an open reference of particular ABC systems,
such as Microsoft’s open source U-prove SDK that is made inter-operable with
the ABC4Trust architecture.
Similarly, IRMA [104] is a project focusing on privacy-preserving attribute-
based credentials inter-operable with the ABC4Trust architecture. The
project’s goal is to develop an experimental framework for attribute-based
credentials using smart cards [181]. The framework is made open source and
is freely available for using it in other applications.
The services under study in this thesis can be mapped to the ABC4Trust
architecture. Issuers trusted by the service provider, i.e. verifier, issue
credentials that a user can use to authenticate to a service. The credentials
can be revoked by a revocation authority or by the service provider himself. The
modeling approach supports the modeling of electronic services using privacy-
enhancing technologies such as the ones considered in ABC4Trust and IRMA.
2.2.3 Privacy Policy Specifications
Privacy policies are often very extensive and for individuals difficult to interpret.
As a result, individuals give their explicit consent to service providers for
processing their personal information without being properly informed about
the data handling practices. The upcoming EU General Data Protection
Regulation addresses this issue by enforcing transparent data handling practices
declared in easily interpretable and unambiguous privacy policies readily
available to individuals. Machine interpretable languages can enable the
automated interpretation of extensive privacy policies. For example, Jafari
et al. [105, 106] present a framework for expressing and enforcing purpose-
based policies. They use a modal logic based language for formally expressing
purpose restrictions. The formal specifications enable machines to enforce
service providers only to collect personal information for the specified purposes.
P3P [182] is a standard format for explicitly expressing high-level privacy
practices of websites that are machine interpretable. This allows browsers –
via an installed plugin [193] – to inform individuals about the practices on
the website and automatically take decisions based on pre-configured privacy
preferences. Like P3P, EPAL [23] is a formal privacy policy specification
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language. It can specify fine-grained enterprise privacy policies, while making
abstraction of the technological details such as the user authentication. Privacy
policies specified with EPAL and P3P can automatically be enforced. EPAL
enables to specify the disclosure of personal information, but unlike P3P it
is not possible to specify its recipients. Overall, both P3P and EPAL lack
expressiveness for high-level company obligations [161].
In contrast to P3P and EPAL, XACML [120] is a declarative XML based
language focusing on the specification of access control specifications of
distributed systems. It is a machine interpretable language enabling the
enforcement of access control specifications. Ardagna et al. [22] propose a
framework for a privacy-preserving attribute based access control system based
on the industry standards XACML and SAML. Access control specifications
of service providers are expressed in an XACML based policy languages and
selected attributes are asserted and transported via SAML to the service
provider. The individual can select the disclosed attributes from a wallet
of credentials he owns. E.g., he can disclose his name from an X.509 based
identity card and his university from his Idemix based student card. Compared
to EPAL, XACML is more comprehensive than EPAL since it is a functional
superset of EPAL [19]. Another example of an access control specification
language is CARL [43], which can be used to enforce privacy-preserving access
control.
In the present thesis, the privacy analysis is performed on models representing
electronic services. The models are extracted from the privacy policy specifi-
cations of the services under study. They describe the personal information
collected and stored by services, and the personal information that services
forward to collaborating entities. Machine interpretable policy languages can
improve the overall quality of the models and privacy analysis as they enable to
automatically generate models from available privacy policies of services.
2.3 Privacy by design
Currently, personal information is a main asset in many business models of
companies. The more data companies collect, the more accurately they can
profile individuals and the more money they can earn by trading it with third-
parties. Data controllers based in a EU member state and data processors
acting on behalf of them will be bound by the upcoming EU General Data
Protection Regulation. Data controllers and processors are enforced to publish
privacy policies compliant with regulations and act accordingly. A key data
protection principle in the EU regulation is privacy by design. The principle
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must ensure that data controllers and processors provide the strongest privacy
protection possible by imposing them to build privacy safeguards into their
services or business operations from the earliest design stage. It should provide
a solution to find a balance between the concerns of individuals and data
controllers and processors. However, privacy by design is barely specified by the
EU’s privacy regulation, and there are challenges that must be addressed before
it can be an effective privacy protection measure [160]. Particularly, building
privacy into systems is not straightforward and cannot be realized by solely
using privacy-enhancing technologies (see Section 2.2.2), but by a combination
of those technologies with a systematic privacy engineering methodology and
governance controls.
From the academic community, a universal privacy by design framework [46]
based on the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP) [175] strives to
establish the strongest privacy protection possible. According to the principles
of which the framework is comprised, systems must have clearly declared
privacy policies available to individuals, and appropriate mechanisms must
be implemented to demonstrate compliance of data handling practices with
declared ones. An individual’s personal information can only be processed
after he gives his explicit consent. The personal information must be
securely collected and maintained throughout its entire life cycle to ensure
confidentiality, and it must be made available to the data subject so that
he can update his collected personal information. The FIPP also aim to
have a systematic privacy methodology in the different stages of the design
process. The design process must respect privacy requirements by including
a conflict resolution strategy for achieving an optimized solution that meets
all requirement types. For example, PETs can realize systems satisfying both
privacy and functional requirements.
The aforementioned framework consists of vague high-level privacy criteria
applying to technologies used, services, architectures of systems and business
operations. The framework neither details concrete technologies and archi-
tectural patterns, nor systematic privacy engineering methodologies. This is
acknowledged in the analysis of Gürses et al. [93]. Moreover, they motivate the
need for the explicit mentioning of data minimization in privacy regulations.
They point out that the loosely defined restrictions on data collection found in
several privacy frameworks lead to different interpretations by data controllers
and processors, and discuss its consequences. For example, data controllers
may define a very small scope of what they consider as personal information
to enlarge the scope of information they are allowed to process. The authors
argue the need for generalizable privacy by design engineering methodologies
based on data minimization. However, limited expertise about privacy by
design methodologies exists. They propose a methodology comprising different
18 BACKGROUND
activities. Each design of a system starts with an analysis of the functional
requirements, in which functionality must be precisely defined to constrain the
tendency of engineers to collect more personal information than required. The
remaining activities – which can be performed in any order – are:
• Data minimization. Designers must check if the set of collected data can
further be reduced and must evaluate if appropriate technologies, such as
privacy-enhancing technologies, can help to realize this.
• Modeling attackers, threats and risks. Possible attacker types (e.g. a
curious third-party), types of attacks ()e.g. linking sensitive health
information to individuals), and the impact of a successful attack.
• Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis. Designers must analyze and
resolve possible conflicts between security and privacy measures. The
conflict resolution strategy may imply the re-iteration of the functional
and multilateral security requirements analysis.
• Implementation and testing. The systems must be implemented and
evaluated whether all requirements are satisfied.
The aforementioned methodology clearly shows that privacy by design en-
gineering is not trivial as it requires designers have knowledge of different
domains. For example, designers must have knowledge of complex privacy-
enhancing technologies, privacy engineering and privacy law. The above
methodology is not complete, it only presents the activities that are essential
in any privacy by design approach. However, the method is too high-level
for designers since it does not inform them about the means for conducting
the actual design activities. Methodologies hiding lower-level details can assist
designers who have no experience with privacy related aspects throughout the
privacy by design process. For example, PriMan [145] is a technology agnostic
development framework that facilitates the integration of privacy-preserving
technologies into applications. Technology-specific configurations are specified
in configuration policies separated from the application’s source code. In this
way, domain experts can specify technology-specific details independently from
developers who only must focus on the functionality. Another example is a
pattern language for privacy-enhancing technologies [94] that can assist non-
experienced system designers with selecting the privacy-enhancing technology
that satisfies privacy and functional requirements. Hoepman [98] argues that
design patterns are too specific and not useful when the first concepts of a
system are designed. He derives eight privacy design strategies and relates
them to existing design patterns – covering aspects fundamental to privacy
protection – supporting privacy by design throughout the full software design
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life cycle even at the beginning when concepts must be developed. The
strategies are: (a) minimize the amount of collected data to what is strictly
necessary, (b) hide data and the relationships with individuals from plain view,
(c) separate the processed data into different unlinkable compartments, (d)
aggregate data to the highest aggregation level possible such that it is still
useful when processing it, (e) inform individuals when processing their data,
(f) give individuals control over the personal information that can be processed,
(g) data handling practices respecting an individual’s privacy should be enforced
by a privacy policy compliant with regulations, (f) demonstrate compliance of
data handling practices with privacy policies and regulation by implementing
mechanisms such as using logs and performing audits.
To ensure that data controllers and processors correctly implement privacy
safeguards into their services or business operations, the European Union
Agency for Network in Information Security [59] (ENISA) recommends policy
makers to support privacy engineering research and that tools should be
provided which assist system designers. Furthermore, policy makers should
promote privacy and data protection in their norms and standardization bodies
should include privacy in their standardization process and provide inter-
operability standards of privacy features. For example, ISO/IEC 29100 [7]
is an international high-level privacy standard framework that supports data
controllers and processors with defining their privacy requirements. The
framework refers to known privacy protection principles, such as consent and
choice, data collection limitations, and data minimization, and also defines a
common privacy terminology and the actors and roles in processing personal
information. The standard is complementary to the data protection regulations,
such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation. ENDORSE [6] is a
EU funded research project creating a legal technical framework to guarantee
privacy and protection during data processing. The project defines a privacy
rule specification language for data access and management in digital systems.
A tool set is created guaranteeing data controllers/processors and individuals
that the processing of personal information complies with law. ENDORSE
also defines a certification methodology for data controllers and processors to
increase the trustworthiness of services towards individuals. Typically, data
controllers or processors can obtain a privacy seal, i.e. a certificate, asserting
they act according their privacy policies and the imposed data protection
regulation. Seals are issued by an external company after having conducted
a successful privacy assessment. According to this scheme, the end-user is
guaranteed by the certification company that his privacy is well protected by
the data controller and processor. However, the privacy seal scheme is only
useful if the certification company is trusted by the end-user. In reality, a wide
variety of privacy seals exist and are often commercially driven. According to
the EU Privacy Seals Project [150] this is disadvantageous for the legitimacy
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of such schemes. For instance, TRUSTe [3] and Comodo Secure [1] are clearly
commercially driven. Also, certification companies are not always transparent
about the criteria they evaluate for issuing privacy seals. Moreover, there is no
uniformity between the criteria of different brands of privacy seals. Hence, a
European-wide transparent certification scheme is essential to be effective.
Some companies, such as HP, already included privacy in their data handling
processes. Their semi-automated decision support tool [141] assists their
employees, who process an individual’s personal information, step-by-step
through a privacy related template questionnaire based on an underlying
flowchart. The tool focuses on business operations rather than on the design of
applications. Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle [127] (SDL) considers
privacy as a security objective, i.e. data confidentiality throughout the complete
development process of applications. SDL does not only focus on the technical
development aspects, it also addresses project management aspects. A maturity
model assigns companies a maturity level – ranging from basic to expert –
according to their expertise. The maturity model lets companies gradually
adopt the complete SDL approach. SDL also defines roles to members of the
development team. For example, the privacy advisor and privacy champion are
responsible for privacy related aspects of the application under development.
To guarantee privacy quality in development systems, the methodology includes
privacy quality thresholds, which are upper-boundaries for the number of
privacy related bugs. Finally, a privacy risk assessment assigns a risk level
to detected privacy vulnerabilities to prioritize them.
The privacy analysis modeling approach proposed in the present thesis can
provide computer-aided assistance to service designers who lack expertise of
privacy-enhancing technologies and privacy regulations. The modeling approach
models high-level privacy properties of different authentication technologies
(e.g. selective attribute disclosure), and collaborations between different entities
that are involved in the modeled service. Moreover, generic models representing
privacy policies can be made available to service designers. The modeling
approach enables designers to automatically check if design decisions conflict
with privacy requirements without requiring expert knowledge from the designer.
2.4 Methodologies
Multiple approaches have been proposed to analyze privacy related properties.
The present section gives an overview of existing methodologies and positions
the approach of this thesis to them. First a global overview of all the approaches
METHODOLOGIES 21
is given and their purposes are briefly discussed. An in-depth discussion follows
in the remainder of this section.
Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the global methodologies for analyzing privacy.
They are categorized into privacy requirement engineering, quantitative and
qualitative methodologies. Requirements engineering approaches are well-
structured methods focusing on extracting privacy requirements at system
level. They can be categorized into security oriented approaches in which
privacy is one of the security objectives, and in purely privacy oriented
approaches. Quantitative privacy analysis methods are based on metrics
enabling to quantify privacy. They result in values indicating the level of
privacy in the analyzed system. For example, they measure the degree
of anonymity of individuals sending messages via an anonymity network.
The resulting measurements can be used to compare privacy in alternative
systems and to order systems according to their level of privacy they provide.
Qualitative approaches provide feedback about qualitative privacy properties
of systems. E.g., they provide feedback about the anonymity level of a user in
terms of anonymity, pseudonymity, and identifiability. The objectives of each
qualitative approach vary. For example, approaches may analyze privacy at
system, application or protocol level; or they focus on detecting conflicts in
privacy policies. Formal methods are popular methods used in qualitative
approaches. For example, the approach presented in this thesis extracts
qualitative privacy properties from logic based models representing the system
under inspection. The remainder of this section discusses each of the privacy
analysis methodologies in more detail.
Privacy requirements engineering. The following approaches assist system
or software engineers with defining and maintaining privacy requirements of
systems. The approaches are well-structured methodologies to extract privacy
related requirements from systems. Different methods/frameworks exist for
deriving privacy requirements.
STRIDE [100] is a Microsoft security threat modeling approach, in which
privacy in terms of data confidentiality is one of the security objectives. A data
flow diagram of the considered system is built, representing how information
enters the system and how it propagates. Security threats are manually derived
from the data flow diagram. The identified threats are then assigned a severity
and priority level using DREAD, Microsoft risk rating model. Appropriate
security and privacy measures are implemented to mitigate the threats.
The CORAS method [121] is another popular approach. It is an intuitive
graphical security oriented threat and risk modeling approach based on UML.
Similar to STRIDE, it focuses on information confidentiality as one of the
2
2
B
A
C
K
G
R
O
U
N
D
	R equirement	Engineering
	Quantave	Privacy	Analysis
	Qualitave	Privacy	Analysis
	Modeling	threats	using:	
				-	Use	cases,	
				-	Misuse	cases,	
				-	Aack	trees
Privacy	is	considered	as	a	
security	objecve
Privacy	oriented
Formal	methods	for	the	veriﬁcaon	of:
				-	Regulatory/Corporate	level	policies
				-	Privacy	policies	at	system	level
				-	Privacy	policies	at	the	level	of	programming	code
													=	Policy-agnosc	programmming
Graphical	formalisms:	
											E.g.	Designing	controlled	ananoymous	applicaons	
Formal	methods	for	analyzing	
privacy	at	system/applicaon	level
Formal	methods	for	analyzing	
privacy	at	protocol	level
Privacy Analysis 
Methodologies System	level
Anonymity	networks
							-	Anonymity	sets
							-	Informaon	theorec	Approaches
															E.g.	Shannon entropy
Relaonal	databases:
			-	k-anonimity,	l-diversity, t-closeness	
Stascal	databases:
			-	Diﬀerenal	privacy									
The	approach	presented	in	this	dissertaon										
F
ig
u
re
2
.1
:
O
v
erv
iew
o
f
th
e
p
riva
cy
a
n
a
ly
sis
m
eth
o
d
o
lo
g
ies.
METHODOLOGIES 23
security objectives. A tool supports documenting the results in UML based
CORAS diagrams. Threat scenarios are identified and documented in threat
diagrams used during the threat risk assessment.
Sindre et al. [159] introduce misuse cases – i.e. use cases describing misuse – to
derive security requirements of systems. Their requirements process is a cyclic
process. First, they identify the critical assets in a system. Security goals are
then defined for each asset. Threats associated with the goals are identified
and described using misuse cases. A risk level is assigned to the threats, and
security requirements are defined taking into account risk and cost for each
threat. Deng et al. [71] present a privacy threat analysis framework for the
elicitation and fulfillment of privacy requirements. They also use misuse cases
but with a larger focus on privacy requirements, while in the former, privacy
is less prominent and considered as one of the security objectives. Similar to
STRIDE, they use a data flow oriented model to identify the privacy threats in
the system under consideration. Misuse cases are then identified for the threats,
followed by a risk assessment to prioritize threats. Based on the assigned
priority, privacy requirements are elicited. Finally, the analyst can select the
appropriate PET via a taxonomy mapping privacy objectives to PETs. Wuyts
et al. [189, 190] conducted an empirical study of the approach and conclude
that the threat analysis framework can be useful for requirements engineering
and architectural design.
Attack trees [154] are another strategy for modeling privacy and security
threats on system. The root node of the tree is the goal of the attacks. The
latter are represented by the leaf nodes. Different values can be assigned to
the nodes of attack trees and facilitate estimating the likelihood an attack
occurs or the cost to perform a particular attack or prevent it. Misuse cases,
instead, are better suited to represent threats at application level and can
easily be combined with use cases showing the interactions between a user
and the system. Attack trees only show the attack paths on systems and are
user-agnostic. An experimental comparison [137] shows that attack trees are
considerably more effective than misuse cases for identifying possible threats
in systems. The results are confirmed by Karpati et al. [110] who compared
attack trees and misuse cases in an industrial setting, but they additionally
conclude that both approaches are complementary because both approaches
detect different types of threats. Hence, both can be combined. The idea
of combining attack trees and misuse cases in a single approach is exploited
by [165, 168].
The requirements analysis methods are mainly manually conducted processes.
Beckers et al. [27] propose computer aided privacy threat elicitation which
supports privacy analysts during the requirements analysis of software systems.
The approach uses problem frames [103] to capture stakeholders, technology,
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and the personal information in the designed system. Problem frames are
a requirements engineering technique defining problem classes. They help
to analyze system requirements by decomposing systems in easier to handle
subproblems. Faßbender et al. [80] provide tool-support – based on problem
frames as well – to transform functional requirements into legal identification
pattern instances [28] that can be used to derive software requirements and
implementation specifications using a structured method [79].
The privacy analysis approach in the present thesis does not provide a structured
way to elicit privacy requirements in systems. It merely provides an automated
reasoning tool capable of verifying if a modeled electronic system complies with
pre-identified privacy requirements. Hence, the privacy analysis approach in
the thesis is complementary to privacy engineering approaches. In particular,
privacy requirements elicited by privacy requirements engineering approaches
are the input for the privacy requirement compliance verification.
Quantifying privacy. Quantitative privacy analysis methods consider privacy
metrics measuring an individual’s degree of anonymity [148] that provides a
continuum between complete anonymity and identifiability towards an attacker.
If the measurement of the modeled system exceeds a threshold, individuals can
be considered sufficiently identifiable.
Díaz et al. [73] propose an information theoretic approach considering a set of
possible (honest) senders of a message, i.e. the anonymity set [143]. They
determine a sender’s degree of anonymity towards an attacker. In their
approach, the attacker is an observer who assigns a probability of being the
sender of a message to each individual in the anonymity set. The degree of
anonymity is a metric based on the Shannon entropy [157], an information
theoretic concept representing the amount of information bits contained in a
message (i.e. a message can be represented by n bits). The above-mentioned
approach addresses the unrealistic assumption made in the approaches of Reiter
et al. [148] and Berthold et al. [30]. The former measures the degree of
anonymity of Crowd members submitting requests to a web server. Attackers
assign a probability pf to a Crowd member being the originator of a message.
However, the degree of anonymity 1 − pf does not distinguish one member
from other members. The latter approach, defines the degree of anonymity as
d = log2(N). The metric corresponds to the maximum Shannon entropy that
only depends on the size N of the anonymity set. It assumes that all users have
equal probabilities of being a message’s sender. The approach is inaccurate
because most realistic systems have users sending messages more frequently
than others. The inequalities between probabilities is addressed by Díaz et al.
defining a normalized comparison between Shannon entropy and the maximum
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entropy. Serjantov et al. [156] show the problems related to anonymity sets.
They argue that the size of the anonymity set is not an adequate indicator
because of the unequal probability distribution of sending a message over the
users in the anonymity set. Their approach is similar to [73], but they consider
both senders and recipients of a message. Instead of considering an anonymity
set, they use a probability distribution over the set of users being the sender
or recipient of a message. Similar to [73], their metric is based on the Shannon
entropy expressing how many additional information bits an attacker needs to
identify a user as being a sender or a recipient. More recently, Almasizadeh
et al. [15] define mean privacy, a security metric quantifying the amount of
private information leaking to an attacker expressed in units of information
bits, i.e. Shannon entropy. They claim their metric is a good indicator for the
security of a computer system. The lower the value of the indicator the safer a
computer system is. They assign a discrete mass probability distribution to an
attack tree representing all feasible attacks on a computer system. Although it
is a security metric, it can be applied to determine privacy of systems based on
requirement engineering approaches use attack trees. The approach assumes
that a probability can be assigned to each node of the attack tree. However,
it is unclear how in practice probabilities must be assigned. Tóth et al. [169]
show the shortcomings of metrics based on Shannon entropy. They illustrate
this by means of two different probability distributions – considering a Shannon
entropy based metric – having the same degree of anonymity. However, both
probability distributions provide different anonymity. They propose a local
anonymity metric based on min-entropy and max-entropy.
The following metrics focus on privacy in databases. Sets of attributes
exhibiting k-anonymity [162] map to at least k entities. The autors of [122]
define l-diversity. A dataset has l-diversity if all groups of attribute sets have
at least l well-represented values for the sensitive attribute. The novel privacy
criterion is resistant to two attacks causing k-anonymized datasets leaking
sensitive information about individuals. In case of the homogeneity attack,
datasets can leak an individual’s sensitive attributes when they lack diversity.
An attacker can have background knowledge about a particular individual,
which helps him to reduce the set of possible data records. Li et al. [119]
claim that l-diversity is difficult and unnecessary to achieve. Moreover, it is
insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure. They define t-closeness, a stronger
privacy criterion. A group of attribute sets have t-closeness if the distance
between the distribution of a sensitive attribute and the distribution of the
attribute in the whole dataset is no more than a threshold t. The dataset has t-
closeness if all groups of attribute sets have t-closeness. Differential privacy [76]
is used in the context of statistical databases. Statistical operations on data
sets that differ only by one element are considered ǫ-differential private if their
outcome shows no significant difference . The objective is to have accurate
26 BACKGROUND
operations, while leaking minimal personal information of individuals.
The aforementioned metrics are not generic as they are designed for specific
PETs. A more generic information theoretic framework for privacy-preserving
systems [146] defines attacker’s estimation error, a privacy metric representing
the estimation error of an attacker who aims to disclose privacy information
that should remain concealed in the system under analysis. The metric relates
the metrics used in the above-mentioned quantitative approaches, i.e. they can
be considered as particular instances of the attacker’s estimation error.
Danezis [57] acknowledges that qualitative approaches, in which metrics are a
summary of the inference of an attacker, have shortcomings [163]. He states
that analysis must take into account that in many cases it is hard to compute
the likelihood function representing the adversary’s observation due to noise
in the system. Hence, the analysis must assume that adversaries can trivially
retrieve all unprotected data, such as timing correlation information [131] of
Tor networks.
Unlike quantitative approaches, the approach in the present thesis does not
summarize privacy in a system by means of a single value. Nevertheless,
the approach is complementary to the above presented approaches, and both
types of approaches can perfectly be combined. More specifically, the outcome
of quantitative approaches can provide statistical information representing the
uniqueness of attribute sets. The approach in this thesis can mark these
sets as identifiable sets that can sufficiently identify an individual. E.g. the
identifiable attribute set sufficiently identifies individuals if it exhibits k-
anonymity, whereby k falls below a threshold where individuals are considered
(sufficiently) identifiable.
Qualitative privacy analysis. Quantitative privacy analysis approaches result
in numeric values expressing the individual’s privacy level in a system. The
quantitative approaches considered above only provide feedback on one specific
privacy aspect, such as an individual’s degree of anonymity. An order can be
defined between different systems w.r.t. the privacy friendliness based on the
resulting numeric values. In contrast to quantitative approaches, qualitative
privacy analyses provide feedback that cannot be expressed by a numeric value.
The feedback from qualitative approaches is broader than from quantitative
approaches. Depending on the goals of the qualitative approaches, different
types of feedback can be provided. For example, approaches may provide
qualitative feedback on the compliance of a service’s data handling practices
with regulations. Other approaches, may focus on feedback expressing an
individual’s privacy in terms of linkabilities to unique identifiers. A brief
overview of different qualitative privacy analysis approaches is given below.
METHODOLOGIES 27
The research community identifies and recognizes the complexity of reasoning
about privacy policies and correctly implementing them. Policy-agnostic
programming [24] is a method enabling programmers to separate functional
program code from privacy policy specifications. The programming model
shifts the responsibility for ensuring compliance with privacy policies from the
programmer to the programming system. The principle is used in the Jeeves
language [191], a functional constraint language. Costanzo et al. [56] present
an approach based on the same principle. They use a separation logic for
enforcing declarative information flow control policies based on Hoare logic [97]
enabling reasoning on programs specified in imperative languages like C. In
case of composite web services, compliance with privacy policies is even more
complex. Breaux et al. [38] illustrate this with a real-world Facebook-app
that forwards data to a third-party advertiser who provides personalized in-
app advertisements. They show the complex privacy conflicts that arise due
to the privacy policies of each individual organization. They have mapped
the privacy policies in human language to formal specifications in description
logic [37]. The formal model, which describes privacy requirements and data
flows in the system – allows to automatically detect conflicts between privacy
policies claimed by individual organizations. Moreover, privacy law frameworks,
such as the EU General Data Protection Regulations, may constrain data
practices applied by organizations. Conflicts may arise between corporate level
service policies and the ones imposed by legislation. To detect conflicts, formal
methods [25, 72] can be used in which legislative rules are expressed using first-
order logic supporting temporal modalities, enabling the automated compliance
verification between data handling practices and legislative privacy frameworks,
such as HIPAA [4]. Tschantz et al. [172] present a formal approach to reason
about the acceptability of data collection. More specifically, they inspect if
personal information that is collected, stored and/or (eventually) distributed
really serves certain goals. E.g. they verify whether data that is collected by
a doctor really serves the patient’s treatment. A generic formal framework for
specifying privacy policies for social networks is presented by Pardo et al. [140].
They aim to provide individuals a means to define their own privacy policies,
and guarantee that their privacy preferences are respected.
Formal protocol models, such as the ones based on process algebras as the
applied π-calculus, can deliver communication level data that is released by
communicating entities. For example, IP addresses, session identifiers and
possibly cookies are exchanged in many communication protocols. Formal
verification tools as ProVerif [31], supporting the applied π-calculus, automate
the formal verification of privacy-preserving protocols. Recent work applies
formal methods for the verification of a privacy-preserving e-voting system [55,
54], e-auction system [75] or a protocol for electric vehicle charging [81].
Veningen et al. [178] present a deductive system to analyze privacy at the
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protocol level. They represent data in a three-layer model that includes the
messages exchanged, their content, and their context. The approach allows for
a very detailed analysis.
The design of systems is complex as designers have to consider requirements
from multiple disciplines. They must not only design systems providing
the functionality required, but also must ensure that systems comply with
privacy requirements. As a consequence, they must have expert-knowledge
of aspects from different disciplines. Computer-aided support tools assisting
designers with their design choices are necessary to improve the overall quality
of systems. The logic based framework [114] focuses, similar to PETs, on the
data minimization principle, and reasons about the impact of architectural
design choices on the privacy in advanced decentralized services comprising
non-trusted stakeholders. The approach presented by Antignac et al. [21, 20]
also focus on the architectural level and motivates the need for reasoning tools
relying on formal models for the adoption of PETs by industry. They suggest
the use of epistemic logic based models addressing conflicts between privacy
requirements and other types of requirements. Naessens et al. [132] present a
multi-paradigm methodology for designing controlled anonymous applications.
The methodology not only takes the privacy concerns of the user into account,
but also the concerns of other stakeholders, such as accountability and the
personalization of services. The methodology allows to express anonymity and
control requirements at a very high abstraction level. Anonymity properties
can be derived from a conceptual model. Their approach also supports the
semi-automatic selection of PETs to realize the objectives. Finally, strategies
for resolving requirement conflicts are proposed as well. Generally, modeling
approaches solely analyze privacy at protocol level or at system level, but not on
both levels. Thong et al [164] bridges this by presenting a process algebra based
modeling approach capable of verifying the compliance of privacy architecture
objectives expressed at high-level and privacy properties of the architecture’s
underlying protocols and PETs.
The current thesis presents a first-order logic based modeling approach providing
qualitative privacy feedback of composite electronic services involving different
stakeholders. More specifically, the approach analyzes the privacy at system
level by computing profiles containing personal information that can be built
by service providers. The approach builds profiles of personal information
that is collected via different types of authentication technologies, such as
Idemix credentials or X.509 certificates. The approach is capable of providing
automated feedback about the privacy consequences of design decisions, the
consistence of individual privacy policies of service providers involved in the
service under consideration, and the impact on the privacy of individuals who
use a particular service. Since models are expressed in a first-order based logic,
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the approach is only partially capable of expressing rules of privacy regulation
frameworks, such as HIPAA. Expressing such rules requires logics that fully
support temporal modalities, e.g. computation tree logic (CTL) where time is
branched.
2.5 Logic Programming Tools
The present section discusses different types of tools automating the reasoning
on logic program (i.e. logic programming tools). A tool is selected suited for
the realization of the privacy analysis approach presented in this thesis. This
section starts by enumerating the requirements for the reasoning tool, followed
by a global comparison between different types of reasoning tools. Next, the
selected reasoning tool is introduces and a motivation for it is given. The
section ends with a more detailed discussion of different types of reasoning
tools.
A key objective of the modeling approach is to assist non-experts with the
modeling of complex electronic services. The selected reasoning tool must meet
the following requirements:
• (P1.) A formal representation language is preferable. Particularly, the
language concepts and semantics should be derived from mathematics.
First-order logic is an examples of a formal language.
• (P2.) It must support a representation language that is fully declarative
and intuitive. Most programmers are familiar with procedural languages
like Java and C++. Programs describe how a solution is computed.
In contrast to procedural languages, declarative languages specify the
(partial) knowledge about a solution, i.e. rules and known facts related
to a solution, rather than how the solution is calculated. Declarative
systems use particular inference techniques to automatically search for
the solution(s) satisfying the modeled knowledge.
• (P3.) The modeling language must be expressive to specify data flows and
relations in multi-component services. For example, a relation is required
to express that a service is provided by a particular service provider, and
that data is forwarded by one service to another.
• (P4.) The modeling language must be capable of expressing the transitive
closure since it is a property of service invocations. A service invoked by
a user causes the automated invocation of a sequence of sub-services. As
a consequence, the user indirectly invokes a chain of sub-services.
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• (P5.) The modeling system must be capable of handling incomplete
knowledge. For example, a designer must analyze if collaborations be-
tween service providers make individuals identifiable. Two configurations
can be considered for collaborations. Collaborations may be given and
the designer of electronic services must just verify if an individual is
identifiable. In the other case, the designer must search for avoidable
collaborations that make an individual identifiable. The modeling system
must be capable of flexible knowledge configurations.
• (P6.) The modeling approach can be applied on different types of services
from different domains. Hence, the language must support modular
modeling. For example, different modules are used for different inferences.
• (P7.) The selected modeling system must compute solutions within
reasonable time. It is not required to have the most efficient solver.
Table 2.1 gives a global overview of different types of reasoning tools and
shows their properties. It can be concluded from this table that IDP meets
the aforementioned requirements. Hence, IDP is selected for the realization of
the privacy analysis approach presented in this thesis.
Table 2.1: Overview of reasoning tools
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
IDP X X X X X X ±
Prolog X X X +
Answer set programming X X X X ±
Operations research X X +
Constraint programming X X X ±
Mathematical modeling X X X X +
IDP. [11, 185] is a state-of-the-art knowledge base system [64]. It is a
declarative logic programming system focusing on the intuitive representation
of knowledge. It uses the FO(.) language. FO(.) is a formal representation
language extending first-order logic (FO) with types, partial functions,
aggregates, and inductive definitions [69] (see Appendix A) under the well-
founded semantics [177]. Under this semantics, incomplete knowledge is
supported. More specific, literals about which no information is available
are assigned a value unknown. A program in the IDP language comprises
three parts: (a) a vocabulary containing the symbols to model systems, (b) a
theory expressed over the vocabulary containing the set of constraint rules and
inductive definitions and (c) a three-valued structure (true, false, uncertain)
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over the vocabulary which is the partial assignment, i.e. interpretation, of the
elements and relations of the vocabulary. The IDP system provides different
inferences to find models that satisfy the theory. The IDP inference used for the
modeling approach of the present thesis is (optimal) model expansion. Given a
partial assignment (i.e. an input model containing given facts), find a complete
(optimal) assignment (i.e. the resulting output model) so that all expressed
constraints and definitions hold. In the remainder of the thesis the input
model and output model will refer to the structure and the resulting complete
assignment of the inference respectively.
The remainder of this sections gives a more detailed discussion about different
types of logic programming tools.
Prolog. Prolog is a partially declarative logic programming system. Only
programs containing solely a set of Horn clauses – a disjunction of at most
one positive literal – are interpreted purely declarative. The property that
the resolvent of two Horn clauses is a Horn clause as well is part of Prolog’s
inference for efficiently finding a model satisfying the program. However,
Horn clauses have limited expressiveness and are inadequate to express all
properties of electronic services considered in the thesis. For example, they
cannot express the transitivity rule of an order relation required to model the
invocation of a service as a consequence of previously invoked services. As
a consequence, the non-declarative language part of Prolog is necessary, such
as recursive definitions required to express the transitivity the property of an
order relation. Recursive definitions comprise a set of rules that possibly refer to
themselves. However, the order in which they appear in the definition influences
the computation in Prolog. Consequently, the modeler must not only focus on
the semantics, but also on the computational aspects. Prolog also provides
negations and evaluates them using negation as failure (NAF) [51], inferring
the negation ¬p from the failure to prove p, but this is semantically different
from the concept negation as known in classic logic. Overall, Prolog is less
suitable for a modeling approach in which the declarative modeling paradigm
is essential.
Answer set programming. Examples of ASP systems are Clingo [86] and
DLV [117]. Unlike Prolog, answer set programming (ASP) is a fully declarative
logic programming paradigm under the stable-model semantics [87]. Stable-
model semantics provide a declarative semantics for negation as failure and
addresses the difference between the truth tables of the negations from
classic logic and Prolog. However, the aforementioned negation as failure
interpretation is insufficient in case of incomplete knowledge. In particular,
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a negative literal ¬p is assigned true if no information about p is available.
To support incomplete knowledge, the standard ASP language [41] is enriched
with strong negation [88], i.e. ¬p is true if p is false. The ASP language is
expressive and like the IDP language it supports both constraints and inductive
definitions [70]. However, IDP supports complex nested first-order formulas,
which are not supported in many ASP systems. Furthermore, ASP systems
are not intuitive as they expect that modelers bear in mind how the ASP
solver handles programs, which is less the case when modeling with IDP. ASP
systems may support modular logic programs. For example, Clingo supports
reusable parameterized subprograms . Benchmark results [61] from the ASP
competition 2013 [17] show that IDP’s efficiency is competitive compared to
the best ASP systems. The choice to use the IDP system rather than ASP
systems is motivated by the fact that IDP has mathematical language aspects
and semantics, such as set-theory, classic logic and inductive definitions. ASP
systems on the contrary, have language concepts – such as negation as failure
and strong negation – originating from the field of commonsense knowledge
representation and non-monotonic reasoning.
Operations research. The field of operations research (OR) includes different
domains of problems. For example, improving the fleet utilization of
carriers [116] to reduce the fuel costs in times of rising fuel charges is important.
Nurse rostering problems [50] are another well known example in which
hospitals must produce duty rosters for nurses. Different powerful analytical
techniques derived from numerical mathematics can be applied to OR problems,
such as linear programming models [60], integer programming models [186] and
discrete time Markov chain models [135]. The performance of OR systems, such
as CPLEX [9], in which linear arithmetics are used are generally superior to
the IDP system, but is worse in case of boolean related problems. Modeling
using OR systems is time-consuming and complex. Moreover, they have no
support for inductive definitions. Consequently, each inductive definition must
be manually constructed. Considering the complexity of using OR systems,
they are not preferable.
Constraint programming. An example of a system for constraint program-
ming (CP) is Minizinc [134], which supports a very expressive language and
has a powerful solver. CP systems are based on mathematical concepts and
overlap with FO(.) used by IDP. However, there are no CP systems that
support inductive definitions, making CP systems unsuitable for the modeling
approach of the present thesis. An additional disadvantage is that CP languages
include concepts which imply that a theory of a problem in a particular context
cannot be reused in another context. More specifically, a theory containing an
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array of known inputs cannot be reused in another context where the input
is unknown. Similar techniques as in the IDP solver are used by the CP
solvers. Compared to other MiniZinc solvers, IDP performed the best on
different constraint satisfaction problems [18, 61].
Mathematical modeling. Principles from mathematics, such as set theory,
form the base of Z [187], B [113], Event-B [13], Alloy [101], and TLA+ [112, 111].
The aforementioned languages are used for formally modeling dynamic systems.
Some languages, such as B and Z support higher-order structures and quan-
tifications, whereas Alloy only supports first-order structures. Furthermore,
the B language enables the automated generation of program code, while Z is
useful in case of large system specifications [102]. Related modeling systems
are ProB [118], Alloy analyzer [101], and TLA+. They focus on the formal
verification of dynamic systems rather than solving problems. The technologies
used by mathematical modeling systems varies. For example, ProB is based
on constraint logic programming, while Alloy uses SAT solver technology.
Although some languages support higher order logics (e.g. ProB), they have no
support for inductive definitions which is required for the modeling approach
of the present thesis. IDP is conceptually closely related with mathematical
modeling systems as it uses a logic based language as well.
2.6 Conclusions
The present chapter identified issues related to including privacy safeguards in
the design process. Privacy regulations imply to integrate privacy safeguards
into the complete design process from the earliest stage. However, they do
not describe how this can be realized. Methodologies that can be used for the
analysis and integration of privacy in the design process are discussed. The
privacy analysis approach presented in this thesis is compared to them. The
chapter also studied different reasoning tools that can be used for automating
the privacy analysis, and motivates the selection of the IDP reasoning tool for
the realization of the privacy analysis approach presented in this thesis.

Part I
Inspecting Privacy in
Electronic Services
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Chapter 3
Modeling Concepts
Electronic services evolved from straightforward interactions between a user
and a service provider, to complex electronic services in which multiple
stakeholders collaborate. Individuals typically interact with these services via
a front-end. Underlying services are often activated in order to perform specific
tasks. For instance, multiple services possibly administered by different service
providers are activated when a user purchases an item in a web shop. The
shop handles the purchase request, whereas an external payment provider is
involved to complete the financial transaction. A postal delivery operator can
deliver the items at the customer’s home. Service providers can collect a lot
of personal information during a transaction, and consequently release that
data to other – possibly untrusted – entities. The latter can use these data to
profile individuals, which are often unaware of the data handling practices after
service consumption. Although only the personal data really required to handle
the initial service request should be released, often much more information
is collected. First, usually much more information than strictly necessary is
disclosed during authentication. For instance, certain services may only be
accessed by adults. The service provider can specify in its access control policy
that the user’s birth date must be proven before he can consume the particular
service. This can be enforced by an authentication procedure using an eID
certificate which contains the user’s birth date. However, in case of an X.509
certificate, all attributes that are included in the certificate are also released,
and provably linked to the user. Moreover, due to uniquely linkable information
kept in the certificate, such as the serial number, all transactions that are
performed with the same certificate can be linked as well. It should be noted
that the user has no impact on the data processing practices once those data
are released. This implies that service providers can collaborate to build huge
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profiles, and use these profiles to possibly discriminate some of them. For
instance, insurance companies can impose a higher fee to rich people or refuse
an insurance based on collected health information.
Contributions. The present chapter identifies key information of a composite
web service that is necessary to allow for reasoning about its privacy properties.
It focuses on a blueprint for representing composite web services from a privacy
perspective. This includes the identification of different types of stakeholders
and interactions between them, as well as the underlying reasons that lead to
personal data release, spreading and linking in composite web services. It is
noteworthy to signal that the blueprint allows to capture coarse-grained trust
relations between entities in the system. Moreover, the blueprint focuses on
three categories of relevant privacy feedback that can be given to designers and
end-users when that key information is available. The blueprint is applied to a
composite travel agency to demonstrate this. The case study also shows that
solving complex queries manually is no sinecure. An automated approach is
undoubtedly less error-prone and less time-consuming compared to an ad hoc
analysis. The framework that supports automatic reasoning on the collected
inputs will be discussed in chapter 4 and 5, and will be validated in chapter 6.
The work in this chapter is peer-reviewed and published in [67].
The remainder of the present chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1
gives a general overview of key concepts that must be captured in order to
enable privacy inspection. Useful privacy feedback is classified according to
three categories in Section 3.2. Basic concepts and terminology are defined in
Section 3.3. Section 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 focus in more detail on certain aspects.
First, the impact of authentication technologies and service provider policies
on the user’s privacy is handled. Second, the impact of trust perceptions on
the privacy analysis is described. Section 3.7 applies the concepts to a travel
agency. Finally, we reflect about the conceptual blueprint and draw conclusions
in Section 3.8 and 3.9 respectively.
3.1 General Overview of the Conceptual Service
Model
Figure 3.1 depicts the key concepts that models composite services. The models
include two types of stakeholders. In particular, the user who interacts with the
system and a set of organizations. An organization can be a credential issuer
and/or a service provider. A service provider offers one or more services that
can be consumed by individuals, possibly after disclosing personal information.
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Figure 3.1: Modeling electronic services.
Such information is represented by attributes to which two assertion levels
apply, including non-asserted and asserted attributes. Non-asserted attributes
reside at the lowest level of assertion. They are disclosed by the user himself
and have not been verified or guaranteed by a trusted entity. For instance,
the user’s name that is manually filled in by himself on a registration form
is considered non-asserted. Any organization can improve the qualities of
the attributes collected by verifying them. Attributes are then asserted by
that organization, by e.g. sending a unique hyperlink after having verified the
user’s email address. The e-mail address is thus asserted after the user has
browsed to the aforementioned hyperlink. In the case attributes are part of a
credential, they are considered asserted/certified by an organization if it trusts
the credential’s issuing organization. Based on the attributes that are collected
and linked, pseudonymous or identifiable profiles can be compiled.
A policy is assigned to each service. This can typically be extracted from the
privacy policies that are currently used by many service providers. It comprises
the following parts:
• Access policy. This part specifies the attributes that must be re-
leased/proved before the service can be accessed.
• Storage policy. This specifies the set of data that is stored by the service
provider.
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• Distribution policy. This part mentions the set of data that is forwarded
to other organizations.
• Output policy. This specifies for instance, the credentials the service
issues.
Besides the application itself, authentication technologies and trust relations
are also formally modeled. A formal representation of different authentication
technologies is developed. The model focuses on the attributes that are released
and linkabilities that are introduced when using a specific credential technology
for fulfilling the access policy. For instance, if a user must only prove to be older
than 18, only that fact is disclosed when using Idemix credential technology.
However, much more info is released when using an X.509 certificate containing
additional personal attributes. Not only the exact birth date, but also all the
other attributes are visible for the service provider. Finally, each user can
assign a level of trust to each organization involved in the system. Contrary
to highly trusted organizations, who are believed to obey their (own specified)
privacy policies, untrusted ones can exhibit, from the user’s point of view, data
handling practices that violate the declared ones.
3.2 Feedback
The approach supports different types of feedback that is relevant for an in-
depth inspection of the user’s privacy. The feedback can be classified according
to three classes:
• Information spreading. This type of feedback reflects the amount
and type of information that is released towards each organization.
Organizations gather information during electronic service consumption
and store it in profiles. A profile keeps information that is linked to the
same individual. Profiles can possibly be merged.
• Organization behavior. This shows the impact of collaborating organiza-
tions on the user’s privacy. Collaboration can lead to discrimination. For
instance, an insurance company can discriminate users who are believed
to suffer from a certain illness based on information obtained from a
commercial e-health provider. However, collaborations may also have
benefits for the user. For instance, data from a social network profile can
be forwarded to ease registration procedures, which improves the user-
experience. Changes in the business landscape, such as two organizations
that merge, also influence the user’s privacy. For instance, they may be
able to merge the profiles of their users.
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• User behavior. The feedback depicts the impact of the decisions/strate-
gies applied by the user on his privacy and trust. For instance, two
e-shops can offer the same e-book at the same price but can apply
different privacy policies. Similarly, using an anonymous e-cash system
for electronic payments is often more privacy-friendly than using a debit
card. Sometimes, multiple alternatives for authentication are possible.
For instance, proving to be a resident of Brussels using an anonymous
credential is more privacy-friendly than using an identity card that is
realized with X.509 certificate technology.
Furthermore, the approach allows to detect violations against ruling policies,
or conflicts between policies at different levels or between different stakeholders.
For instance, corporate level policies that conflict with governmental policies,
or user preferences that conflict with service policies. Changes in policies at
different levels, such as governmental, corporate, service specific policies, are
covered by this approach as well. The model’s formal policy rules can be
adapted in accordance to the changes in policies.
3.3 Terminology and Basic Concepts
E represents the set of stakeholders. It includes the user u ∈ U ⊂ E and the
system’s organizations o ∈ O ⊂ E. Each organization can offer a set of services,
and different organizations can offer the same service. For this reason, Σ ⊆
S×O represents the set of all service instances, with S the set of services. The
set of attributes A includes all the attributes related to the user. It should be
noted that abstraction is made of the actual attribute values. Hence, attributes
only reflect the types of information they contain. For instance, the attribute
eye color represents data of type eye color. Some attributes, such as the user’s
eye color or his name and address, refer to characteristics of the user. Others
can be related to technological identifiers or system parameters, such as the IP
address, or environmental context, for instance the user’s location.
Organizations can store the attributes that are collected during service
consumption in a profile, which groups related attributes. For instance, a
profile can contain attributes revealed during transactions under the same
pseudonym. P ⊆ A× E defines a profile, with E the stakeholder asserting the
attributes. An attribute in a profile is considered asserted if an organization
vouches for its correctness. Attributes that are considered non-asserted are
supposed to originate from the user and their correctness is not vouched for
by a trusted organization. For instance, a user’s e-mail address is asserted if
the service provider can verify that it belongs to the user. For that purpose,
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the user is obliged to click on a unique link he received in a special e-mail
message. Formally, (ae-mail , o) ∈ P depicts an e-mail address that is asserted
by organization o while (ae-mail , u) ∈ P represents the non-asserted variant.
Profiles can be identifiable or pseudonymous:
• A profile P is identifiable if ∃I ∈ I : ∀a ∈ I, ∃e ∈ E : (a, e) ∈ P ,
with identifiable set I ⊆ A and I the set of all identifiable sets. These
sets represent combinations of attributes that sufficiently identify an
individual [143]. The term sufficiently is less restrictive than uniquely in a
sense that it allows for identifying an individual with a certain probability.
For instance, someone’s first name and surname can be considered to
form an identifiable set, although, it is not unlikely to find two people
with the same first name and surname. Another example of this is the
identification of individuals based on datasets containing meta-data of
credit card transactions [63].
• A profile P is pseudonymous, if ∃N ∈ N : ∀a ∈ N, ∃e ∈ E : (a, e) ∈ P ,
with pseudonymous set N ⊆ A and N the set of all pseudonymous sets.
These sets contain attributes that form a unique combination. All data
associated with it, can be linked. For instance, the set of attributes
that represents the fingerprint of a browser [78] can be considered as a
pseudonymous set.
A profile P where ∀a ∈ I, ∃o ∈ O : (a, o) ∈ P is asserted identifiable.
Similarly, a profile can be asserted pseudonymous. Multiple profiles can share
a pseudonym or identifiable set. In this case all these profiles can be linked
and merged together. A profile is anonymous if it is not identifiable, nor
pseudonymous.
3.4 Authentication Technologies
Users mostly must authenticate before they get access to a service. Authenti-
cation technologies T are classified into claim-based technologies and network-
based technologies. In the former case, users authenticate using credentials
that contain a set of attributes, such as anonymous credentials [139, 44],
certificates (e.g. X.509), or a username/password combination. Compared
to the other claim-based technologies, anonymous credentials enable the user
to remain anonymous during authentication unless identifiable attributes are
requested. To support accountability, authentication technologies allow to
verify the authenticity of the credential’s content. For instance, a digital
signature guarantees that the content is authentic. C ∈ 2A × O × T defines a
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credential. The definition comprises a set of attributes {a, . . . } ∈ 2A, the issuer
o ∈ O, and the technology t ∈ T . Credentials are kept in the user’s credential
wallet W , which can grow in the case a service issues a credential.
On the other hand, network-based authentication technologies are based on user
profiles P that are managed by organizations. These can be accessed by the user
and possibly external organizations. Usually, this requires authentication by
one or more stakeholders E and possibly also the user’s consent when he must
accept a profile access request. Hence, these technologies are often combined
with claim-based authentication mechanisms. For instance, a user accesses a
music stream service via his favorite social network account. Therefore, he
must authenticate to the social network using his account name and password.
Consequently, the music stream service obtains read access to the public part of
the user’s social network profile and also the visible part of data of his friends in
his social network. Furthermore, the application can update the music listening
history in his profile that is shared among his social network friends.
3.5 Service Policies
Organizations enforce policies to access their services. These contain rules that
define the conditions under which a service can be used. The policy rule-types
that are considered in this ontology are pre-conditions, post-conditions, data
storage, and data distribution. Pre-conditions specify the attributes that must
be revealed to an organization and the properties that must be fulfilled. It also
includes whether data must be asserted or not. For instance, the user needs
to reveal his name and birth date to the music stream provider and prove to
be older than 18 before he is able to stream music to his computer. His age
must be asserted and, hence, this requires the consumer to use his identity
card. Post-conditions are causal rules that describe the output of services. For
instance, the music stream subscription service issues a credential to a user.
This credential provides access to the complete library of rock music. Data
storage rules define the data that is stored in one or more profiles owned by the
organization. Data distribution rules specify to which parties data is forwarded.
Each policy applies to a service (s, o) ∈ Σ and is represented as π(s,o) ∈ Πo,
with Πo the set of all policies of organization o. Possibly, alternative conditions
for service access may exist. For instance, during subscription the user can
choose between two different social networks from which personal information
is obtained. Different attributes are revealed to the music stream provider
depending on the selected social network. Each policy can be a disjunction of
alternative sub-policies π(s,o) ≡ π
1
(s,o) ∨ . . . ∨ π
n
(s,o), with n ∈ N0.
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3.6 Trust Relationships
The data that organizations exchange depend on their trust relations. Users
and organizations often have conflicting requirements. The former want
minimal data disclosure. This view is based on the data minimization principle
(i.e. to reveal the least amount of personal information). The more data a user
reveals, the higher the risk to harm his privacy. The latter are profit driven and
are therefore often interested in building large profiles. This enables them to
improve the level of personalization and make their applications more attractive
to the user. Different trust relations are applied in this ontology:
• Users need to trust organizations. This is represented by storage trust
relation TS ⊆ O and distribution trust relation TD ⊆ O. Typically,
organizations specify this behavior in a privacy policy that is publicly
accessible to their users. Users have to accept it before they are granted
access to the organization’s services. Consequently, it is convenient to
specify the user’s trust towards the policy set Πo of organization o ∈ O.
We assume that users do not trust other organizations by default (o /∈ TS
and o /∈ TD). This means that users really opt-in new organizations
o ∈ O in TS and TD. Expressing that a user trusts one of these policies
presumes that only the specified data is affected by the services. We
assume that untrusted organizations will store or forward all data that
can be collected. For instance, an organization’s policy can stipulate that
it only obtains the user’s name from his electronic identity card that is
based on the X.509 technology. If o ∈ TS , then only the name is stored
by the organization. Otherwise, all the attributes of the user’s certificate
are collected and stored, although the policy might specify it differently.
• Interactions require also the trust from organizations towards users. If
data is not asserted, users can provide false information to organizations.
For instance, they can enter an incorrect name and address during
registration. To exclude inaccurate data, organizations can oblige users
to provide asserted data. These trust relations are specified implicitly
in the organization’s access policy. The trust relation is defined as
TΣ ⊆ A×O×Σ = {(a, oa, (s, os)) | a precondition rule of π(s,os) specifies
that oa asserts attribute a}.
• Finally, trust is often required between interacting organizations. Two
types of interactions are defined, namely (1) an organization can
accept credentials issued by another organization or (2) an organization
can forward data to another organization. Both are implicit in the
organization’s policies. The former are expressed in the access policy
while the latter are expressed in the data distribution rules of the policy.
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The definition of this trust relation is TO ⊆ O × O = {(o1, o2) | Πo1
specifies a rule where o1 accepts credentials or profiles from o2, or forwards
data to o2}. The model implicitly assumes trust between interacting
organizations.
3.7 A Travel Reservation System
The defined concepts are validated through the modeling of a travel reservation
system. First, we give an overview of the system. Next, the system is modeled.
Finally, we focus on valuable feedback that can be extracted from the model.
3.7.1 Scenario and Setup
A student wants to use an online travel reservation system to book a trip. The
travel agency offers triple-packs including the flight, hotel, and a theme park
visit. Each item can also be booked separately. This requires users to access
the web services of the airline company, the hotel chain and the theme park
directly. Special reductions are offered at the theme park’s website to students
and loyal hotel guests. The airline company and the theme park belong to the
same holding. They collaborate to increase efficiency. The student believes
that the travel reservation system stores and forwards all data released to it,
even though the privacy policy specifies it differently. He also has limited trust
in the hotel chain. He assumes they store all collected data. Before he books
his trip, he wants to have an insight on the profiles that can be built by the
organizations when using a specific booking strategy (fb1 ). Furthermore, he
wants to find out the most privacy-preserving strategy to book the theme park
tickets (fb2 ). Finally, he wants to verify whether he remains unidentifiable by
the theme park when taking a student offer (fb3 ).
Services and organizations. The stakeholders in the system are the user u ∈
U and the organizations O = {otravel, oair , ohotel , opark, ogov, ouniv}. Note that
the holding only supports collaboration between the airline company and the
theme park. The government ogov issues governmental electronic identity cards
and electronic driving licenses, while an educational institution ouniv issues
electronic student cards. Table 3.1 gives an overview of the authentication
technologies together with the attributes that are included. All credentials
are X.509 certificates except the hotel’s rewards membership credential crew,
which is a username/password combination. The latter gives access to a
membership account Prew. The services Σ are split in two groups Σ
′ and Σ′′,
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Table 3.1: Travel reservation system authentication
Credentials Issuer Attributes
eID ceID ogov name, address, citizenship, DoB,
profession, SSN
Driving license cdriv ogov name, address, citizenship, DoB
Student card cstud ouniv name, address, DoB, institute, study
Hotel rewards crew ohotel reward id
Profiles Owner A× E
Hotel rewards Prew ohotel (reward id, ohotel), (name, u), (e-mail, ohotel),
(DoB, u), (rewards status, ohotel)
with Σ = Σ′ ∪ Σ′′. The former are directly accessible by consumers, namely
Σ′ = {(book, otravel), (book, oair ), (book, ohotel), (book, opark), (reduction, opark)}).
The latter can only be accessed by the travel agency, namely Σ′′ = {(bookext,
oair ), (bookext, ohotel), (bookext, opark)}.
Policies and trust relations. The travel agency (book, otravel) requires that a
consumer at least proves his name and address before he can book a triple-
pack using the (bookext, o) service. Those attributes must be asserted by
the government using an electronic identity card or driving license. Other
attributes, such as his e-mail address and flight destination do not need to be
asserted. Only personal data that is strictly necessary to obtain a plane voucher
cplane, a hotel voucher chotel , and a theme park voucher cpark are forwarded to
the respective organizations. The airline company and hotel chain require at
least the user’s name and his address when tickets are booked directly using
(book, oair ) and (book, ohotel). These must be asserted by the government via
the identity card. Other attributes, such as the user’s e-mail address, hotel
location, and flight destination are non-asserted. All attributes are stored by
both organizations. Optionally, tourists can also define diet preferences. Both
organizations issue a voucher to the consumer after a successful reservation. A
theme park visit (book, opark) only requires the user’s e-mail address and the
date of visit (non-asserted). The visitor gets an entry voucher. All his attributes
are stored. Tourists get a reduction when they can prove to be a student or
to be silver members in the hotel’s rewards program. When the student uses
his student card to fulfill the preconditions, the theme park obtains his name,
address, and birth date (DoB), which are asserted by the student’s school. The
consumer can also opt to prove to be a silver member. If so, he is redirected to
the hotel chain where he needs to login with his password. After a successful
login, the user’s rewards status is forwarded to the theme park. Attributes that
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Table 3.2: Model of the travel reservation system policy to book a travel
pi1(book,otravel), pi
2
(book,otravel)
– alternatives 1 and 2
Reveal from c1eID or c
2
driv : name, address, citizenship, DoB
Reveal from u: e-mail, flight destination, date of travel, diet,
hotel location, room type, date of arrival,
date of departure
Reveal from crew : reward id
Forward to (bookext , oair ): name, address, citizenship, DoB, e-mail, diet,
flight destination, date of travel
Forward to (bookext , ohotel): name, address, citizenship, DoB, e-mail, room type,
hotel location, reward id, date of arrival,
date of departure
Forward to (bookext , opark): e-mail, date of visit
pi(book,ohotel )
Reveal from ceID: name, address, citizenship, DoB
Reveal from crew : reward id
Reveal from u: e-mail, hotel location, room type, date of arrival,
date of departure
Store: name, address, citizenship, DoB, e-mail, room type,
hotel location, reward id, date of arrival
date of departure
Output: chotel
pi(book,oair )
Reveal from ceID: name, address, citizenship, DoB
Reveal from u: e-mail, flight destination, date of travel, diet
Store: name, address, citizenship, DoB, e-mail,
date of travel, flight destination, diet
Output: cair
pi(book,opark)
Reveal from u: e-mail, date of visit
Store: e-mail, date of visit
Output: cpark
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Table 3.3: Model of the travel reservation system policy to get a reduction
pi1(reduction,opark) – first alternative
Reveal from u: e-mail, date of visit
Reveal from cstud: name, address, DoB
Store: name, address, DoB, e-mail, date of visit
Output: cpark
pi2(reduction,opark) – second alternative
Reveal from u: e-mail, date of visit
Reveal from crew: reward id
Reveal from Prew: rewards status
Store: reward id, e-mail, date of visit
Forward to (get status, ohotel) : reward id
Output: cpark
Table 3.4: Model of the travel reservation system policy of the services that
are accessible for external organizations
pi(bookext,ohotel)
Reveal from otravel : name, address, citizenship, DoB, rewards id, e-mail,
hotel location, room type, date of arrival, date of departure
Store: name, address, citizenship, DoB, e-mail, hotel location,
room type, reward id, date of arrival, date of departure
Output: chotel
pi(bookext,oair )
Reveal from otravel : name, address, citizenship, DoB, e-mail, flight destination,
date of travel, diet
Store: name, address, citizenship, DoB, e-mail, flight destination,
date of travel
Output: cair
pi(bookext,opark)
Reveal from otravel : e-mail, date of visit
Store: e-mail, date of visit
Output: cpark
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are released to get a reduction are stored by the theme park. Tables 3.2, 3.3
and 3.4 give a formal overview of the policies that are applied in the travel
reservation system.
Multiple trust assumptions can be applied. TS = {oair , opark} means that
the user trusts the storage policies of the airline company and theme park.
TD = {oair , ohotel , opark} means that the user trusts the distribution policies of
the organizations included in TD. Note that it is quite trivial to modify these
sets.
3.7.2 Feedback
To demonstrate the expressive power of our models, different types of feedback
are extracted, namely fb1, fb2 and fb3.
fb1: User profiles. The end-user and/or designer can get an overview of
the information spreading in the system. Details are provided in Tables 3.5
and 3.6. Each service consumption (s, o) leads to a profile P(s,o) containing the
attributes gathered by the service. The specific booking strategy has an impact
on the type and amount of attributes that are part of the profile. P eID(book,otravel)
and P driv(book,otravel) show the attributes in the profile when the identity card or
the driving license are used, respectively. The student only has very limited
trust in the travel agency’s storage policy and therefore the profile contains
all attributes that are released to that organization. Among others, a social
security number (SSN) and profession are added to P eID(book,otravel) as these are
the attributes of the X.509 certificate in the eID card.
The travel agency needs to forward attributes to the airline company, hotel
chain, and theme park. In return, vouchers are issued. The student assumes
that the travel agency forwards all data that is gathered. However, the profiles
P(bookext,oair) and P(bookext,opark) only contain the attributes that are specified in
the respective storage policies, as the tourist trusts their storage policies. The
profile kept by the hotel chain contains all data that is released by the user.
Using the driver’s license for authentication leaks less information than using
the eID card. More specifically, the user’s SSN and profession are stored in
the profile when the eID is used. The profiles P(book,oair), P(book,ohotel), and
P(book,opark) list the set of attributes that are collected if the travel agency does
not mediate in the bookings. All profiles comply with the specified storage
policies, except the one owned by the hotel. The hotel keeps the user’s SSN
and profession. It should also be noted that the strategy that is selected to
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Table 3.5: Travel reservation system user profiles of the services that are
accessible for users
P eID(book,otravel) owned by otravel
Non-asserted: e-mail, flight destination, date of travel, diet, hotel location,
room type, date of arrival, date of departure
Asserted by ogov : name, address, citizenship, DoB, profession, SSN
Asserted by ohotel : reward id
P driv(book,otravel) owned by otravel
Non-asserted: e-mail, flight destination, date of travel, diet, hotel location,
room type, date of arrival, date of departure
Asserted by ogov : name, address, citizenship, DoB
Asserted by ohotel : reward id
P(book,ohotel) owned by ohotel
Non-asserted: e-mail, hotel location, room type, date of arrival,
date of departure
Asserted by ogov : name, address, citizenship, DoB
P(book,oair ) owned by oair
Non-asserted: e-mail, flight destination, date of travel, diet
Asserted by ogov : name, address, citizenship, DoB
P(book,opark) owned by opark
Non-asserted: e-mail, date of visit
P stud(reduction,opark) owned by opark
Non-asserted: e-mail, date of visit
Asserted by ouniv : name, address, DoB
P rewards(reduction,opark) owned by opark
Non-asserted: e-mail, date of visit
Asserted by ouniv : reward id, rewards status
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Table 3.6: Travel reservation system user profiles compiled by the services that
are accessible for external organizations
P eID(bookext,ohotel) owned by ohotel
Non-asserted: e-mail, flight destination, date of travel, diet, hotel location,
room type, date of arrival, date of departure
Asserted by ogov : name, address, citizenship, DoB, profession, SSN
Asserted by ohotel : reward id
P driv(bookext,ohotel) owned by ohotel
Non-asserted: e-mail, flight destination, date of travel, diet, hotel location,
room type, date of arrival, date of departure
Asserted by ogov : name, address, citizenship, DoB
Asserted by ohotel : reward id
P(bookext,oair ) owned by oair
Non-asserted: e-mail, flight destination, date of travel, diet
Asserted by ogov : name, address, citizenship, DoB
P(bookext,opark) owned by opark
Non-asserted: e-mail, date of travel
get a reduction at the theme park also has an impact on the attributes in the
profile.
fb2: Impact of reduction on privacy. Selecting a specific booking strategy can
have an impact on the user’s privacy. If the travel agency is used, authenticating
with the drive license protects the user’s privacy better then when using an eID
card. However, the travel agency still collects a lot of valuable personal data.
No data is released to the travel agency in case of direct bookings, but this
compels the consumer to use his identity card for the hotel and airplane booking.
Hence, the user’s SSN is revealed to both organizations. The latter is a unique
identifier to which a lot of information can be linked. If a student wants a
reduction, he must book directly. Apparently, using the rewards membership
seems the most privacy-friendly option as only the user’s e-mail address and
reward id are revealed. In contrast, the user’s e-mail address, name and address
are revealed if the student card is used. However, the theme park and the airline
company belong to the same holding and exchange data. The profiles from the
airline company and theme park can be linked by means of the user’s e-mail
address. Thus, the theme park also knows the user’s name and address. Hence,
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using the student card is slightly more privacy-friendly.
fb3: Reductions are identifiable. Verifying if the student can remain
unidentifiable towards the theme park when booking a voucher at reduced price
is done by a query based on identifiable sets. The identifiable sets in our system
are I = {I1, I2}, with I1 = {name} and I2 = {address} where name comprises
the user’s name and surname. Note that the user or designer can define what
is identifiable. Note that the union I3 = I1 ∪ I2 is also an identifiable set. A
user is unidentifiable to an organization if the following two conditions are met.
First, the organization owns no identifiable profile. Second, the organization
contains no pseudonymous set that is shared with an identifiable profile of a
collaborating organization. According to these conditions, the first condition is
only met when the student uses his reward id. However, the second condition is
not fulfilled. To explain this, the pseudonymous sets N1 = {e-mail} is required.
N1 ⊆ P(book,oair) ∩ P
rewards
(reduction,opark)
and I3 ⊂ P(book,oair) (profile is identifiable).
Hence, booking at a reduced price is always identifiable.
3.8 Evaluation
The modeling concepts presented are holistic. They model a wide range of
authentication technologies, different components of a service policy, and trust
relationships between different stakeholders. Moreover, advanced interactions
between the user and service providers can be expressed. The modeling
concepts reside at the application layer and assume that applications run on
top of anonymous channels such as onion routers [74]. As a consequence,
privacy-related properties intrinsically associated to non-anonymous lower layer
protocols are abstracted away by the concepts defined. An example of linkable
attributes are the IP address or MAC address, that are revealed when protocols
run. Nevertheless, this could easily be modeled with pseudonyms.
Different types of feedback is possible when analyzing the user’s privacy in
modeled systems. The feedback is derived from the model’s user profiles that
are compiled from service policies and the user’s trust perceptions. These
profiles represent the set of linkable personal attributes that possibly can be
collected by organizations. These profiles are examined for linkage through
pseudonyms and identities. The feedback is from the user’s viewpoint because
it is based on his trust perceptions about the service providers. Other
aspects that are modeled, such as collaborations between organizations or used
authentication technologies, have consequences for the information spreading
as well. The models only consider the information spreading in the system and
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not the purpose for which personal data is collected. Other complementary
approaches [172] can be used to analyze the purpose of collecting personal data.
Improvements on the readability of the feedback are necessary. This is clearly
illustrated in the case study of the travel reservation system in Section 3.7.2.
It shows a large amount of data, which makes it borderline comprehensible.
A static view on the privacy is provided by the models. Consequently, sequences
of events over time that influence the user’s privacy cannot be expressed. The
static view significantly reduces the search space and makes the feedback
generation more efficient. Moreover, it makes conclusions stronger because
they are not restricted to a finite time-domain as is the case if time is modeled.
Models optimize the search space even more by making abstraction of users. In
particular, the models only consider one user, which enables to abstract away
the actual attribute values. For instance, the attributes name and city models
the real-world proposition John lives in New York instead of name = John and
city = New York. However, tuples (attribute type, attribute value) can easily be
added to model attribute values in case it is not feasible to abstract them away.
This abstraction may also have consequences in modeling structures such as
the list of friends in the user’s social network. Tuples (Friendlist, Friend) can
express this.
Real-world data handling practices of organizations are specified in their
service policies. These often are merely vague declarations that can be
interpreted in multiple ways and are insufficient to correctly extract the actual
behavior. Hence, this severely complicates the modeling. Existing policy
specification languages, such as P3P [182], CARL [43], and XACML/SAML
based languages [22] help service providers to exactly express their policies in
a standard format that is machine readable. This enables to automate the
extraction of policy rules so that these can easily be included in the model.
The models are flexible enough to support system modifications. Changes in
service policy can be handled automatically in case they are specified in machine
readable languages. Otherwise, modifications in the service policies require
manual interventions. Other types of changes, such as collaborations between
organizations or newly added organizations are also added manually to the
model. For instance, adding a new organization o to the system involves adding
the new organization to the set of stakeholders E and the set of organizations
O. New services are added to the sets Σ and S and new service policies of
organization o are added to Πo.
Future work can focus on how this approach can be integrated in tools for
automated privacy analysis of systems or the design of privacy-friendly services.
Such tools can verify the compliance of service policies with policies at corporate
or legislative level. The tools can also be added to end-user applications, such
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as a browser plug-in to verify whether the data that will be revealed complies
with the user defined policy. The browser plug-in consults an online available
model of the application to notify a user if, e.g. his SSN will be revealed while
his privacy preferences state to keep it hidden from commercial organizations.
3.9 Conclusions
This chapter identified a set of key concepts for modeling advanced electronic
services in which multiple organizations collaborate. Once a system is modeled,
the designer and end-user can analyze privacy properties based on varying trust
assumptions. The concepts are applied to the modeling of a composite web
service, namely a travel agency in which multiple stakeholders are involved.
Finally, it is shown that feedback can be extracted that is meaningful for both
end-users and service designers.
Chapter 4
Modeling Approach
Chapter 3 identifies key information that is necessary in order to inspect
privacy properties in advanced electronic services. The information is classified
according to multiple categories. Chapter 3 also shows that relevant privacy
feedback can be given to both end-users and system designers. For instance,
the end-user can inspect the impact of collaborations between highly untrusted
entities in the system. Similarly, system designers can detect conflicts between
corporate level policies and legislative privacy policies. Moreover, extracting
useful privacy feedback manually proved to be not trivial in more complex
settings. It is clear that semi-automating privacy inspection is useful in
many settings. To support this, additional rules must be defined that express
additional knowledge. For instance, generic rules can be defined that express
the impact of using certain credentials technologies on the resulting privacy
properties of the system. Although a security expert knows that anonymous
credentials are more privacy-friendly than X.509 certificates, it is not always
clear what impact design and runtime choices have on the system privacy.
The impact of selecting a particular credential technology on the privacy also
depends on the storage and processing policies, the collaboration between
service providers, etc.
Contributions. This chapter focuses on a logic-based framework that supports
automatic reasoning about privacy properties in advanced electronic services.
The concepts that are identified in chapter 3 are mapped to framework
components. The framework also represents the interrelationships between
these concepts. Furthermore, an instantiation of the framework is realized in
a knowledge base system, namely IDP. It is selected for two major reasons,
namely (a) the potential of IDP to represent knowledge and reasoning and
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(b) the relevance of IDP from a research perspective. The framework assists
modelers in representing advanced composite web services by offering reusable
building blocks. This means that some components in the framework can be
reused when a modeler wants to model a new system and reason about it. The
present chapter also presents an approach to automatically extract relevant
privacy properties from the models that were built. To validate the framework,
it is applied to the modeling and privacy analysis of a web shop.
The contributions in this chapter are peer-reviewed in [66].
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, a web shop and
its conceptual model are described in Section 4.1. The system mentioned is
used throughout the remainder of this chapter. Section 4.2 gives an overview
of the modeling framework for logic-based reasoning, and introduces the major
components. Section 4.3 focuses on the input model after which the inference
strategy is described in more detail. This chapter ends with an evaluation of
the framework (see 4.5) and conclusions (see 4.6).
4.1 Web Shop Scenario
Purchase
Delivered
Delivery Request
Delivery
WS::OrderNr
WS::OrderNr
WS::OrderNr
Gov::Basic ID Card
Edu::Student Card
Gov::Advanced ID Card
Web Shop (WS) Postal Service Company (PS)
User::Name
User::Address
User::EmailGov::DoB
PS::URLUser::Name
User::Address
User::Email
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Model of a Web Shop and Delivery Service.
The present section presents a composite web service that is used as an
example to clarify the concepts throughout the rest of this chapter. The
major components are depicted in Figure 4.1. The web service consists of
two service providers, namely a web shop (WS) and a postal service company
(PS). A consumer can purchase products at an online website managed by
WS. As the shop wants to exclude minors, a consumer needs to prove to be
older than 18. The web shop supports two credential technologies to fulfill
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that prerequisite. Either the consumer uses a basic electronic identity card
or a more privacy-friendly one. It is assumed that the former consists of
an X.509 certificate which embeds the customer’s name, address, birth date
(DoB), and social security number (SSN), and the latter can be an anonymous
credential which contains the same attributes. Anonymous credentials allow
to selectively disclose attributes. More specifically, a user can prove to be
older than 18 without revealing his birth date. Students can purchase goods
at a reduced price if they show their electronic student card. It consists of an
X.509 certificate with the student’s name, address, and institute as attributes.
Consumers also must disclose their email address when they want to buy a
product. When a purchase transaction is completed, WS sends transaction
details together with personalized recommendations to the consumer’s email
address. WS also shares the order number (OrderNr) and email address (Email)
with PS, and redirects the user to PS where he must fill in his name and address
in the delivery information form. PS collects the data and sends a unique
hyperlink to the user’s mailbox, which can be used to track the delivery status.
After delivery, PS informs WS that the delivery corresponding to OrderNr was
successful. The data exchanged at lower communication layers is for simplicity
omitted.
4.2 Modeling Framework
When invoking a service, information is disclosed to the organization providing
the service. The information includes a user’s personal information, such as his
birth date or email address, or information generated by the service or the user
during service consumption. For example, an order number that is generated by
the service. The information can both be stored by the organization providing
the service or be forwarded to other services. These services can, in turn,
also store or forward the collected information. The organizations involved
can use this information to compile user profiles, which collect the attributes
that belong to the same user. The user profiles that organizations may possibly
build, form the basis from which conclusions about the user’s privacy are drawn.
This privacy analysis considers that actual data handling practices of service
providers are hidden to users and are possibly not compliant with declared
practices. E.g., a highly untrusted service provider is suspected to store – and
possibly distribute – more attributes than specified in its service policy. Hence,
the user’s trust perceptions of a service provider’s data handling practices are
considered as well.
Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the major components in the framework of the
modeling approach. The System Independent Modeling Component consists
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Figure 4.2: Framework for logic reasoning about privacy properties in complex
electronic services.
of a vocabulary (E) and a set of formal sentences (R) that denote generic
propositions on systems and can be reused in whatever system (or application)
is modeled. For instance, sentences that describe the properties of X.509
certificates. The Input Model (MI) is system independent and consists of a
User Model (MU ), a System Model (MS), and an Identifier Model (MID).
MU defines the user’s initial state and trust perceptions. Therefore, this
component needs to be replaced if a new type of user is modeled. Similarly,MS
is application specific and needs to be replaced if a new application is modeled.
MID defines sets of attributes that are each sufficient to distinguish a single
user. Some sets are identifiable, others are pseudonymous. For instance, the
user’s name and birth date can be an identifiable set, while an email address can
be a pseudonymous singleton. A modeler can then decide how strict the notion
of identifiability and pseudonymity should be. Finally, the Logic Component
represents a knowledge base tool that automatically infers privacy conclusions
(MO) based on the System Independent Model and the Input Model. The rest
of this section discusses the major components in more detail.
Vocabulary. The Vocabulary E consists of three parts, namely EI , ER and EO.
The input vocabulary EI includes the symbols required for the specification of
new systems (or services). ER defines theory dependent symbols for reasoning,
which are meant for internal use only. The output vocabulary EO includes the
symbols necessary to express conclusions. Consequently, new symbols must be
defined when new types of conclusions need to be supported.
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Theory. The Theory R comprises a set of logic sentences that are expressed
over the vocabulary E . It is divided into a fixed behavior theory RB and an
interchangeable inference theory RI . RB defines the concepts that are fixed
for the same kind of inferences. For instance, the non-functional properties of
authentication technologies are expressed here. More specifically, formal rules
express that multiple transactions with the same X.509 certificate can be linked
and that all attributes within an X.509 certificate are released to the service
provider, whereas anonymous credentials support unlinkability and selective
disclosure of attributes. RI contains the theory that is required to draw
conclusions from a given input model. Depending on the type of conclusions,
another (pluggable) inference theory component is used. Section 4.4 focuses
on an instance of RI that is used to draw conclusions from user profiles kept
at different organizations.
System Model. The System Model MS defines (a) the set of organizations
involved in the composite web service, (b) the set of services they offer, and (c)
a set of service policies assigned to those services. Four types of policies are
assigned to each service: the access control policy defines the attributes that
must be disclosed (or proven) before a service can be consumed; the storage
policy defines the set of attributes that will be stored by the service provider
(i.e. typically a subset of the attributes released by the user); the distribution
policy defines the set of attributes forwarded to other service providers (i.e. also
a subset of attributes released by the user); and the output policy defines data
generated during service consumption. For instance, a new account that is
created or the list of purchased goods.
User Model. The User Model MU defines the set of credentials of a single
user (only one user of the services is considered in this appraoch). A credential,
such as an electronic identity card, is a collection of attributes, certified by an
issuer and managed by the user. Credentials and profiles can be used to fulfill
access control policies. MU also defines the trust perception of the user. More
specifically, the framework allows for specifying whether a user trusts that the
expressed storage and distribution practices are observed by an organization.
Different users may have different trust assumptions. For instance, privacy
concerned users may have less trust in the specified data practices than other
users. The framework allows to model multiple types of users.
Logic Component. The Logic Component consists of a logic tool that
automates the reasoning on formal models. IDP [185] has been selected for the
realization of this logic reasoning system. IDP is a knowledge base system that
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reasons on models specified in the IDP language, which is a formal language
based on typed first-order logic. This language has successfully been used for
the formal specification of services. IDP reasons on an input model MI using
a theory R. The results are presented in the output model MO.
4.3 Input Model Specification
This section shows what elements and relations a modeler needs to express when
modeling a particular system. The elements and relations are instantiations of
the symbols in the input vocabulary EI ⊂ E , and together form the Input Model
MI = MS ∪MU ∪MID. The presented input specification is based on the
web shop scenario described in section 4.1 and can be expressed with the IDP
language.
Organizations and Attributes. The organizations that are involved in the
system being modeled are part of the Organization domain. They participate in
services provided to the user or they can issue credentials required by services.
The data that is exchanged when invoking services are modeled by attributes
that are part of the Attribute domain. These represent data types instead of the
actual data values. This abstraction is possible due to the single-user approach.
IDP Listing 4.1: Partial input model representing organizations and
attributes.
MS :: type Organization = {Government;University;WS ;PS}
MS :: type Attribute = {
Name;Address;DoB;SSN ; Institute;OrderNr ;URL;Email}
Identities and Pseudonyms. The identifiers in the model, which can
link profiles, are elements of the Identifier domain. Identifiers can be-
long to the Identity or the Pseudonym domain. The former sufficiently
identify an individual and can link a profile to that individual, while the
latter only can associate user profiles that share the same pseudonym.
IdentifierAttr(Identifier ,Attribute) assigns a set of attributes to each identity
and pseudonym. In our system, one identity Identity1 ∈ I and four pseudonyms
(i.e. singletons) Nymi ∈ N are defined. The modeler specifies that the user’s
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Name and Address belong to Identity1 (i.e. collecting both attributes will
make someone identifiable), and that the user’s SSN, OrderNr, the unique
URL provided by the delivery service provider, and Email address are unique
pseudonyms. Note that another modeler could specify the user’s SSN as an
identity instead of a pseudonym, or specify that the user’s Name is sufficient
to identify the user.
IDP Listing 4.2: Partial input model representing identities and pseudonyms.
MID :: type Identifier = {Identity1 ;Nym1 ;Nym2 ;Nym3 ;Nym4}
MID :: type Identity isa Identifier = {Identity1}
MID :: type Pseudonym isa Identifier = {Nym1 ;Nym2 ;Nym3 ;Nym4}
MID :: IdentifierAttr(Identifier,Attribute) = {
(Identity1 ,Name); (Identity1 ,Address);
(Nym1 ,SSN ); (Nym2 ,OrderNr); (Nym3 ,URL); (Nym4 ,Email)}
User Trust Perception. These relations (part of MU ) allow to specify
trust perceptions of the user with respect to the organizations in the model.
The relations below specify that the user only believes that the postal service
company abides his storage policy, and that the web shop observes his
distribution policy.
IDP Listing 4.3: Partial input model representing the user trust perception.
MU :: StorageTrust(Organization) = {PS}
MU :: DistributionTrust(Organization) = {WS}
Credential Specification. All credentials owned by the user are listed in
the Credential domain. In the web shop scenario, the user may have three
credentials, namely, a basic identity card, a privacy-friendly identity card,
and optionally a student card. For each credential, multiple properties need
to be defined, namely the set of attributes included in the credential, the
underlying credential technology that is used, and the credential issuer. In the
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example, three credential elements are specified in Credentials. For instance,
the user’s name and address are embedded in the BasicIDCard, which is an
X.509 certificate issued by the Government.
IDP Listing 4.4: Partial input model representing credentials.
MU :: type Credential = {BasicIDCard ;PrivIDCard ;StudentCard}
MU :: CredAttr(Credential,Attribute) = {
(BasicIDCard ,Name); (BasicIDCard ,Address); . . . ,
(PrivIDCard ,Name); . . . }
MU :: CredTech(Credential) : ClaimbasedTech = {
BasicIDCard → X509 ;PrivIDCard → Idemix ; . . .}
MU :: CredIssuer(Credential) : Organization = {
BasicIDCard → Government;PrivIDCard → Government; . . .}
Services and Service Policies. Services are uniquely referred in the model
by identifiers from the ServiceIdentifier domain. The model assigns a type from
the ServiceType domain to each service and associates the services with the
organizations that provide them. The relations below focus on the specification
of a service identified by BasicPurchaseServ. In addition, for each service
the applicable policies are specified. The access control policy, for instance
PurchaseAccessPol, specifies the attributes that need to be disclosed and their
source in order to grant access (e.g. reveal DoB from the BasicIDCard). The
storage policy specifies the attributes that are stored and the distribution
policy defines which attributes are sent to another service. As shown below,
BasicPurchaseServ forwards OrderNr to the postal company when invoking
DeliveryRequestServ. Optionally, an output policy specifies the data returned
to the user when the service was invoked.
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IDP Listing 4.5: Partial input model representing services and service
policies.
MS :: type ServiceType = {Purchase;Delivery;DeliveryRequest;Delivered}
MS :: type ServiceIdentifier = {BasicPurchaseServ;PrivPurchaseServ;
DeliveryRequestServ; . . .}
MS :: Service(ServiceType,Organization) : ServiceIdentifier = {
(Purchase,WS)→ BasicPurchaseServ;
(Purchase,WS)→ PrivPurchaseServ;
(DeliveryRequest,PS)→ DeliveryRequestServ; . . .}
MS :: ServicePolicies(ServiceIdentifier,AccessPolicy, StoragePolicy,
DistributionPolicy,OutputPolicy) = {
(BasicPurchaseServ ,PurchaseAccessPol,PurchaseStorePol ,
PurchaseDistrPol ,PurchaseOutPol); . . .}
MS :: RevealAttr(AccessPolicy,AttrSrc,Attribute) = {
(PurchaseAccessPol ,BasicIDCard ,DoB); . . .}
MS :: StoreAttr(StoragePolicy,Attribute) = {
(PurchaseStorePol ,OrderNr); . . .}
MS :: DistrAttrTo(DistributionPolicy, ServiceIdentifier,Attribute) = {
(PurchaseDistrPol ,DeliveryRequestServ,OrderNr); . . .}
MS :: OutputAttr(OutputPolicy,Attribute) = {(PurchaseOutPol,URL)}
4.4 Inferring Privacy Based on Trust
This section presents the general idea behind the inference rules RI that are
used for the automated reasoning on the input model MI . The inference
strategy starts from a service invocation graph, which is a representation of
the possible invocations of services which may either be directly or indirectly
invoked by a user. It is used to compile user profiles that belong to
organizations, based on the user’s trust in the involved organizations. These
user profiles show for each organization the personal information that can be
linked to the same user and possibly make him identifiable. In the rest of this
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section, this inference strategy is further discussed and demonstrated using the
web shop scenario.
Service Invocation Graph. This is an acyclic directed graph G = 〈Π,F〉,
where each node πo ∈ Πo represents a service provided by organization o ∈ O,
with Πo ⊆ Π the set of services provided by o. Each edge f ∈ F ⊆ Π × Π
defines the invocation of a service by another service. These edges are derived
from the data distribution specifications of the service policies. Nodes without
incoming edges, denoted by π∗o ∈ Π
∗ ⊆ Π, are only invokable by users. We
assume that services can neither directly nor indirectly invoke themselves. As a
result, this graph is acyclic and a strict order relation <G on Π that expresses
the relative invocation order between services can be defined. For instance,
πio <G π
j
o′ expresses that π
j
o′ is invoked by π
i
o (directly or indirectly), with π
i
o,
πjo′ ∈ Π. Note that a service policy is assigned to each service.
The service invocation graph for the web shop scenario is illustrated in
Figure 4.3. As an example, when a user makes a purchase at the web shop,
the web shop sends a delivery request to the postal service. There are four
alternative invocations that depend on the selected purchase option. One
of them is presented by an edge in the service invocation graph from the
WS:BasicPurchase service (πa∗ws) to the PS:DeliveryRequest service (π
1
ps). The
other incoming edges of π1ps represent the other alternatives.
(Purchase,WS)
(DeliveryRequest, PS)
(Delivery, PS)
(Delivered,WS)
pia∗WS pi
b∗
WS
pic∗WS pi
d∗
WS
pi1PS
pi2PS
pi3WS
Student Card
+
Student Card
+
Gpia∗WS
Basic ID Privacy-Friendly ID
Basic ID Privacy-Friendly ID
Figure 4.3: Service invocation graph G of the web shop scenario.
Figure 4.3 also shows the sub-graph Gpia∗ws of G. This sub-graph includes all
services that are invoked when invoking πa∗ws . Semantically, it corresponds
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to the services in the web shop scenario that are invoked when a product is
purchased with a basic ID card. More formally, Gpi∗o = 〈Πpi∗o ,Fpi∗o 〉 is the sub-
graph for a user invocable service π∗o that is defined by Πpi∗o = {πo′ ∈ Π |
π∗o <G πo′} ∪ {π
∗
o} and Fpi∗o = {(π
i
o′ , π
j
o′′) ∈ F | π
i
o′ ∈ Πpi∗o ∧ π
j
o′′ ∈ Πpi∗o},
with o′, o′′ ∈ O. We assume that the sub-graph contains no alternative service
invocations (i.e. nodes have at most one incoming edge). Therefore, it forms a
tree with root node π∗o . Starting from these sub-graphs Gpi∗o , user profiles are
compiled.
User Profiles. In this approach, we analyze the user’s privacy even if
organizations are not trustworthy. Therefore, the user profiles that are built,
are not only based on what is specified in the service policies, but also on the
user’s trust perception. In other words, profiles satisfy the user’s expectations.
The user’s trust is specified in relation to the data storage and data distribution
policies of organizations:
• Storage trust (o ∈ TS), specifies that for each service πo ∈ Πo , the user
believes that only the attributes Ωpio specified in the storage policy of πo,
are actually stored. Without storage trust, all data possibly collected by
these services, is expected to be stored.
• Distribution trust (o ∈ TD), specifies that for each service πo ∈ Πo , the
user believes that only the attributes Θδo specified in the distribution
policy of πo, are forwarded to the specified service. Otherwise, all data
possibly collected by these services, is expected to be forwarded.
The compilation of user profiles, that organizations build by executing a user
invokable service π∗o , consists of two steps. In the first step, the sub-profile
P (πo′ |π
∗
o) is compiled for each service πo′ ∈ Πpi∗o . It defines the attributes
that are persistently kept by o′ when executing πo′ . Next, the sub-profiles of
different services that are kept by an organization, are combined to compile its
user profiles.
STEP 1: compiling sub-profiles for π∗o . A sub-profile P (πo′ |π
∗
o) is compiled
for each of the nodes πo′ of the sub-graph Gpi∗o . These store the attributes that
are collected by πo′ with respect to the user’s expectations. Equation (4.1)
gives the attributes that are part of sub-profile P (πo′ |π
∗
o). It consists of two
conditional rules. The first gives the attributes stored in the case the user trusts
the organization’s storage policy. This is trivial because only the attributes are
stored that are explicitly specified in the storage policy of that service. The
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other rule lists the attributes stored in case that there is no storage trust. This
involves different attribute sources, namely:
• disclosed attributes Υpi
o′
contain the attributes revealed due to the access
policy of πo′ . It not only consists of the attributes required by the access
policy, but also of the additional attributes disclosed due to the used
authentication technology. For instance, in the case of X.509 certificates,
although the user is only required to reveal his birth date to access a
service, he reveals all other attributes included in the certificate as well.
• generated data Γpi
o′
contains the data generated during service consump-
tion. For instance, when a user purchases a product in the web shop an
order number will be generated.
• forwarded attributes Φ(πo′ |π
∗
o) consist of the data that is forwarded by
services πo′′ ∈ Πpi∗o to πo′ , with πo′′ <G πo′ .
The attributes from Υpi
o′
and Φ(πo′ |π
∗
o) are derived from the access policy of
the service πo′ , which is trivial. Finding the attributes that are forwarded
to πo′ is more complex and depends on the distribution trust with respect to
the services that forward data to this service. These attributes are given by
Equation (4.2). This equation gives the attributes that are forwarded to service
πio′ by service π
j
o′′ , which directly invokes it (i.e. π
i
o′′ = pred(π
j
o′)). It consists of
two rules that cover both the case in which there is distribution trust, and the
case in which there is no distribution trust. In the former case, the attributes
are specified in the distribution policy of πjo′′ . In the latter case, π
j
o′′ forwards
all the attributes that it generates itself (Γ
pi
j
o′′
) and that are disclosed to it due
to its own access policy Υ
pi
j
o′′
or that have been forwarded by its predecessor
Φ(πjo′′ |π
∗
o).
This is applied to the web shop scenario, which is depicted in Figure 4.1.
The data that is received by service WS:Delivered from the perspective of a
customer depends on his trust perception of the parties involved. The service
only receives the order number OrderNr from service PS:Delivery, if the user
has distribution trust in the postal service company PS (PS ∈ TD). Whereas if
PS /∈ TD, WS:Delivered may not only receive OrderNr from PS:Delivery, but
also the Name and Address of the user and the URL to track the delivery status
of the purchase.
P (πo′ |π
∗
o) =


Ωpi
o′
, o′ ∈ TS
Υpi
o′
∪ Γpi
o′
∪ Φ(πo′ |π
∗
o) , o
′ 6∈ TS
(4.1)
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Φ(πio′ |π
∗
o) =


Θ
pi
j
o′′
, o′′ ∈ TD
Υ
pi
j
o′′
∪ Γ
pi
j
o′′
∪ Φ(πjo′′ |π
∗
o) , o
′′ 6∈ TD
(4.2)
with Φ(πo′ |π
∗
o) = ∅ for πo′ = π
∗
o , and π
j
o′′ = pred(π
i
o′)
STEP 2: Compiling user profiles. The user-profiles of the organizations are
compiled using their sub-profiles that were generated in the previous step. This
requires the presence of one or more shared identifiers id ∈ I ∪ N. Initially,
all sub-profiles that include an identifier, are considered as user profiles. User
profiles sharing a same identifier are merged into a single user profile that
contains all the attributes from these user profiles. Since identifiers may be
defined as a set of attributes (see Section 4.3), and these attributes may be
spread over different user profiles, merging these profiles may have as side-
effect that a new identifier appears in the resulting profile. Therefore, this step
is repeated until no new identifiers are formed in the merged user profiles. As
a result, a number of user profiles P ido′ (G|π
∗
o) are compiled with attributes that
can be linked by organization o′ to a unique identifier id after the user invoked
service π∗o . Hence, the organization may keep multiple user profiles of the same
user who cannot be linked to each other because they have no shared identifier.
Note that the same user profile may contain multiple identifiers.
Impact of Multiple Service Invocations on Profiles. Until now, we have
focused on the profiles that can be compiled when a user invokes a single
service π∗o . However, in practice, a user typically invokes multiple services over
time. Hence, user profiles often grow gradually. For instance, in the web shop
scenario, the user purchases a product with a BasicIDCard and StudentCard
(i.e. service invocation πb∗ws). Later on, he receives an PrivIDCard from the
government and quits high school. If he then purchases an item, service
invocation πb∗ws is applied. Similarly, consider a web shop that offers three
services to users, namely Register, Browse, and Purchase. When browsing the
site, a persistent cookie is installed that is requested each time to personalize
offers. Before a user can Purchase a product, he must Register. At that phase,
additional attributes are possibly disclosed. In that case, it does not make
sense to only evaluate the impact of the service invocation Purchase on the
profiles kept by organizations. On the contrary, the impact of multiple types of
service invocations on the profiles is relevant. Our framework easily compiles
profiles that result from multiple invocations. P ido′ (G|[π
a∗
oa
, πb∗ob , ..., π
x∗
ox
]) defines
the expected profile kept by o′ with attributes linked to id after a sequence of
68 MODELING APPROACH
Table 4.1: User’s additional attributes in the web shop’s user profile related to
the case where both organizations are trusted.
TS = {PS}, TD = {WS ,PS} TS = {PS}, TD = {WS}
P idws(G|pi
a∗
ws) Name, Address, DoB, SSN Name, Address, URL, DoB, SSN
P idws(G|pi
b∗
ws) — Name, Address, URL
P idws(G|pi
c∗
ws) Name, Address, DoB, SSN ,
Institute
Name, Address, URL, DoB, SSN ,
Institute
P idws(G|pi
d∗
ws) Name, Address, Institute Name, Address, URL, Institute
services [πa∗oa , π
b∗
ob
, ..., πx∗ox ] are invoked by the user. P
id
o′ (G|[π
a∗
oa
, πb∗ob , ..., π
x∗
ox
]) is
constructed by merging all the profiles P ido′ (G|π
i∗
oi
) with πi∗oi ∈ [π
a∗
oa
, πb∗ob , ..., π
x∗
ox
].
4.5 Evaluation
To validate the framework, both the theory R – including the behavior RB
and inference rules RI – and the input model MI for the web shop scenario
were realized1 in IDP. This is used to compare the alternative services of
WS::Purchase (i.e. πaws, π
b∗
ws, π
c∗
ws, and π
d∗
ws) under different trust perceptions
of the user. When considering the case in which both the web shop and postal
service company, comply with their service policies (i.e. this corresponds with a
user perception where services are fully trusted), the resulting user profiles are
independent of the used credentials. WS stores only the OrderNr and Email.
PS instead, stores the user’s Name and Address, the OrderNr and the tracking
URL. Both organizations have user profiles that are pseudonymous. The postal
service can also identify the user by his Name and Address from its user profile.
When no storage trust is present in both WS and PS, extra attributes are
part of the user profiles and it depends on the distribution trust of the user.
Table 4.1 presents the extra attributes collected in the web shop’s user profile
for the alternative services of WS::Purchase under different trust perceptions.
In the second column, the user has distribution trust in both organizations,
while in the third column he only trusts WS. The table clearly shows that,
except for service πb∗ws that uses the privacy-friendly ID card in the case that
TD = {WS ,PS}, the user is always identifiable by the web shop. These two
examples illustrate some of the conclusions generated by the framework. For
instance, to remain unidentifiable towards WS, the user needs to trust the
storage and distribution policies of both WS and PS.
1see https://github.com/decroik/inspect-privacy-and-trust/, 2013
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In addition, user profiles are bounded by a minimum and maximum. For the
user profile P ido′ (G|π
∗
o) we get that P
id
o′ (G|π
∗
o)
Tmax ⊆ P ido′ (G|π
∗
o) ⊆ P
id
o′ (G|π
∗
o)
Tmin .
The minimum user profile correspond to a full user trust perception Tmax =
{TmaxS , T
max
D }, where ∀o
′ ∈ O : o′ ∈ TmaxS ∧ o
′ ∈ TmaxD . The maximum user
profile instead, corresponds to a user who has no trust Tmin = {TminS , T
min
D },
with TminS = ∅ and T
min
D = ∅. It is trivial to prove this order between user
profiles using Equations (4.1) and (4.2). This requires to define the order
relation between two trust perceptions Tu = {T uS , T
u
D} and Tv = {T
v
S , T
v
D},
namely Tu ≥ Tv, with Tu ≥ Tv ⇔ T vS ⊆ T
u
S ∧ T
v
D ⊆ T
u
D.
Flexibility. Different types of users are easily modeled based on the user’s initial
state (e.g. the credentials the user owns) and his trust perception. Modelers can
use this to estimate the acceptance of a system for different types of real-world
users, since their perceptions influence their attitude towards the attributes
they disclose [192, 77]. Furthermore, our framework supports a less strict
definition of identifiability and pseudonymity represented in the identifier model
MID, which may be closer to their real-world counterparts.
Basic Framework. The approach presented here, is a basic framework for the
analysis of the privacy of users across different organizations. This framework
already allows to analyze many real-world scenarios and offers interesting
conclusions. Nevertheless, the framework can easily be extended to include
many more features, and coarse-grained concepts proposed here can be further
refined. Extra inference rules RI can be added to the theory R to extract more
conclusions. For instance, inference rules can be defined to show the gradual
growth of the user’s profiles over time for each additional invocation of a service.
Other inference rules may be used to verify the correctness (consistency) of
the input model or show the resulting user profiles when organizations collude.
Extensions to the vocabulary E may be necessary when defining new conclusions
and adding new inference rules to the framework. However, both inference
rules and vocabularies can be part of a library that is available to modelers.
Currently, the user’s trust perception is rather coarse-grained based on storage
and distribution trust. Although it may express many real-world settings, the
framework can easily be extended with more fine-grained trust perceptions.
Usability. Current service policies often vaguely describe their data practices.
It is, therefore, not trivial to use them as an input to automatically generate
the system model. Specification languages [22, 43, 182] present proposals that
enforce organizations to act according to the service policies that accurately
describe their data practices. These formal representations can be used to
automatically derive the system model in our framework. To make the
system modeling more comprehensive for non-experts, an input and output
component can be added to the framework. For instance, the input component
can automatically generate a user model MU and identifier model MID
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from a graphical representation made by the modeler. Similarly, a graphical
representation of the conclusions can be created to ease the interpretation of
the generated output.
4.6 Conclusions
The present chapter presented a formal approach to analyze privacy properties
in advanced electronic services. A framework realized in IDP is designed,
comprising an input model and an inference strategy. The latter supports the
compilation of user profiles from policies that are defined by service providers.
Relevant privacy properties can be extracted from these profiles. Among others,
it allows to check whether the actual system behavior corresponds to the user’s
expectations about the provider’s data practices. To show the framework’s
flexibility, it is realized and applied to a web shop. This chapter also described
the inference strategy in more detail, and applies it to a user with certain
privacy and trust assumptions. The next chapter will model multiple users
and show that the acceptability of the system under study also depends on the
user’s privacy preferences and trust in other stakeholders.
Chapter 5
Queries and Feedback
An approach to model electronic services with as main goal to analyze the
privacy properties is presented in chapter 3 and 4. The former defines the key
concepts for representing the privacy-related aspects of composite electronic
services; the latter integrates these concepts in a framework that consists
of components and relationships between them. Moreover, a strategy to
infer privacy properties was described, and the framework was realized in a
knowledge base system, namely IDP. The previous chapters also show how
relevant privacy feedback can be extracted.
Contributions. It is the present chapter’s goal to show the enormous potential
of the framework for extracting relevant privacy feedback. Therefore, it is
fully devoted to queries and feedback. Queries are classified according to
multiple categories. They can be applied to inspect the privacy of advanced
composite electronic services. Some queries focus on feedback related to
personal information spreading in the system whereas other queries show what
data can be linked. Multiple queries are applied to two alternative loyalty
schemes. The present chapter shows that the framework supports reasoning
about the privacy properties of different schemes. The resulting privacy
properties can be compared. This is useful feedback for both end-users and
system designers.
The contribution in this chapter are peer-reviewed in [68].
First, two loyalty schemes that are used in the rest of this chapter are described.
Section 5.1 gives an overview of the conceptual models. Thereafter, the privacy
assessment strategy is explained, and relevant privacy queries are defined (see
section 5.2). Relevant privacy properties of both loyalty schemes are then
71
72 QUERIES AND FEEDBACK
evaluated and compared in Section 5.3. This chapter ends with an evaluation
of the approach (see 5.4) and conclusions (see 5.5).
5.1 Loyalty Schemes
To demonstrate the power of the modeling approach, the methodology is
applied to two variants of a loyalty system. This case study targets the
validation of the approach and aims at demonstrating its practicability. An in-
depth privacy assessment will be performed, and both variants will be compared
based on key privacy properties. In a loyalty system, customers can collect
loyalty points. If a threshold is exceeded, the customer can get a reduction
after which the loyalty point balance is decreased with a given value. This
section gives an overview of the functional behavior of both variants.
Loyalty scheme 1. In the first scheme, each customer owns a plastic loyalty
card with a QR code printed on it. The latter embeds a customer identifier
(i.e. a unique pseudonym) and is issued during registration. During this
phase, the customer releases personal information to the loyalty provider (LP),
including his address, e-mail address, phone number, and possibly a collection of
other personal properties. After registration, the card can be used at a grocery
store (GS). When the customer checks out, the cashier scans all products, and
subsequently the customer identifier on the plastic card. All these data are
sent to the loyalty provider, which calculates the number of loyalty points that
are collected. Afterwards, LP sends back the increment, together with the
customer’s new balance, to the grocery store. These data are then printed on
the customer’s ticket. The loyalty provider forwards the list of products in each
shopping cart to an advertiser (AD). The advertiser pays a monthly fee to get
the data, and can build anonymous profiles based on the retrieved information.
The data can be processed to increase the attractiveness of product offerings
at certain grocery stores.
Loyalty scheme 2. In the second variant, the plastic card is replaced by a
smartphone app that is provided by a loyalty app provider (LA), and can be
used to manage multiple loyalty cards in a virtual card wallet. When using
it the first time, users must release their name and e-mail address during the
registration phase. Each virtual card contains a customer identifier (i.e. a
unique pseudonym) stored in the context of the app. It can be displayed
as a QR code by the app and subsequently presented to the grocery store
(GS). When the app is installed, the consumer gets a notification of the app’s
permissions. It mentions that the app provider can collect the user’s e-mail
address, his location and a fingerprint of the mobile device when the app is
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running. The app policy further defines that these data can be forwarded to
an advertiser (AD). A user typically starts the loyalty app when checking out.
He then selects the right virtual card, and presents the right QR code to the
scanner. The rest is similar to variant 1.
Smartphone (SM)
Grocery Store (GS)
Loyalty App Provider (LA)
LoyaltyCard::CustomerID
LoyaltyApp::CustomerID
Checkout
PrintTicket
Loyalty Program Provider (LP)
CollectLoyaltyPoints
CollectAppData
Advertiser (AD)
CollectData
Email
Location
DeviceFingerprint
Products
CustomerID
Location
DeviceFingerprint
Products
CustomerID Products
PointsEarned
PointBalance
SM::Location
SM::DeviceFingerprint
PointsEarned
PointBalance
Products
CustomerID
Address
Email
PhoneNumber
LoyaltyRegistrationProfile
Loyalty Scheme 1 + 2
Loyalty Scheme 2
Email
Name
AppRegistrationProfile
CustomerID
Figure 5.1: Conceptual model of loyalty schemes 1 and 2.
Conceptual model. Figure 5.1 displays a graphical overview of the data flow
in both variants of the loyalty system. It shows that the user can either use a
plastic loyalty card or a mobile app to identify him to the grocery store. The
model also includes the set of stakeholders (i.e. User, GS, LP, AD and LA)
and the set of services that are assigned to each service provider. Moreover,
it defines the order in which services are invoked, and the access policies that
are assigned to each service. The latter is specified in the privacy policies
that are made publicly available by the service providers. This can either be
in a P3P policy file for traditional web services or as a list of permissions
that is displayed to the user when a mobile app is installed. Two actions
(or services) are initiated by the customer (or by his mobile device), namely
CheckOut and CollectAppData. The former is represented by node πc∗GS in
the service invocation graph and refers to releasing the customer identifier
embedded in the QR code to the scanner when checking out at the grocery
store. The latter is represented by node πs∗LA in the service invocation graph
and defines the data that is released by the smartphone to the loyalty app
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provider when the app is running. Node πs∗LA is only relevant for variant 2.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 derive the service invocation graphs for variants 1 and 2
respectively. It should be noted that that services that are marked with an
asterix are invoked by the customer (or his smartphone).
GS::Checkout
GS::PrintTicket
AD::CollectData
LP::CollectLoyaltyPoints
pic∗GS
pic2GS
pic1LP
piAD
GpicGS
GS LP AD
Figure 5.2: Service invocation graph of loyalty scheme 1.
GS::Checkout
GS::PrintTicket
LA::CollectAppData
AD::CollectData
LP::ColletLoyaltyPoints
pic∗GS
pis∗LA
pic2GS
pic1LP
piAD
GpisLA
GpicGS
GS LP LA AD
Figure 5.3: Service invocation graph of loyalty scheme 2.
5.2 Privacy Assessment Strategy
The privacy assessment inspects and queries the profiles that can be built
by the stakeholders in the loyalty schemes. The profiles under study are
expected profiles. This means that they are variable under different user trust
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perceptions. For instance, a user may highly trust a specific service provider.
Amongst others, this means that he believes that the service provider will
comply with the storage policy that is specified and made publicly available.
Only the attributes that are included in the storage policy will be stored even
if a user releases more personal data during a service transaction. For instance,
if a user needs to release his birth date (to prove to be older than 18 years old)
to access a service and the policy does not state that the age will be stored, the
age will not be included in the (expected) profile. On the contrary, a user may
have low trust in a service provider, and believes that all personal attributes
that are released, will be stored (even though specified differently in the privacy
policy). Besides the trust assumptions, the user’s notion of identifiability and
anonymity will also have an impact on the outcome of the queries. For instance,
one user can assume that the birth date and city make him identifiable, whereas
another user can assume that, besides the birth date, his full address is needed
to make him uniquely identifiable. In this chapter, we model two prototypical
types of users, and assess (and compare) the privacy properties by querying the
expected profiles under different trust and identifiability assumptions. Both
loyalty schemes are evaluated. It is worth mentioning that our approach is
flexible to model many different types of users. This is exactly one of the key
properties of our methodology. The rest of this section is structured as follows.
First, user profiles are formally defined. Thereafter, the queries that will be
performed on both loyalty schemes are classified. Finally, two prototypical users
(or consumers) are instantiated. The next section returns query results on both
schemes given the trust and identifiability assumptions of these consumers.
User profiles. The tuple (o, id , s) defines a profile that is kept by organization
o ∈ O and that contains the unique identifier id ∈ ID (i.e. a unique
pseudonym or a set of uniquely identifying attributes). The profile (o, id , s)
is created as soon as the user invokes service s ∈ S. UserProfile(o, id , s, a)
defines that attribute a ∈ A is included in the profile (o, id , s). For instance,
UserProfile(LP ,CustomerID,Checkout ,Address) defines that the profile (LP,
CustomerID,Checkout) also contains the customer’s Address.
Querying privacy properties. Multiple types of queries can be performed
on the (expected) user profiles. They return useful information related to the
privacy properties of the overall system. The queries can be classified according
to four categories. Table B.1 in Appendix B formally defines the queries:
• Querying the anonymity level (i.e. Q1). This class defines the
anonymity level of a prototypical user towards each organization in the
system under study after he invoked a specific service. This anonymity
level is derived from the (expected) information that is included in the
profiles. Three anonymity levels are defined. A user is identifiable towards
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an organization if the profile that can be compiled by that organization
contains identifiable information that is sufficient to point to a physical
individual. A user remains pseudonymous towards an organization if
a persistent unique pseudonym is part of the profile. However, the
pseudonym cannot be linked to an individual. A user is anonymous
towards an organization if no unique data is revealed to that organization
when a particular service is accessed.
• Querying the attributes that are released to organizations
(i.e. Q2). A straightforward query can return all attributes that are
kept in the profile by an organization after a user invoked a service.
However, this set of attributes can be large. Therefore, two variants
Q2.1 and Q2.2 are presented here. Q2.1 queries all organizations in the
system that store a given set of attributes SearchSet after a certain service
invocation. For instance, the SearchSet can be {Address,Products,Name,
CustomerID}. If so, the organizations are returned that store at least
those four attributes about the user in a profile. Q2.2 allows to check if
certain privacy requirements are met in a given system. More specifically,
the designer or audit instance can impose the requirement that certain
organizations should not be able to store certain sensitive information.
For instance, personal medical records may certainly not be stored and
processed by a commercial advertiser in an e-health system. Similarly,
secret banking information may not be stored by the web shop in an
e-commerce application. In the latter case, only the bank institution
may store bank account information. Query Q2.2 allows to input a set
of attributes that may not be revealed towards certain organizations.
Subsequently, the query returns the service requests that may violate
those requirements, together with more information about the exact
requirement that is violated. In the loyalty system, it might be useful
to impose the requirement that the advertiser (AD) may not collect a
user’s Name, Address or Email, and then check whether this is fulfilled
when alternative services are invoked.
• Querying the impact of underlying collaborations (i.e. Q3). In
some cases, information exchange between organizations is important to
guarantee a quality of service in composite web services. For instance,
a web shop may release the customer’s address to a delivery service
provider. Without that information, the latter can never deliver a packet
to the customer. However, in other cases, information exchange is not
functional, but rather a means to increase profit. It is noteworthy to
signal that these types of collaborations are often not specified in the
privacy policies. For instance, a commercial organization, such as the
loyalty program provider, may make a contract with an advertiser. The
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contract can define that the commercial organization releases certain
attributes or even full profiles to the advertiser. In return, the former
receives a monthly fee. In many cases, these types of collaborations
lead to unidirectional information exchanges for which an organization
receives money. In our methodology, ShareDataWith(ofrom , oto) defines
that organization ofrom releases the collected user profiles to organization
oto (probably in return for a compensation). This predicate can be used
in two types of queries Q3.1 and Q3.2.
Q3.1 analyzes the new links that are introduced if a new collaboration
takes place. For instance, we can query the new links and profiles if
the loyalty provider (LP) shares all collected profiles with the grocery
store (GS). In order to investigate that impact, the user adds a predicate
ShareDataWith(LP,GS) to the model, and thereafter applies query Q1
(see Table B.1 in Appendix B). Next, Q2.1 returns the attributes in the
profiles.
Q3.2 returns a set of collaborations between organizations that are
necessary to fulfill more advanced requirements. It should be noted
that, in some cases, no valid set can be returned. Four types of
advanced requirements can be imposed. We can either impose that
users are Identifiable, Pseudonymous or Anonymous towards certain
organizations after certain service invocations are completed. If a user
must be Unidentifiable, this means that he remains either Pseudonymous
or Anonymous towards a certain organization. We can further impose
that certain collaborations must occur and that others are forbidden. We
refer to queryQ3.2 in Table B.1 in Appendix B for a concrete instantiation
of the query. Amongst others, the set of additional requirements
imposes that the user must be identifiable towards the grocery store after
Checkout, and at the same time remain unidentifiable to the loyalty app
provider. Moreover, LP must release all the collected data to GS. At
the same time, some collaborations are not allowed. Similar to the first
example, this type of query can be solved by reusing queries Q1, Q2.1
and Q2.2.
• Querying trust that is required between organizations (i.e. Q4).
If multiple entities are involved in a composite web service, certain
organizations must trust others. This is typically the case for attributes
that are exchanged between organizations. An organization Y that
receives user attributes from another organization X must rely on X
when it comes to the correctness of the user attributes. Moreover, in
composite web services, certain user attributes are passed through a
chain of organizations. In that case, the final recipient must trust all
entities in the chain. Query Q4.1 focuses on these trust relations. It
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searches for the organizations that must be trusted by a given set of
organizations TrustRelationshipsOf. These trust relations are represented
by Trusts(oref , e) that expresses that oref trusts stakeholder e (i.e. the
user or an organization). This relation is built from the data flow
of attributes AttributeDataFlow. This is constructed by the inductive
definition r4.2 (see Table B.1 in Appendix B), and can be derived from
the service invocation graph. Although not illustrated in the presented
loyalty schemes, our methodology also supports returning trust relations
that are required between organizations in case attributes are certified
(or signed) by an issuing organization O. In that case, the receiving
organization Y only needs to trust O, and not all organizations X ′ in
a chain that possibly forwards the data towards the final receiver. The
outcome of these queries is independent of the user’s trust assumptions.
Two prototypical consumers. The queries are performed on two proto-
typical consumers in the next section. Both consumers have different trust
perceptions and identifiability assumptions. Lisa is modeled as a consumer who
is rather cautious about her privacy, and Homer as a more careless character. It
should be noted that the methodology should be flexible enough to model a wide
range of user types. Both characters are discussed in more detail below. An
overview of their identifiability and trust assumptions is also listed in Table 5.1:
• Homer. He trusts nearly all entities in the loyalty system. This means
that he expects that most entities will comply with their privacy policies.
More specifically, he expects that the grocery store, the loyalty app
provider, and the loyalty program provider will only store the attributes
that are specified in their policy, and that they will only forward a
selection of those attributes to other entities as specified in the policy. In
fact, the advertiser is the only entity that is not trusted by Homer. Homer
further assumes he becomes identifiable if both this Name and Address
(i.e. I1) are included in a profile. A set of other personal attributes – like
his e-mail address (i.e. N2), his customer identifier (i.e. N3) and device
fingerprint (i.e. N4) – are considered pseudonyms.
• Lisa. She worries more about her privacy. In contrast to Homer, she
only trusts the grocery store. She assumes that the loyalty app provider,
the loyalty program provider and the advertiser do not always comply
with their specified privacy policy. Moreover, she assumes that either
revealing her Name (i.e. I2) or Address (i.e. I3) makes her identifiable
towards an organization. Just like Homer, she marks a set of attributes
as pseudonymous.
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Table 5.1: User models of a less privacy aware user Homer and a more privacy
aware user Lisa, applied to the modeled services of the loyalty schemes in
Section 5.1.
Homer Lisa
Trust Perception
Storage Trust GS,LA,LP GS
Distribution Trust GS,LA,LP GS
Identifiability model (Identifiers)
Identity I1 = {Name,Address} I2 = {Name}, I3 = {Address}
Pseudonym N1 = {PhoneNumber}, N1 = {PhoneNumber},
N2 = {Email}, N2 = {Email},
N3 = {CustomerID}, N3 = {CustomerID},
N4 = {DeviceFingerprint} N4 = {DeviceFingerprint}
It is noteworthy to signal that not all these user assumptions should be
modeled each time a new system is analyzed. In fact, prototypical and realistic
identifiability models can be reused when other systems are modeled. For a
specific system, the user must mark the level of trust he has in all stakeholders,
although experience teaches us that this is easier by far than reasoning about
realistic identifiability assumptions.
5.3 Privacy Assessment Results
The present section discusses the results of the queries applied to the model
of two variants of the loyalty scheme. These queries give feedback about the
privacy level and perception of two prototypical consumers, namely Homer
and Lisa, and mainly extract the feedback from the service invocation graphs
and the compiled profiles. The list of queries – as implemented in IDP –
can be found at https://github.com/decroik/inspect-privacy-and-trust. The first
scheme inspects the impact on the privacy of a consumer when checking out
(i.e. Checkout) with a plastic loyalty card at the grocery store. The second
variant performs a similar evaluation. The impact of running the mobile app
(i.e. CollectAppData) and checking out (i.e. Checkout) with the virtual card are
both considered here in the privacy analysis.
Table 5.2 and 5.3 compare the level of anonymity that Lisa and Homer have
in both schemes given the trust perception and identifiability assumptions of
them. Therefore, query Q1 is performed. The results show that, when checking
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out, Homer is persistently pseudonymous towards the loyalty program provider
and remains anonymous towards all other organizations in both variants of the
ecosystem. However, in variant 2, the mobile app makes Homer pseudonymous
towards the loyalty app provider and advertiser. In contrast, Lisa becomes
identifiable towards the loyalty program provider and the advertiser when
checking out with the plastic card, whereas she remains anonymous towards the
grocery store. Running the mobile app and checking out makes her identifiable
towards the loyalty program and app provider, and to the advertiser. Hence,
users who define more strict privacy concerns will probably prefer the plastic
card compared to the mobile app variant.
Table 5.2: Outcome of query Q1 applied to variant 1. Three levels of anonymity
are defined: (I)dentifiability, (P)seudonymity, or (A)nonymity.
.
Checkout
Homer Lisa
GS A A
LP P I
AD A I
Table 5.3: Outcome of query Q1 applied to variant 2. Three levels of anonymity
are defined: (I)dentifiability, (P)seudonymity, or (A)nonymity.
.
CollectAppData Checkout
Homer Lisa Homer Lisa
GS A A A A
LP A A P I
AD P I A I
LA P I A A
Table 5.4 and 5.5 return results related to queries Q2.1 and Q2.2 respectively.
They analyze the attributes that are kept in profiles. Table 5.4 shows that
no organization except the advertiser has the set {Address, Products,Name,
CustomerID} in a profile. This is only valid for Lisa’s profile caused by her
belief that much more information is stored and distributed by the stakeholders
in the ecosystem than actually presented in their privacy policy. Moreover, this
is only valid for variant 2 of the loyalty system. Hence, more privacy aware
consumers may opt for using a plastic card.
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Table 5.4: Outcome of queryQ2.1. The table shows the consumer’s user profiles
containing {Address, Products,Name,CustomerID}.
Homer Lisa
Variant 1
– –
Variant 2
(AD, N1,Checkout)
(AD, N2,Checkout)
(AD, N3,Checkout)
(AD, N4,Checkout)
(AD, I2,Checkout)
(AD, I3,Checkout)
Table 5.5: Outcome of query Q2.2. It shows whether the attributes (1) name,
(2) address, and (3) e-mail address are stored by the advertiser when invoking
a specific service.
Homer Lisa
Rule (1) (2) (3)
Variant 1
Checkout X X
Variant 2
CollectAppData X X
Checkout X X X
As advertisers are typically highly untrusted by many consumers – even Homer
may have his doubt about the trustworthiness of an advertiser – it might be
useful to inspect whether certain attributes are kept in their profiles about
consumers. Consumers want to inspect if their Name, Address or Email is
exposed to them. Releasing the first two attributes allows advertisers to
overload the user’s postal box with publicity; the latter can lead to spam.
Inspecting the presence or absence of these attributes is exactly what is
performed by query Q2.2. The results are listed in Table 5.5.
Queries Q3.1 and Q3.2 focus on the impact of collaborations between
organizations on the user’s level of anonymity. Query Q3.2 starts from a set of
identifiability/anonymity requirements ReqIdent and collaboration constraints
ReqColl , and returns what additional collaborations are at least required to
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Table 5.6: Results of query Q3.2. Additional collaborations that are necessary
to fulfill requirements ReqIdent ∪ReqColl (see Table B.1 in Appendix B) for the
second variant.
Homer Lisa
to GS LA LP AD GS LA LP AD
from
GS
LA X
LP X X X
AD X X X
fulfill ReqIdent . Our query imposes two identifiability requirements ReqIdent ,
namely (a) the grocery store (GS) wants to identify consumers at checkout and
(b) consumers are not anonymous towards the loyalty app provider (LA) during
checkout when the loyalty app is running. Furthermore, we assume that LP
must collaborate with GS, and a set of other collaborations are not allowed.
For instance, neither GS nor LP may collaborate with the loyalty app provider
(LA).
The query returns if all these requirements can be satisfied, and if so, evaluates
which collaborations (i.e. data sharing between organizations) are necessary to
fulfill all these requirements. Table 5.6 shows the results after being applied
to the second variant of the loyalty scheme. From the perspective of Homer,
at least five collaborations are required. In contrast to Lisa’s perspective, two
collaborations may meet the requirements as returned in the table.
To analyze the impact of the new collaborations on the anonymity level of
Homer and Lisa, query Q3.1 is applied on the model (including the new
additional data sharing predicates). Table 5.7 shows the anonymity level
in scheme 2 of Homer’s and Lisa’s. It is trivial that the overall level of
anonymity decreases compared to the situation in which less data sharing
was introduced. At Checkout, Homer is now pseudonymous towards the
loyalty program provider and identifiable towards the grocery store, loyalty
app provider, and advertisers. Lisa becomes identifiable to all organizations.
The fact that customers are identifiable towards advertisers at Checkout is
unacceptable for Lisa. If query Q3.2 is applied with the additional constraint
that it is not permitted to be identifiable at Checkout towards advertisers, we
see that no solution exists for Lisa. This result is expected because Table 5.3
shows that even without collaborations she is already identifiable.
Queries can check if these new collaborations allow organizations to link
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Table 5.7: Results of query Q3.1 that return the consequences of the
collaborations of Table 5.6 on the consumer’s anonymity level. Three levels
of anonymity are defined: (I)dentifiability, (P)seudonymity, or (A)nonymity.
CollectAppData Checkout
Homer Lisa Homer Lisa
GS P A I I
LP A A P I
AD P I I I
LA P I I I
Table 5.8: Results of query Q2.1 to analyze the attribute based consequences
in variant 2 of the collaborations of Table 5.6. User profiles (Organization,
Identifier, Service) containing set {Address, Products,Name,CustomerID}
are marked (X).
Homer Lisa
GS LA LP AD GS LA LP AD
CollectAppData
– – – – – – – –
Checkout
I1 X X X
I2 X X
I3 X X
N1 X X X X X
N2 X X X X X
N3 X X X X X
N4 X X X X X
Homer’s and Lisa’s purchased products with their name, address and customer
id. The results of Q2.1, presented in Table 5.8, show that from Homer’s
perspective the grocery store, the loyalty app provider, and advertisers are
able to link those user attributes. From Lisa’s perspective, only the loyalty
app provider and advertiser can do this. Furthermore, query Q2.2, of which
the results are presented in Table 5.9, shows that advertisers can retrieve the
name, address, or e-mail address when checking out at the grocery store in the
second loyalty scheme.
Finally, query Q4.1 returns the required trust relationships between the
84 QUERIES AND FEEDBACK
Table 5.9: Results of query Q2.2 to detect violations in variant 2 in case of
the collaborations of Table 5.6. Advertisers are not permitted to store the
customer’s (1) name, (2) address, or (3) e-mail address. User profiles (AD,
Identifier, Service) that violate this, are marked (X).
Homer Lisa
Rule (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
CollectAppData
I1
I2 X X
I3
N1
N2 X X X X
N3
N4 X X X X
Checkout
I1 X X X
I2 X X X
I3 X X X
N1 X X X X X X
N2 X X X X X X
N3 X X X X X X
N4 X X X X X X
Table 5.10: Results of query Q4.1 to analyze trust relationships in scheme 1 for
Homer and Lisa. Organizations that are trusted by another are marked (X).
Trusted User GS LP AD
By
GS
LP X X
AD
stakeholders for both variants of the loyalty system. The results, presented
in Table 5.10, show that for both variants the loyalty provider must trust the
user and grocery store. This result is derived from the invocation graphs, and
is independent from the user model applied.
EVALUATION 85
5.4 Evaluation
GS::Checkout
GS::PrintTicket
LA::CollectAppData
AD::CollectDataFromApp
LP::CollectLoyaltyPoints
picGS
pis∗LA
pic2GS
pic1LP
pi
′
AD
pic∗GS
pis∗LA
pic2GS
pic1LP
pi
′
AD
AD::CollectDataFromLoyaltyProvider pi
′′
AD pi
′′
AD
GpisLA
GpicGS
GpisLA
GS LP LA AD GS LP LA AD
(a) G′ (b) G′′
Figure 5.4: Alternative service invocation graphs of loyalty scheme 2.
This section reflects on the usability and flexibility of the modeling approach,
and proposes alternative service representations. Model extensions are
mentioned at the end of this section.
The privacy analysis methodology allows to extract meaningful information
towards system designers, audit instances and end-users. These are the major
three stakeholders that can benefit from the formal methodology.
System designers can adopt the approach for many reasons. First, they
can extract whether the current design is compatible with corporate privacy
policies and legislation, and eventually perform modifications that may lead
to compliance. Second, the methodology also returns relevant information
about the identifiability level and size of the profiles kept by certain service
providers. This gives feedback about possible additional security measures
that should be taken. If profiles are identifiable, they are probably a more
interesting target for hackers. In contrast, anonymous profiles have less
value and, consequently, will be attacked with a much lower probability.
Third, system designers can also query the impact of alternative design
decisions. For example, the impact of using alternative authentication tokens
on the privacy can be returned. More specifically, although it is already
clear that anonymous credentials are in many cases more privacy friendly
than traditional certificate technology, this methodology can show the exact
profiles in both cases. Hence, a more fine-grained comparison is possible. If
the privacy gain by using anonymous credentials is meaningless or low, the
designer might opt for more straightforward authentication technologies (such
as X.509 certificates). However, if the privacy increases considerably when
using anonymous credentials, this solution might be considered (although this
technology often introduces some performance penalty). Finally, prototypical
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users can be modeled. From this, the designer can derive which types of
characters will typically use the system, and which ones will be reluctant to use
it. This can give indications about the market share of a typical system. For
instance, if a prototypical user is modeled that represents the trust perception
and privacy wishes of 25 percent of the population, and if serious conflicts arise
between the trust required to meet the privacy wishes and the trust perception
of that prototypical user, that system will probably hardly be adopted by those
individuals.
Audit organizations are possibly the major adopters of this methodology.
Those instances can verify whether systems under study are compatible
with privacy legislation, and derive the required trust in the organizations
for realizing certain privacy claims (related to data storage, processing and
distribution). Audit organizations will typically also be interested in the impact
of collaborations on the overall privacy.
Finally, the end-users can compare the privacy-friendliness of systems with
similar functionality, and select one based on the privacy analysis that is
possibly performed and published by an audit organization. For instance, if
multiple web shops offer the same book, the user can select a particular shop
not only based on the price, but also based on the privacy properties when using
the service. If multiple credentials, such as a Google account, a student card or
an electronic identity card, are supported for accessing/using the service, the
user can now select the most appropriate token based on the privacy properties.
Although the user cannot model each system it accesses, model descriptions of
multiple electronic services can be published by an audit instance. Instead of
moving a meaningless privacy slider that is often used in current web browsers,
the user can set his trust perceptions and identifiability assumptions. This
only needs to be done once. These inputs can serve as input to the models
that are published by audit instances. It is worth mentioning that one could
argue that the user needs to input his trust perception in each individual entity
in the system. However, categories can be proposed, and the input tool can
already propose many suggestions. For instance, users typically have lower
trust in commercial organizations than in governmental ones. Similarly, users
are willing to release bank account information to financial institutions whereas
they are willing to release e-health attributes to health providers (and not to
their bank institution).
It is worth mentioning that this methodology models the privacy properties of
one single individual. Hence, it can provide feedback about user’s privacy in
terms of (un)linkability (i.e. anonymity, pseudonymity, and identifiability) when
using electronic services as defined by Phitzmann et al. [143]. Complementary
strategies are needed to evaluate undetectability and unobservability (i.e. two
privacy concepts also defined by Phitzman). The user profiles and the
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attributes they contain, generated by our approach, can serve as input for
other types of analysis, for instance approaches based on anonymity sets [156].
Representations of service invocations in scheme 2. In some cases,
multiple variations are possible to model a single application. We discuss two
alternatives for the service invocation graph of scheme 2. The first one, depicted
in Figure 5.4a, splits node πAD ∈ Π into two nodes, namely π
′
AD ∈ Π
′ and
π
′′
AD ∈ Π
′. This is based on the property that nodes with multiple incoming
edges can be split into nodes with one incoming edge that represent the same
service as the original one. However, this comes at a price, namely, the required
memory for inferring the service model increases with the number of nodes.
Hence, unless required by semantics, nodes should remain undivided. Nodes
should be split only when they meet one of the following conditions:
• A node in a sub-graph has at least two incoming edges from nodes in the
same sub-graph (i.e. a sub-graph must be a tree).
• The access policies related to each incoming edge of a node are
different. For instance, a web e-mail provider’s service policy specifies
that user information is logged (i.e. logging service) during registration
(i.e. registration service) and when the e-mail service is used (i.e. send e-
mail service). During registration the user’s name and e-mail address are
logged, while only the e-mail address and time information is collected
when the user sends an e-mail.
In case of the second scheme, the service πAD collects data from π
s∗
LA and π
c3∗
GS .
However, it is typical that these service policies are vague and only mention
they forward data to an advertiser without mentioning the exact advertiser.
In the model, such services are connected with empty service policies (service
policies are not available to the modeler). Furthermore, it requires to model
that a user has no trust in organizations that host these services. They assume
that such organizations store and forward all the data they can collect.
The second alternative, depicted in Figure 5.4b, concerns the checkout at the
grocery store as a causality of selecting the loyalty card in the loyalty app,
namely, πs∗LA <G π
c
GS (note that π
c
GS 6∈ Π
∗). It meets the assumption that a
customer selects his loyalty card only to checkout at the grocery store. Because
πs∗LA and π
c3
AD are both part of GpisLA , πAD must be split into π
′
AD and π
′′
AD. This
requires additional memory for inferring the model. Moreover, complications
arise with modeling the scanning of the QR code from the loyalty app during
the checkout phase at the grocery store. This is modeled as a QR code that is
forwarded from πs∗LA to π
c
GS . Nevertheless, it deviates from reality and leads to
incorrect results. In reality, it is physically only possible to scan a customer’s
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QR code with the scanner. In the model however, forwarded data depends on
the customer’s trust perception. In case it is modeled that he has no trust in the
data forwarding practices of an organization, then all data possibly collected by
that organization is forwarded. For instance, the loyalty app provider collects
and forwards not only the QR code, he also collects other personal data, such
as the customer’s e-mail address, his location, and linkable data specific to his
mobile device (e.g. a unique mobile device ID) or mobile operator (e.g. carrier
user ID). Currently, this cannot be expressed and a more fine-grained user trust
perception model is required to accurately model this loyalty scheme.
Temporal privacy analysis. In the current model, privacy is analyzed
based on user profiles generated from a given state. However, more useful
queries are possible when temporal aspects are added to models of the current
approach. In particular, each service that is invoked is attached to a point in
time. User profiles can then be generated depending on the point of time. Also,
dependencies between services can be expressed. For instance, collecting loyalty
points is only possible after a customer registered to the loyalty program. This
extension creates a wide variety of possible privacy analysis. A first example
is to infer a sequence of services that is required for invoking a given service
while preserving a user’s privacy and meeting a set of functional requirements.
Another example is to verify the reachability of a user invokable service that is
given.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter shows the potential of the framework for inspecting the privacy in
composite electronic services. It focuses on relevant privacy feedback that can
be extracted by querying models that are constructed with the framework. We
show that multiple users can be represented. The framework can reason about
the acceptability of a system with respect to the privacy preferences and trust
assumptions of those users. Moreover, the framework allows to model multiple
instances of the same application, and subsequently reason and compare those
instances. To demonstrate the flexibility of the framework, two loyalty schemes
were modeled and queried. Moreover, multiple users are modeled. We show
that a user model can be reused if a new application is modeled. Vice versa,
users with different privacy and trust expectations can easily be added without
impact on the system modeling part.
Part II
Extensions and Validation
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Chapter 6
Modeling Ticketing Systems
in Public Transport
Part I of this thesis presented a modeling based approach for inspecting privacy
in complex electronic services. Chapter 3 identified modeling concepts essential
for capturing privacy properties. Chapter 4 defines a framework comprising
the previously defined modeling concepts. The potential of the framework for
deriving feedback of privacy properties is shown in Chapter 5. The flexibility
of the approach is demonstrated by inspecting the privacy in services from
different application domains. The framework considers users who interact with
a single service front-end that automatically invokes underlying sub-services.
Contributions. This chapter extends the framework of Part I to analyze the
privacy of a user who interacts with multiple service front-ends. Additional
modeling concepts are defined to capture advanced credential technologies
and relate credential ownership and service invocations to time. A privacy-
preserving public transport ticketing system is presented and modeled in IDP
for validating the framework. Queries are defined that search for a sequence of
executable services that represents the order in which a user interacts with the
service front-ends . Time-dependent user profiles, from which feedback about
privacy properties are extracted, can be built based on these extensions.
The privacy-preserving public transport ticketing system is joint work with
Milica Milutinovic and is peer-reviewed in [129]. The contributions to this
paper include the research of state-of-the-art public transport ticketing system
technologies, assistance with the protocol specifications, and the performance
measurements of the protocols.
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 categorizes
credential technologies and extends the privacy analysis framework of Part I
with newly defined concepts capturing the properties of alternative credential
technologies. Next, modeling concepts capturing temporal properties related
to service invocations are added to the framework (see Section 6.2). Section 6.3
defines the modeling concepts necessary to represent conditional service
accesses. The inference strategy to compute the user profiles associated with a
sequence of services invoked by a user is discussed in Section 6.4. Section 6.5
presents a privacy-preserving public transport ticketing system that is used for
the validation of the privacy analysis approach and extensions. This chapter
ends with conclusions in Section 6.6.
6.1 Supporting Alternative Credential Technolo-
gies
6.1.1 Motivation
The framework presented in Part I of this thesis supports a limited set
of credential technologies. It is important to show the extendability of
the framework since other credential technologies may have more advanced
properties. First, privacy properties are identified that characterize more
advanced credential technologies. Modeling extensions are then defined that
represent these identified properties.
6.1.2 Privacy Properties of Credential Technologies
Many ticketing services in public transport are based on contactless smart cards.
They are issued as personalized or anonymous passes, such as the personalized
or anonymous OV-cards [170] in the Dutch public transport system. The
personalized version records traveler’s personal attributes, while the anonymous
card provides better privacy. However, a traveler with an anonymous card has
access to a limited set of services. For example, in the Dutch public transport
system, a traveler with an anonymous OV-card cannot benefit from reductions
based on his age since no personal attributes are stored on his card. The cards
are read when a traveler enters the vehicle and in some implementations, such as
in the Dutch public transport system, also when he exits. This allows to employ
a pay-per-use system, i.e. the traveler pays a fixed price (e.g. the maximum
ticket value) when starting a ride and is returned the change when exiting.
A commonly used smart card technology for implementing these systems is
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Mifare Classic [136]. They are used in the Dutch OV-chip card ticketing system
and the London Oyster chip cards [171]. Transactions with this type of cards
require mutual authentication between the card and the reader before the card’s
memory can be accessed. This involves, even in case of an anonymous pass, the
exchange of the card’s unique identifier, making all transactions with the card
linkable. Another example of a commercially used technology is Calypso [42].
This is an NFC-enabled smart card technology used in Belgium (MOBIB) [130]
and Paris (Navigo) [133]. Similar to Mifare Classic cards, transactions in which
a Calypso smart card is used are linkable as well since the card’s serial number
is disclosed.
A more privacy-preserving public transport ticketing system is presented in
Section 6.5. This system relies on eTokens [128]. The tokens, denoted
by {C, info, pbsig}, represent a partially blinded signature pbsig on a public
information part info and a private part C. It is assumed that the public
information part, which is always revealed, leaks no unique attributes that can
be linked to the traveler. The private part is a commitment on a secret. The
secret is linked to an Idemix credential and is not revealed to public transport
operators. A traveler possesses a batch of tokens that can only be spent once.
The tokens allow to travel anonymously since their issuance cannot be linked
with their spending and the spending of two tokens cannot be linked as well.
Table 6.1 gives an non-exhaustive overview of the privacy properties of
advanced credential technologies relevant to public transport ticketing systems.
The considered properties are:
• Linkability/Unlinkability. A service’s access policy may require that
individuals prove ownership of a set of credentials (i.e. spending a
credential) to access the service. The credentials are issued by a trusted
third-party or by the service provider. Unlinkability between credential
issuance and spending (C1 ) and between two spendings of a same
credential (C2 ) are two essential properties when considering privacy in
services.
• Attribute disclosure. Data minimization is a main privacy protection
principle aiming for minimal disclosure of personal attributes to service
providers. For this reason, it is important to consider selective attribute
disclosure (C3 ) of credential technologies. For example, a user can choose
to only reveal his name even though his address and birth date are
included in the credential as well. Furthermore, the selective attribute
disclosure property also enables to prove attribute properties without
revealing their values (i.e. attribute predicate disclosure). For example,
an individual proves his age is between 18 and 25, based on his birth date
included in his credential, without revealing birth date.
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Table 6.1: Overview of privacy properties of credentials
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(C1 ) Issuance ↔ Spending L U U L L U2
(C2 ) Spending ↔ Spending L U U3 L L U2,3
Attribute disclosure
(C3 ) Selective attribute disclosure X X X X X X
1: It is assumed that no unique set of attributes are disclosed
2: It is assumed that the eToken’s public information part info, which is always
revealed, leaks no unique attributes that can be linked to an individual
3: Can only be obtained with diﬀerent credentials used for each spending
Linkability/Unlinkability. Depending on the used credential technology, unique
attributes that can be linked to an individual may be revealed towards the issuer
and service provider during the issuance and spending of a credential. During
the issuance process, the unique identifiers of X.509 certificates, Mifare Classic
and Calypso smart cards are revealed (e.g. an X.509 certificate’s serial number
and public key, or the card’s unique identifier in case of a Mifare Classic and
Calypso card). Moreover, since the same identifiers are also disclosed when
spending the above-mentioned credentials, their issuance and spending (C1 )
and multiple spendings (C2 ) are linkable.
Better privacy properties can be achieved with PETs such as eTokens, Idemix
and U-Prove credentials. During the issuance of Idemix credentials, the
user sends, along with the (blinded) attributes, a freshly generated one-time-
used pseudonym (i.e. commitment on his secret) to the issuer. Furthermore,
mutually unlinkable one-time-used pseudonyms are generated each time the
Idemix credential is spent. Given that no unique set of attributes is disclosed
during the spending, the issuance of the Idemix credential cannot be linked to
the spending (C1 ) and multiple spendings of the same credential cannot be
linked (C2 ). An eToken is a hybrid cryptographic scheme based on Idemix
credentials, partially blinded signatures and commitments that can only be
spent once. Their issuance and spending is unlinkable (C1 ) given that no
unique set of attributes is disclosed during the spending. Unlinkable spendings
(C2 ) can be realized if for each spending a new eToken is selected from a pool of
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eTokens. The issuance of U-Prove credentials instead, uses blinded signatures
to realize unlinkability between the issuance and spending (C1 ). Similar to
eTokens, unlinkable spendings of U-Prove credentials can be realized in case
different credentials are selected fro each spending from a pool of credentials
(C2 ).
Attribute disclosure. (C3 ) Selective attribute disclosure is supported by
Idemix and U-Prove. Moreover, both technologies enable to prove properties
based on attributes included in the credentials without revealing their values.
In contrast to Idemix and U-Prove, all attributes included in eTokens, X.509
certificates, Mifare Classic and Calypso based smart cards are disclosed.
6.1.3 Modeling Credential Technologies
Credential technologies. In the framework presented in Part I, credentials
are represented by elements of the Credential domain. Sub-domains of the
Credential domain are defined for each supported credential technology. For
instance, X.509 certificates are represented by elements of the X.509 domain,
which is a sub-domain of the Credential domain. Similarly, sub-domains are
defined for each credential technology in Table 6.1.
Linkability/Unlinkability. In some PETs, credential spendings with the same
credential cannot be linked. The current framework cannot express this
since it makes only distinction between pseudonyms and identities that are
represented by the domains Pseudonym and Identity respectively. Both are
sub-domains of the domain Identifier. To support this, a new domain and
predicate are defined. TransactionPseudonym is a sub-domain of Identifier
representing one-time used pseudonyms (i.e. transaction pseudonyms [143]).
The predicate CredentialIdentifier(Credential , Identifier) expresses which cre-
dential technology-specific identifiers are revealed when spending a credential.
Listing 6.1 illustrates how the newly defined concepts can be used to model an
X.509 certificate based identity card and one that is based on Idemix credentials.
The X.509 certificate based identity card reveals a set of pseudonyms (i.e. the
card serial number and signature, and the owner’s pubic key) in case it is spent.
The Idemix based identity card only reveals a one-time-used identifier when it
is spent.
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IDP Listing 6.1: Modeling example of credential technology specific
identifiers revealed when spending a credential.
type Idemix = {IdentityCardIdemix}
type X509 = {IdentityCardX509 }
type TransactionPseudonym = {OneTimeUsedPseudonym}
type Pseudonym = {SerialNumber ;PublicKey;Signature}
type Identity = {}
CredentialIdentifier(Credential, Identifier) = {
(IdentityCardIdemix ,OneTimeUsedPseudonym);
(IdentityCardX509 ,SerialNumber); (IdentityCard ,PublicKey);
(IdentityCard509 ,Signature)}
Attribute Disclosure The framework is extended with concepts capable
of expressing the attribute disclosure properties (C3 ) of the credential
technologies considered in Table 6.1. The current framework supports
expressing the non-selective and selective disclosure of attribute values, but
lacks expressiveness to capture attribute predicate disclosure. Attributes
can be considered as properties describing the user (e.g. his eye color)
and its context (e.g. his location). Moreover, properties can be based on
combinations of attributes. For this reason, the framework is extended with
the PropertyBasedOn(Attribute,Attribute) predicate. This predicate relates
a property (i.e. first argument) to the attributes from which it is derived
(i.e. second argument). Listing 6.2 illustrates how the property 18 < Age < 25
can be expressed in terms of his birth date. For example, an individual proves
his age is between 18 and 25 using the birth date that is included in his
credential. In case, for example, an Idemix credential is used, this can be
proven while keeping the birth date hidden. In case an X.509 certificate is
used, then besides his birth date all other attribute values in the credential
are revealed as well. Additional rules are defined in the framework’s theory
describing the selective attribute disclosure.
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IDP Listing 6.2: Modeling example of the property 18 < Age < 25.
type Attribute = {AgeBetween18and25 ;BirthDate}
PropertyBasedOn(Attribute,Attribute) = {
(AgeBetween18and25 , BirthDate)}
6.1.4 Reflection
The modeling concepts of the framework in Part I (see Listing 4.4) can be
reused to represent the advanced credential technologies in Table 6.1. However,
they lack the expressiveness to fully capture the properties of these credential
technologies. For this reason, additional modeling concepts were defined to
express advanced properties such as selective attribute disclosure and the
disclosure of unique sets of attributes (i.e. pseudonyms or identities) related
to the used credential technology. The latter could be expressed by the
predicate CredAttr(Credential, Attribute) as defined by the framework in Part I
(see Listing 4.4). However, its semantics is not accurate. For example, the
relation CredAttr(IdentityCardIdemix,OneTimeUsedPseudonym) expresses that
OneTimeUsedPseudonym is an attribute of IdentityCardIdemix, but it does
not express that it is inherently revealed due to the technology used by the
credential that is spent.
6.2 Temporal Aspects of Privacy
6.2.1 Motivation
The framework in Part I focuses on analyzing the privacy of a user interacting
with the front-end of a single service that, in his turn, interacts with underlying
sub-services. In more realistic settings, users interact with front-ends of
multiple services. For example, a user first registers to the public transport
ticketing system to obtain a transport pass. He can then use that pass to
validate bus trips or to purchase transport products (e.g. a monthly reduction
plan). This section, hence, extends the framework to capture the privacy of a
user who interacts with multiple services.
98 MODELING TICKETING SYSTEMS IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT
6.2.2 Modeling Temporal Aspects of Privacy
In the framework of Part I, let x <G x1 <G x2 <G . . . <G xp and y <G y1 <G
y2 <G . . . <G yq denote the order in which services are invoked as a consequence
of a user invoking services x and y respectively. A causal-order relation <G is
considered between services automatically invoked by x and between services
automatically invoked by y. However, the order between services xi and yj
cannot be expressed by means of this causal-order relation. Therefore, a time-
order relation is added to the framework.
Let x <T y define the time-order relation, denoting that the user invokes service
x before service y. For example, x represents the registration to the public
transport ticketing system and y the purchase of a transport product. For this
reason, a finite Time domain is added to the framework with discrete ordered
time points of a linear (i.e. unbranched) time line. The aforementioned linear
time representation can be expressed using the Linear Time Calculus (LTC)
used for modeling dynamic systems [34] and which is supported by the IDP
language. Real world service invocations, occurring in continuous time, are
mapped to discrete finite time. Figure 6.1 depicts the two-dimensional time-
causality service invocation graph of user-invoked services x, y, and z. The
services invoked by the user are ordered along the Time axis according to the
order in which they are invoked by the user. Services that are invoked by other
services (i.e. causality) are ordered along the Causal axis.
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Figure 6.1: A service invocation time-causality graph
The time-order between invoked services implies that some relations must
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include an additional Time argument to express time dependencies. The
number of those relations grows linearly with the size of the Time domain
(i.e. Cartesian product). As a result, the search space to compute solutions
(i.e. output models) grows as well. The following modeling decisions are made
to compute solutions more efficiently and avoid an explosion of the search space.
• Finite Time domain. The Time domain is finite and cannot grow
dynamically. An estimation of size of the Time domain must be made
beforehand. It is important to limit the size of the Time domain since
it influences the size of the search space. However, the smaller the size
of the Time domain, the weaker the conclusions that can be drawn from
the resulting output models. For example, in case no satisfying output
models are found within the modeled time interval, there is no guarantee
that no models exist outside the interval. To minimize the Time domain,
services invoked by the user are mapped to consecutive time points of the
interval [t0 . . . tm] (see Figure 6.1). No information is lost compared to
invoked services that are not mapped to consecutive time points as only
the relative time-order is considered in the framework.
• Non-simultaneous service invocations by the user. To decrease the
complexity of the modeling, a user cannot simultaneously invoke services
(i.e. along the Time axis). This corresponds with the real world in which a
user cannot simultaneously interact with different services (i.e. at least an
infinite small time delta can be detected between two invoked services).
• Service invocation relative order. Discrete time points in the model
represent a relative order between services invoked by the user. Let x
and y be two services consecutively invoked by the user at respective real-
world continuous time points tx and ty, with tx < ty. The time points are
mapped to the respective discrete time points t0 ∈ Time and t1 ∈ Time,
with t0 < t1.
• Orthogonality property. Time and causality are orthogonal. This
property implies that two services x and x’ are invoked at the same
time point in case x <G x
′. This reduces the modeling complexity since
it enables specifying a time-order between sub-services of different user-
invoked services (e.g. xi <T yj, with x <T y ∧ xi <G x ∧ yj <G y).
Moreover, relations (x, x), (x, x1), . . . , (x, xp), expressing that services
x, x1, . . . , xp are invoked by service x which is invoked by the user, can
be rewritten as (t0, x), (t0, x1), (t0, x2), . . . , (t0, xp), with t0 being the time
point at which service x is invoked by the user.
Listing 6.3 illustrates how the invocation of the services depicted in Figure 6.1
are modeled. A Time domain of n time points is defined. The services are
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referred to by elements of the ServiceIdentifier domain (see Section 4.3). The
causal order between services is defined by the relations described by the predi-
cate DistrAttrTo (see Section 4.3). A partial function ServiceInvokedByUserAt
is defined representing the time at which a service is invoked by the user. The
function is partial as only a subset of the Time domain is related to invoked
services. For instance, there are no services invoked by the user at time points
m+ 1 until n in Figure 6.1.
IDP Listing 6.3: Modeling the services invocations of Figure 6.1
type Time = 0 . . . n
type ServiceIdentifier = {x;x1; . . . ;xp; y; y1; . . . ; yq; z; z1; . . . ; zr}
type DistributionPolicyId = {dpx; dpx1; . . . ; dpxp−1; dpy; dpy1; . . . ; dpyq−1}
DistrAttrTo(DistributionPolicyId, ServiceIdentifier,Attribute, Stakeholder) = {
(dpx , x1, ax, ox); (dpx1, x2, ax, ox); . . . ; (dpxp−1, xp, ax, ox);
(dpy, y1, ay, oy); (dpy1, y2, ay, oy); . . . ; (dpyq−1, yq, ay, oy);
(dpz , z1, az, oz); (dpz1, z2, az, oz); . . . ; (dpzr−1, zr, az, oz)}
partial ServiceInvokedByUserAt(Time) : ServiceIdentifier = {
0→ x; 1→ y;m→ z}
6.2.3 Reflection
The modeling of temporal aspects of privacy is computational more complex
because the size of the search space increases in relation to the size of the Time
domain. The modeling decisions in this section minimize the size of the Time
domain which is more efficient to find solutions (i.e. reducing the size of the
search space). Nevertheless, a modeler must foresee how many time points will
be needed to find a solution since the Time domain is finite and cannot grow
dynamically. If the sequence of user-invoked services is known, the modeler
can easily estimate the number of time points (i.e. the size of the Time domain
is equal to number of user-invoked services). Otherwise, the modeler must
estimate the number of required time points.
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6.3 Conditional Service Invocations
6.3.1 Motivation
In the privacy analysis framework, as presented in Part I, it is assumed that
a user owns the credentials requested by a service’s access policies. As a
consequence, services are executed unconditionally. For example, the traveler
must register to the public transport ticketing system to obtain a travel pass.
To purchase transport products he must show his travel pass. Hence, this
section extends the framework with modeling concepts required to capture
time-dependent credential ownership.
6.3.2 Modeling Conditional Service Invocations
The framework should make a distinction between a service that is invoked
and a service that is executed. The former is represented by the predicate
ServiceInvokedAt(ServiceIdentifier,Time) specifying the time point at which
a service is invoked. The latter is represented by the predicate ServiceExe-
cuteAt(ServiceIdentifier,Time) specifying the time point at which a service is
executed. A service can only execute if all access policy requirements are met.
A user initially owns a set of credentials (e.g. his identity card). Other
credentials are issued to him via a registration phase (e.g. his travel pass).
Modeling concepts are defined capturing both options. The predicate Ini-
tiallyOwnedCredentials describes the unary relation specifying the credentials
initially owned by the user. Listing 6.4 shows an input model representing a user
who initially owns an identity card. The second type of relation is described by
the fluent (i.e. properties that can change over time) OwnCredentialAt, defined
in Listing 6.5. They represent the credentials that are owned by a user at a
given time point. The definition in Listing 6.5 includes the rules to derive those
relations. The first rule includes the initially owned credentials (i.e. t = 0). The
second rule, which is based on a service’s output policy specifications, includes
the credentials issued by a service executed at time point t. The final rule
includes the credentials that are already owned by the user at time point t− 1
and are not revoked at time point t.
IDP Listing 6.4: Modeling an identity card initially owned by the user.
InitiallyOwnedCredential(Credential) = {IdentityCard}
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IDP Listing 6.5: Modeling time-dependent credential ownership.
OwnCredentialAt(Credential ,Time)
Def
=


∀c : OwnCredentialAt(c, 0)← InitiallyOwnedCredential(c).
∀c∀t : OwnCredentialAt(c, t)← ∃s∃op : ServiceExcecute(s, t)∧
OutputPolicy(s) = op ∧ OutputCred(op, c).
∀c∀t : OwnCredentialAt(c, t)← ∃tx : OwnCredentialAt(c, tx)∧
¬RevokedCredential(c, t) ∧ t = tx + 1.
(6.1)
6.3.3 Reflection
In the framework as presented in Part I, credential ownership is modeled
implicitly. The elements in the Credential domain are assumed to be owned by
the user from the beginning. In this section, credentials can be issued at any
time point in the Time domain. For this reason, the framework is extended
to make a distinction between initially owned credentials and those that are
not owned from the beginning. The former are specified by the modeler in
the framework’s user model (i.e. the part of the input model describing the
user); the latter can be automatically derived from the service’s output policy
included in the system model (i.e. the part of the input model describing the
system).
6.4 Dynamic User Profiles
6.4.1 Motivation
The privacy analysis framework as presented in Part I is limited to a user
interacting with a single service front-end that, in turn, interacts with
underlying sub-services. Privacy properties are extracted from the user profiles
that are built based on what is specified in the service policies and also on the
user’s trust perception. This chapter extends the framework with newly defined
concepts capturing the privacy of a user interacting with multiple service front-
ends. As a consequence, modeled user profiles are dynamic as their content
can increase with every service that is invoked by the user.
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6.4.2 Modeling Dynamic User Profiles
The framework in Part I represents a user profile (see Listing 6.6) as a set of
attributes stored by an organization that can link the set to an identifier. An
attribute in the user profile is asserted by a stakeholder and is collected by a
service invoked by the user. This representation lacks expressiveness to capture
dynamic user profiles.
IDP Listing 6.6: The modeling representation of a user profile as presented
in Part I.
UserProfile(Organization, Identifier, ServiceIdentifier,Attribute, Stakeholder)
The framework is, hence, extended with a time-dependent representation
capturing dynamic user profiles (see Listing 6.7). It is noteworthy to mention
that the predicates representing the static (see Listing 6.6) and dynamic user
profiles are overloaded. Dynamic user profiles are represented as a set of
attributes stored by an organization that can link the set to an identifier. An
attribute in the user profile is asserted by astakeholder and is collected by a
service that is invoked by the user at a given time point. It is trivial to prove,
using the non-simultaneous service invocation and orthogonality property (see
Section 6.2.2), that ServiceIdentifier in Listing 6.6 can be replaced by Time.
IDP Listing 6.7: The modeling representation of a dynamic user profile.
UserProfile(Organization, Identifier,Time,Attribute, Stakeholder)
6.4.3 Strategy to Infer Dynamic User Profiles
Consider services x and y invoked by a user and organizations ox and oy ,
respectively, providing these services. The user profiles at a given time point t
are computed in multiple steps.
STEP 1: build user profile along the causality axis. The first step is similar to
the inference strategy as presented in Section 4.4 as it considers the causality
dimension. User profiles are separately computed for services x, x1, x2, . . . , xp
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and y, y1, y2, . . . , yq, with x <G x1 <G x2 <G . . . <G xp and y <G y1 <G
y2 <G . . . <G yq. The resulting user profiles, represented by the predicate in
Listing 6.6, are used in the next step.
STEP 2: build user profile along the time axis. The second step considers
the time at which services are invoked by a user. The user profiles built
are inductively defined in Listing 6.8. The first definition rule adds the user
profiles associated with the service invoked by the user at time point t, resulting
from STEP 1. The second rule states that existing user profiles are never
destroyed. More specifically, if a user profile exists at moment t − 1, then
it exists at moment t as well. The third rule considers the collaboration
between two organizations, which is modeled with the unidirectional relation
ShareDataWith(Organization,Organization). Given two organizations o1 and
o2, ShareDataWith(o1, o2) expresses that o1 shares its data with o2. For instance,
o2 pays to get the customer database of o1. The final definition rule considers
a user profile of organization o linked to identifier idx at moment t.
IDP Listing 6.8: Inductive definition of a dynamic user profiles.
UserProfile(Organization, Identifier ,Time,Attribute,Stakeholder )
Def
=


∀o∀id∀t∀a∀e : UserProfile(o, id , t, a, e)← ∃s :
UserProfile(o, id , s, a, e)∧
ServiceInvokedByUserAt(t) = s.
∀o∀id∀t∀a∀e : UserProfile(o, id , t, a, e)← ∃t0 :
UserProfile(o, id , t0, a, e) ∧ t = t0 + 1.
∀o∀id∀t∀a∀e : UserProfile(o, id , t, a, e)← ∃ox :
UserProfile(ox, id, t, a, e) ∧ ShareDataWith(ox, o).
∀o∀id∀t∀a∀e : UserProfile(o, id , t, a, e)← ∃idx :
UserProfile(o, idx, t, a, e)∧
¬
(
∃ax : IdentifierAttr(id, ax)∧
¬
(
∃ex : UserProfile(o, idx, t, ax, ex)
))
.
(6.2)
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6.4.4 Reflection
The inference strategy for computing dynamic user profiles reuses the steps
for compiling the user profiles as presented in Part I. This enables splitting
the inference strategy in two independent computations. The first step is a
pre-computation generating an output model that contains the user profiles as
presented in Part I. In the following step, the resulting user profiles are included
in the input model to compile the dynamic user profiles. This approach makes
the computation of dynamic user profiles more efficient.
The dynamic user profiles are complementary to the profiles as presented
in Part I. The former contain the personal attributes collected from a user
interacting with multiple service front-ends; the latter keep the personal
attributes of a user who invoked a single service. Both are combined to extract
feedback regarding the user’s privacy. For example, a user revealed his e-mail
address and name to a service provider during previous service invocations.
His name and e-mail address are part of the same dynamic user profile as the
service provider can link both attributes (i.e. the user is identifiable towards the
service provider). At time point t, the user invokes a service. It can be derived
from the user profile associated with the invoked service that the user revealed
his e-mail address. Even though he only revealed his e-mail address, the service
provider can identify him since the provider can link his e-mail address to his
name (i.e. derived from the dynamic user profile).
6.5 Modeling the Privacy-Preserving Ticketing Sys-
tem
The present section applies the modeling concepts defined in this chapter to
analyze the privacy in a Privacy-preserving Public Transport Ticketing System
(PPTS) [129]. The system provides a privacy-friendly alternative to state-
of-the-art ticketing systems in which a traveler’s transactions (e.g. purchases,
trips) can be linked. First, a background of public transport ticketing systems
is given, followed by a high-level overview of the PPTS system. The PPTS
system is then modeled and queried for privacy properties.
6.5.1 Background
As technological advances are creating possibilities for advancing the ticketing
systems, there are a number of research initiatives focusing on this topic. Some
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solutions try to increase the efficiency of ticket purchasing. Initial proposals
focus on existing mobile features [107, 35]. SMS messages are investigated in
combination with the NFC technology, resulting in higher user satisfaction and
usability [89]. The work of Finzgar and Trebar [83] uses NFC communication
channels and QR codes to reduce the infrastructure requirements and simplify
the existing systems. However, the use of NFC requires careful privacy
considerations and users tend to express privacy concerns about solutions that
use this technology [99]. Similarly, multiple studies identify that privacy is a
serious issue in advanced ticketing systems. They can collect information about
users, such as locations and movements [84, 142]. The way some commercial
systems are deployed also create grounds for concern [184]. For example, the
Washington D.C. Metro was functioning for years without a clearly defined
privacy policy [167, 96]. Many solutions rely on cards with unique identifiers
and utilize other personal information, even credit card data [166]. To tackle
this, there is a limited number of research proposals. Verslype et al. [179] design
a system based on the use of anonymous credentials. While the design focuses
on protecting the privacy of the user, it is not flexible for public transport
systems. It does not consider pricing per traveled distance and reduction
plans. On the other hand, work of Jorns et al. [109] focuses on the problem of
location services. As the telecommunications service providers gradually open
their interfaces for mobile applications that use travelers’ location and presence
information, privacy issues arise. The authors propose a pseudonymous system
to keep the users identity hidden. However, the users are pseudonymous and
every ticket contains a unique identifier, linking its purchase and usage. Finally,
the proposal of Heydt-Benjamin et al. [96] uses an e-cash payment scheme,
anonymous credentials and proxy re-encryption for concealing personal data,
while ensuring correct payment. However, the system describes the functioning
on a higher level of abstraction and system flexibility can be limited compared
to currently offered services.
6.5.2 Public Transport Ticketing System Architecture
The ticketing service is offered through collaboration of multiple stakeholders.
It usually comprises the ticketing system operator (TSO), who issues travelers’
passes and handles the related interactions, and the public transport organizers
(PTO), who organize the actual public transport. The TSO usually collaborates
with multiple PTO entities. It manages the personal information obtained
during the registration procedures and the identifiers contained in the passes.
The PTO is able to record the trips taken and the disclosed data, such as the
unique pass identifier [136, 42]. Existing systems collect this travel data in
order to optimize the provided services. However, recording unique identifiers,
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such as smart card serial numbers, is a major privacy concern. It allows for
creating profiles and, possibly, linking them with information obtained during
registration, including a traveler’s personal identifiable information. Some
solutions for mitigating privacy concerns [142] rely on corporate level policies
that separate travel transactions from user data and restrict access to only one
of the databases. However, the privacy depends on the discipline inside the
organization and may be prone to internal or external attacks which could link
identifiable data to travel patterns.
6.5.3 Privacy-Preserving Public Transport Ticketing System
Services
This sections gives a high-level overview of the services in the PPTS system.
Similarly to existing systems, the proposed scheme consists of interactions
between a traveler, a ticketing system operator (TSO) and a public transport
organizer (PTO). Before participating in the PPTS system, every traveler
needs to install a smartphone application provided by the TSO (i.e. PPTS
application), which interfaces with the ticketing system. All travelers are also
issued with credentials which serve as personal passes. Before utilizing the
public transport services, a traveler recharges his ePurse balance, which is
stored on his smartphone, with single use tickets. The application on his
smartphone can also store products such as monthly passes. Even though the
products are linked to the traveler’s credential in order to prevent unauthorized
sharing, no identifying data is disclosed at the time of purchase. In order to use
the transport services, a traveler’s application contacts the TSO to be issued
with a single-use ticket for the desired ride. For this, the application spends or
proves possession of a previously purchased product and demonstrates that it
is linked to the credential the traveler owns. The acquired temporary ticket is
validated by the PTO’s validation machine on the vehicle. At the end of the
journey, the traveler’s phone interacts with the validation machine once more to
be issued with change in case the spent product is not fully used. The obtained
change proof can then be exchanged with TSO for a long-term token. Although
there are multiple interactions with TSO/PTO, they are mostly transparent
to the traveler, as he only initiates the ticket issuance and travel start/end,
while all the other operations are automatically performed by the application.
The services in the PPTS system are discussed next. The detailed protocol
interactions can be found in [129].
Traveler Credential Issuance. After installing the PPTS application on the
smartphone, a traveler interacts with the online ticketing application of the
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TSO to be issued an anonymous credential which serves as a personalized
pass and is denoted as the PPTS credential. Credential attributes include
the traveler’s personal information (e.g. name and birth date), the validity
information and the traveler’s ticketing system secret (tss), which is different
from the credential’s master secret and is not disclosed to the TSO. The
personal information is provided by the traveler, similar to online registration
procedures in existing systems. In case additional assurances are required,
the traveler’s electronic identity card can be used for asserting this data. In
systems where the smart card is delivered to the traveler’s home address, there
is additional confirmation of the provided address information. The PPTS
system can also realize this, by having a code sent via post, which is used upon
reception to complete the registration and credential issuance. On the whole,
this approach improves the efficiency, while providing the same guarantees as
in existing public transport ticketing systems, such as in the Dutch OV-card
system. Idemix credential technology allows for all subsequent interactions with
the TSO or PTO to remain unlinkable to the credential issuance. Additionally,
for a better privacy-protection it is assumed that the network layer meta-data
does not allow linking activities of the same user.
ePurse balance recharge. In order to recharge the ePurse balance, the
traveler makes a request via his PPTS application to the TSO and pays the
desired amount. The request only contains the requested amount to be added to
the ePurse. In order to be granted the recharge, the traveler’s PPTS application
also proves that the traveler holds a valid PPTS credential by creating a
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. In case of a successful proof, the TSO
can generate an appropriate invoice for the traveler. The traveler makes the
payment via a third-party payment service provider (PSP). After a successful
payment, the TSO is notified and issues a number of eTokens. The public
details in the tokens contain the denomination information, which add up to
the requested recharge amount. The denomination of each token corresponds
to the maximal charge for a ride. This way, the service provider is assured
that the full trip fee will be paid, because the traveler spends one token when
entering the vehicle and is reissued the change if a cheaper ride was taken. In
the final step, the traveler’s PPTS application stores the details of each eToken.
Purchase of travel products. The proposed system also allows for the PTO
providers to offer multiple-use products, such as monthly discounts, which is a
service already present in current public transport ticketing systems (e.g. the
Dutch U-OV bus or NS railway services). The traveler initially requests a
multiple-use product via his PPTS application. The request only records the
type of product that is requested. The traveler also proves ownership of a valid
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PPTS credential. It may, additionally, be required to prove certain properties,
such as the age group, using the birth date attribute of the credential. The
proof is provided in the form of a signed zero-knowledge proof (SPK). It only
convinces the provider that the attributes in the traveler’s credential satisfy
the given properties, and hide other information recorded in the credential. If
the proof verifies, the PTO can generate an appropriate invoice for the traveler.
The traveler makes the payment via a third-party payment service provider
(PSP). Similar to the ePurse recharge, the requested product is issued by the
PTO in the form of a batch of eTokens. The tokens contain a hidden link to the
traveler’s PPTS credential and the product specification, such as the product
validity, product type and issuing PTO, in the public information part. These
tokens are spent with the TSO before starting a trip. Until the restrictions on
these tokens (such as validity date) is met, the application interacts with the
PTO before the last token is used; the last token can be spent with the TSO
to obtain a new bundle of eTokens.
Validation of the trip start. For charging the ePurse, the traveler’s PPTS
application interacts with the TSO to spend an eToken and obtain a temporary
single-use ticket from the TSO. The ticket is sent to the PTO’s validation
machine over an NFC channel upon entering the bus, where it is verified.
Alternatively, the traveler’s PPTS application could interact directly with the
PTO’s validation machine to spend an eToken. However, this would take
too much time to validate a trip start as the verification of eToken is a
computational intensive task given a validation machine running on a low-end
processor.
Validation of the trip end using the ePurse. In existing systems such as in
the Dutch public transport ticketing system, the travelers validate their cards
when exiting the vehicle, in order to receive back the difference between the
guaranteed amount and the price of their journey. Similarly, in the PPTS
system where the traveler’s PPTS application establishes an anonymous short-
range communication with the PTO’s validation machine to receive the change.
The validation machine calculates the applicable fare before generating the trip-
end ticket. This ticket is then sent to the traveler’s PPTS application which
forwards it to the TSO that reissues the change.
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6.5.4 The PPTS Model
Figure 6.2 depicts the conceptual model of the PPTS which is realized in
IDP 1. The model shows the system’s stakeholders, the user’s credentials, and
the personal information collected and distributed by the services. The model
decomposes the services, which are presented in Section 6.5.3, into sub-services.
Table 6.2 details the service decomposition and associates the services with
steps in the considered protocols. The detailed protocol steps can be found
in [129]. The services in the table are denoted as Service Provider::Service[n],
with n the steps in the protocol considered. The ePurse balance recharge and
purchase of travel products services include a payment phase where the traveler
pays for his purchases via the online payment interface provided by the third-
party payment provider (PSP). The payment makes the traveler identifiable
towards the bank. Hence, additional payment details are modeled according
to state-of-the-art payment services. It involves a third-party payment services
provider (PSP) acting on behalf of the payee as a proxy service redirecting
payments to the user’s bank. The remaining stakeholders in the PPTS that
are modeled are: the user, the TSO, and the PTO. The PPTS application
is represented in the model by the TSO since it provides the application.
Consequently, it is assumed that the data stored in the application can be
accessed by the TSO.
1see https://github.com/decroik/inspect-temporal-privacy
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Table 6.2: Decomposition of the PPTS services into sub-services (the detailed
protocol steps can be found in [129]).
Travel credential Issuance
TSO::IssuePPTSCred⋆
ePurse Balance Recharge
TSO::Recharge⋆[1− 4])→ PSP::SelectBankRecharge[5]→
Bank::PayRecharge[5]→ PSP::ConﬁrmPaymentRecharge[5]→
TSO::IssueRecharge[6− 10]
Purchase of Travel Products
PTO::BuyProduct⋆[1− 4]→ PSP::SelectBankProduct[5]→
Bank::PayProduct[5]→ PSP::ConﬁrmPaymentProduct[5]→
PTO::IssueProduct[6− 10]
Validation of the trip start
TSO::TripStart⋆[1− 13]→ TSO::GetTripProofOfPayment[14]→
PTO::ValidateTripStart[15− 18]
Validation of the trip end
PTO::TripEnd⋆[1− 7]→ TSO::ReceiveTripEnd[8− 9]→
TSO::IssueChange[10− 16]
∗: A user-invoked service
Service notation: Service Provider::Service[protocol steps]
1
1
2
M
O
D
E
L
IN
G
T
IC
K
E
T
IN
G
S
Y
S
T
E
M
S
IN
P
U
B
L
IC
T
R
A
N
S
P
O
R
T
IssueCred
SelectBankRecharge
ConfirmPaymentRecharge
PayRecharge
IssueRecharge
RechargePurse
SelectBankProduct
ConfirmPaymentProduct
PayProduct
IssueProduct
BuyProduct
TripStart
GetProofPayment ValidateTripStart
ReceiveTripEnd
IssueChange
TripEnd
Gov::Name, Gov::Address, Gov::DoB, Gov::PassportPicture
User::AccountName, User::Email:
User::PaymentAmount:
TSO::InvoiceReferenceRecharge,
User::PaymentAmount
TSO::InvoiceReferenceRecharge,
User::PaymentAmount
TSO::InvoiceReferenceRechargeTSO::InvoiceReferenceRecharge,
User::Product:
PTO::InvoiceReferenceProduct,
User::PaymentAmount
PTO::InvoiceReferenceProduct,
User::PaymentAmount
PTO::InvoiceReferenceRecharge
PTO::InvoiceReferenceRecharge
User::StartLocation
TSO::StartLocation, TSO::TripStartNonce
TSO::TripStartValTime, TSO::TripStartValSignature,
PTO::BusId
TSO::StartLocation, TSO::TripStartNonce
TSO::TripStartValTime, TSO::TripStartValSignature,
PTO::BusId, PTO::eTokenProductInfo
TSO::StartLocation, TSO::TripStartNonce
TSO::TripStartValTime, TSO::TripStartValSignature,
PTO::BusId, PTO::eTokenProductInfo
PSP Bank
PTOTSO
Gov::IdentityCard = {Name, Address, DoB, PassPortPicture}
TSO::PPTSCred = {Name, Address, DoB, PassPortPicture}
TSO::eTokenPurse = {eTokenPurseCommitment,eTokenPurseInfo}
PTO::eTokenProduct = {eTokenProductCommitment,eTokenProductInfo}
Show PPTSCred
Show PPTSCred
Show eTokenPurse
Show eTokenProduct
Show PPTSCred
Show IdentityCard
F
ig
u
re
6
.2
:
C
o
n
cep
tu
a
l
m
o
d
el
o
f
th
e
P
P
T
S
.
MODELING THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING TICKETING SYSTEM 113
The credentials modeled are:
• the electronic identity card issued by the government, represented by
Gov::IdentityCard, containing attributes {Name,Address,PassportPicture,
DoB,SSN ,SerialNumber}.
• the PPTS credential issued by the TSO, denoted as TSO::PPTSCred,
containing attributes {Name,Address,PassportPicture,DoB}
• the ePurse eTokens issued by the TSO, represented by TSO::eTokenPurse,
containing the committed secret eTokenPurseCommitment linking the
eToken to the PPTS credential and the information part eTokenPurse-
Info.
• the travel product eTokens issued by the PTO, represented by PTO::eTo-
kenTravelProduct, containing the committed secret eTokenProductCom-
mitment linking the eToken to the PPTS credential and the information
part eTokenProductInfo.
6.5.5 Privacy Assessment and Results
The present section analyzes the privacy of a user interacting with multiple
service front-ends. These interactions are represented by a path of user-invoked
services. The privacy analysis consists of two steps. The first step verifies
the conditions regarding the paths of user-invoked services. The second step
performs a privacy analysis based on the user profiles compiled due to the
execution of the services in the considered path. The privacy feedback is
extracted from these user profiles using the queries presented in Chapter 5
(i.e. Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 ).
The PPTS system is modeled in IDP to illustrate how the newly defined
modeling concepts and above-mentioned steps can be applied to analyze the
privacy in systems in which a user interacts with multiple service front-ends.
It is assumed that the user fully trusts the stakeholders in the PPTS (i.e. he
trusts that organizations act according to their service policies).
STEP 1: Verifying the execution of the path of user-invoked services. This
consists of two types of verifications (i.e. V1 and V2) which are defined in
Table 6.3.
• Execution of the services in a given path of user-invoked services (V1).
It is verified that the service access conditions (i.e. credential ownership)
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Table 6.3: STEP 1: Verifying the execution of the path of user-invoked services.
V1. Execution of the services in a given path of user-invoked services.
r5.1 ServiceInvokedByUserAt = {0→ IssuePPTSCred , 1→ Recharge, 2→ BuyProduct , 3→ TripStart,
4→ TripEnd}
compute ∀o∀id∀t∀a∀e
(
UserProfile(o, id, t, a, e)
)
V2. Reachability of services.
∀s
(
Reachability(s)⇒ ∃t
(
ServiceExecuteCompleteAt(t) = s
))
.
∀s∀s′ : Reachability(s) ∧ ReachabilityViaService(s′)⇒
∃t∃t′ : ServiceExecuteCompleteAt(t) = s ∧ ServiceExecuteCompleteAt(t′) = s′ ∧ t′ < t.
∀s∀s′ : Reachability(s) ∧ ReachabilityNotViaService(s′)⇒
∃t∃t′ : ServiceExecuteCompleteAt(t) = s ∧ ServiceExecuteCompleteAt(t′) = s′ ∧ t < t′.
∀s∀c
(
Reachability(s) ∧ ReachabilityNotCredential(c)⇒
∃t
(
ServiceExecuteCompleteAt(t) = s ∧ ¬
(
∃t′
(
OwnCredentialAt(c, t′) ∧ t < t′
))))
.
with ServiceExecuteComplete(T ime) : Service
Def
=


∀su∀t : ServiceExecuteCompleteAt(t) = su ←
ServiceInvokedByUser(su) ∧ ServiceExecuteAt(su, t)∧
¬
(
∃s : ServiceInvokedBy(s, su) ∧ ¬ServiceExecuteAt(s, t)
)
.
r6.1 Reachability = {TripEnd}
r6.2 ReachabilityViaService = {Recharge}
r6.3 ReachabilityNotViaService = {IssuePPTSCred}
r6.4 ReachabilityNotCredential = {eTokenPurse}
search ∀t∀s
(
ServiceInvokedByUserAt(t) = s
)
and compute ∀o∀id∀t∀a∀e
(
UserProfile(o, id, t, a, e)
)
are met for each service (including the sub-services) so that they are
able to execute. The access conditions, such as proving ownership of
an electronic identity card, are extracted from the access policies (see
Section 4.3) associated with the services. An example is given by r5.1 in
Table 6.3.
• Reachability of services (V2). The reachability of user-invoked service
s (Reachability(s)) is defined as the ability of s to execute during the
considered Time domain. Considering the access policies of each service,
a search is performed to find a path of user-invoked services enabling the
execution of s. For instance, r6.1 queries whether TripEnd can execute.
It is assumed that a service s invoked by a user at time point t can
execute only if all sub-services on which it relies can execute as well.
This is represented by the function ServiceExecuteCompleteAt(t) = s
(see Table 6.3). The search may result in multiple alternative paths of
user-invoked services. Examples of additional conditions that can be
checked during the reachability analysis are presented below.
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– The modeler specifies a set of services s’ that must execute before
service s executes. For example, rule r6.2 specifies that Recharge
must execute before TripEnd. This may be used by the modeler to
give a hint to the reasoner to reduce the time for finding a solution.
– The modeler specifies a set of services s’ that excludes the paths of
user-invoked services in which the services s’ execute before service
s executes. This is useful for verifying the correctness of the access
conditions of service s. In case a path is found in which services
s’ are executed before service s, the designer must reconsider the
design. For instance, rule r6.3 verifies if it is possible to validate the
start of a bus trip without having been issued a PPTS credential.
– The modeler specifies a set of credentials c that excludes the paths of
user-invoked services in which services issue the credentials c before
service s is executed. This is useful for verifying the correctness of
the access conditions of service s. In case a path is found in which
service s can execute before the user owns credentials c, the designer
must reconsider the design. For example, rule r6.4 verifies if it is
possible to execute s without having eTokens in the ePurse.
STEP 2: Computation of the user profiles associated with the path of
user-invoked services. User profiles are computed for each time point in the
Time domain in case the above-mentioned verifications result in a path of user-
invoked services in which all services are able to execute. Queries Q1, Q2, Q3
and Q4 (see Chapter 5) can then used to extract feedback from these profiles
regarding the privacy of a user in the system under analysis.
The modeler verifies if a path of user-invoked services exists in which the
traveler must recharge his ePurse (r6.2) before TripEnd executes (r6.1). This
results in a path of user-invoked services {0→ IssuePPTSCred, 1→ Recharge,
2→ BuyProduct, 3→ TripStart, 4→ TripEnd}.
User profiles are then computed based on the path of user-invoked services
resulting from r6.1 and r6.2. Table 6.4 shows the anonymity level (i.e. feedback
from query Q1 ) of the traveler in the PPTS system considering the above-
mentioned path of services. The traveler is identifiable towards the TSO due
to the personal information (e.g. his name and address) disclosed during the
PPTS credential request (t = 0). He can also be identified by the TSO and PTO
if he recharges his ePurse (t = 1) or purchases transport products (t = 2). In
both cases, the traveler can be identified via the TSO’s or PTO’s bank account,
which records the invoice reference number associated with the purchase and
the traveler’s name in the payment transaction history.
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Table 6.4: The traveler’s anonymity level (Q1 ) in the PPTS system when
executing {0 → IssuePPTSCred, 1 → Recharge, 2 → BuyProduct, 3 →
TripStart, 4 → TripEnd . A traveler can be (I)dentifiable, (P)seudonymous
or (A)nonymous.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
TSO I I I I I
PTO A A I I I
PSP A P P P P
Bank A I I I I
The above-mentioned user profiles contain the attributes collected from services
invoked during the time interval [0..4]. However, they cannot provide
feedback regarding the user’s privacy in case he uses a single service front-
end. Additional feedback can be extracted from user profiles as presented
in Listing 6.6 that are computed. Table 6.5 shows the anonymity level
(i.e. feedback from query Q1 ) of the traveler in case he validates the start
(i.e. TripStart) and the end (i.e. TripEnd) of his bus trip. The table shows that
in both cases the traveler is anonymous towards the organizations in the PPTS
system.
Table 6.5: The traveler’s anonymity level (Q1 ) in the PPTS system for
TripStart and TripEnd . A traveler can be (I)dentifiable, (P)seudonymous
or (A)nonymous. The results are based on the user profiles as presented in
Listing 6.6.
TripStart T ripEnd
TSO A A
PTO A A
Based on the results shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, it can be concluded that a
traveler’s trip start and end transactions cannot be linked to the user profiles
kept by any of the PPTS stakeholders. Additionally, the modeler verifies if a
traveler cannot validate the trip end (r6.1) in case he did not request a PPTS
credential (r6.3) or in case he did not recharge his ePurse (r6.2). In both cases,
no solutions are found.
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6.5.6 Reflection
The verifications defined in this section(i.e. V1 and V2 ), can be combined with
the queries from Chapter 5 to analyze the privacy of a user who interacts with
multiple service front-ends. Based on the privacy analysis of the PPTS system,
it can be concluded that the memory consumed by the privacy analysis is too
high. This may have two reasons. The first reason are the time dependencies
of the relations, which cause the search space increases in relation to the size
of the Time domain. The second reason is the degree of freedom in the path
of user-invoked services (i.e. the number of unknown services that is searched
for). The degree of freedom can be reduced by giving hints (see rule r6.2 in
Table 6.3). Another approach is to split the inference for the generation of
output models in two steps in which the output of the first step is the input for
the second step. The first step considers the causal-order between services to
compute the user profiles. In the second step, the time-order between services
is considered to compute the user profiles. This strategy, however, limits the
flexibility of the privacy analysis. For example, it is impossible to directly
search for a path of user-invoked services so that a user is anonymous towards
the TSO when validating the trip start. This can be solved by first generating
all possible paths of user-invoked services in which TripStart is reachable. Then,
the anonymity level of the user towards the TSO can be extracted from the user
profiles built for each path. Only those paths for which a user is anonymous
towards the TSO are selected.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter showed how to extend the capabilities of the privacy analysis
framework to capture the privacy of a user who interacts with multiple service
front-ends. Newly defined modeling concepts are added to the framework
that represent the properties of advanced credential technologies, temporal and
conditional aspects of service invocations. Furthermore, the inference strategy
to compile user profiles as presented in Part I is extended with an additional
step that captures time-dependent user profiles. This chapter also presented
a privacy-preserving public transport ticketing system (PPTS) to validate the
privacy analysis framework. The framework extensions are realized in IDP
to analyze the privacy in the modeled PPTS system. This analysis showed
that even for a medium-sized model, such as the model representing the PPTS
system, no solution could be found because of the memory required by the
privacy analysis. Hence, the analysis had to be split in two independent steps
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in order to extract privacy properties from the model representing the PPTS
system.
Part III
Inferring Service Provider
Accountability
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Chapter 7
Service Provider
Accountability
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present an approach for modeling advanced electronic
services and inspecting their privacy. The approach gives an overview of the
profiles that can be compiled by organizations. These, in their turn, can
contain sensitive personal information that can be linked to an individual. The
profiles are the input for a qualitative privacy analysis that provides meaningful
feedback to both end-users and service designers. The former can select a
service based on the minimal data disclosure principle; the latter can select
privacy enhancing technologies and define consistent privacy policies from the
earliest design stage.
In many cases, privacy policies can be downplayed to merely vague declarations
of intended data handling practices. Often, a guarantee of compliance between
the actual data handling practices and the declared ones is absent. As a
result, individuals remain uncertain about the processing of their personal
information. Even if all entities publish detailed unambiguous privacy policies
easily interpretable by an individual, they are still opaque towards individuals
because systems may involve many collaborating entities. It is useful for
individuals to have a system-wide panoramic view on data handling practices
rather than a per-entity view. The protection of personal information is
not solely the responsibility of consumers. Service providers too, must be
enforced to see privacy as a major obligation. Therefore, the upcoming
European General Data Protection Regulation explicitly cites the accountability
principle, which puts responsibility on data controllers (e.g. service providers)
as well. They have the obligation to demonstrate compliance with Regulations
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and internal policies and must implement mechanisms to ensure this. For
example, log evidence containing traces of data processing can be used by
auditors to verify compliance. Accountability is a privacy enforcement principle
strongly linked with privacy by design [47], putting privacy as a concern that
must be integrated from the earliest design stage. Even though loggings
may leak privacy sensitive information, privacy-preserving logging solutions
that improve the transparency of data handling practices towards individuals
exist. For example, Pulls et al. [144] propose a distributed privacy-preserving
transparency logging solution that makes it impossible to link multiple log
entries associated to a same individual.
Contributions. The present chapter realizes an inference model providing
individuals with global accountability guarantees of multi-component systems.
The approach maps different user expectations to log evidence of declared
data handling practices. The chapter mainly focuses on interactions between
organizations. The feedback provided by this approach is useful for both end-
users and auditors who conduct privacy assessments on behalf of the end-users.
The approach is validated on a railway surveillance infrastructure.
The contributions in the present chapter are peer-reviewed in [65], which is a
joint work with Denis Butin (INRIA Lyon). The contributions to this paper
include assistance with defining the railway surveillance case, defining the
inference strategy providing individuals with global accountability guarantees,
and the IDP realization of the inference model.
The present chapter continues the discussion of related work on formalizations
of service provider accountability and privacy in Section 7.1. The modeling
approach is applied to a railroad surveillance infrastructure use case, which is
presented in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 gives an overview of the accountability
inference framework and its components and applies the framework to the
use case. The approach and its results are evaluated in Section 7.4. The
chapter ends with conclusions about limitations and possible extensions of the
framework (see Section 7.5).
7.1 Related Work
The approach of using standardized privacy policies to enable accountability
by clarifying obligations is widespread. In particular, the idea of performing
a posteriori verification of compliance by combining privacy policies with data
handling logs appears in [183]. The gap between system event logs and logs at
the level of abstraction of privacy policies is addressed in [40]. The consequences
of log design choices for log analysis and accountability are addressed in [39].
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Adequate log design for compliance checking is tricky because of the numerous
possible semantic ambiguities. Both papers presume a single data controller
rather than the setting of this chapter – a constellation of interacting data
processors with different, potentially incompatible privacy policies.
Logs tracing events are the source for audits which are conducted to verify
compliance with privacy policies. Audits are time-consuming as privacy policies
are usually expressed in a natural language. Different research approaches
propose formal semantics – machine interpretable – for expressing privacy
policies. As a consequence audits can be automated and become less expensive.
The authors of [155] address privacy compliance in big data systems. They
define a privacy policy specification language familiar to natural language, yet
machine interpretable while suited for privacy-experts who have no experience
with formal representations. More expressive semantics are offered by [85, 26].
In practical settings, logs trace events in systems may be incomplete. Log
entries may be overwritten by more recent ones or they may be inconsistent,
or it may be impractical to log particular events. Policies are expressed in
first-order or first-order temporal logic, enabling the automated reasoning on
incomplete logs to check compliance with privacy policies. Other work [173]
defines formal semantics to express purpose restrictions on data processing.
Systems are considered as partial black boxes. An automated planning based
approach predicts log traces. Actual log traces which differ from predictions are
flagged as potential violations. Audits are considered by Blocki et al. [32, 33]
as a game between an auditor and adversary (e.g. an employee of the data
controller). In this game the former must find the best audit strategy to defeat
the latter.
The approach in the present chapter uses a first-order logic based language
that is capable to express typical aspects of data handling practices, such as
purpose restrictions, data retention limits, and data forwarding. Incomplete
logs are considered as well. More specifically, the approach can represent
policy statements for which log evidence is missing as mere declared statements.
Moreover, the approach associates statements with particular components of
which a system is comprised.
Besides the area of computer science, accountability is also a topic of privacy
regulations [91]. A key question related to this chapter is how far data
controllers should be required to go to demonstrate compliance. Distinctions
are sometimes [53] made between different levels of accountability, ranging
from public declarations of intent to full technical transparency, such as
the ones advocated here. The adequacy of procedures, i.e. organizational
measures, is very often under discussion. Privacy Impact Assessments are
often advocated [188] and can be seen as a bridge between accountability of
procedures and accountability of practice if the assessment is conducted in
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sufficient detail. The question of privacy-preserving surveillance infrastructures
is particularly addressed in the PARIS project [2], from an interdisciplinary
angle.
7.2 A Railway Station Surveillance Scenario
To illustrate the modeling approach, the scenario of video camera surveillance
in a railway station is considered. The cameras in the railway station
collect images (i.e. personal data) of individuals (it is assumed that cameras
do not record sound). Several categories of personal data can be inferred
from camera recordings, such as identification through face detection [180],
gait recognition [115], behavioral tracking [125] and many others. Signs
inform passersby that the Railway Company installed Cameras for video
surveillance. The cameras provide the railway’s Monitors in the control room
with real-time video feeds containing Blurred Faces and Gaits of travelers.
Furthermore, detailed images of individuals’ Full Body and Gait are stored in
the railway’s Image Database serving as Evidence in legal investigations. Only
authorized Image Processors employed by the railway company have access
to it. Additionally, surveillance Guards employed by a third-party Security
Company patrol in the station. They are authorized to view real-time images
on the monitors, and carry a Mobile Device for registering Contextual Data
(e.g. time and location) in case of incidents. These devices are connected with
the Status Database, property of the security company. It is only accessible for
the security company’s Status Processors upon request of legal institutions for
collecting Evidence. It is assumed that surveillance guards are honest and obey
the policies imposed by the security company (e.g. guards are not permitted
to film incidents with their smartphone).
The trusted auditor (acting on behalf of a filmed individual) is external to the
model and the data handling statements from the entities collecting personal
data, listed in Table 7.1 are used to illustrate the approach.
7.3 Components of the Accountability Inference
Model
The present section describes the framework’s building blocks (depicted in
Figure 7.1) in detail. Entities, all related to a core organization, provide
individual statements about their data handling practices. These statements
can be provided together with unverified logs, verified logs, or by those
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Table 7.1: Camera surveillance data handling statements. Entity statements
are (D)eclarative, (L)ogged-unverified or Logged-and-(V)erified.
(R)ailway Company, (C)amera, (M)onitor, (I)mage Database Statements
Stat R.1 (L) Full body pictures with blurred or clear faces, gaits, heights, and
behavior are recorded for incident detection.
Stat R.2 (D) Collected pictures containing evidence of incidents can be forwarded
to legal authorities upon their request.
Stat R.3 (L) Pictures are never collected for commercial purposes.
Stat R.4 (L) The maximal retention time for any category of collected personal
data is 60 days.
Stat C.1 (L) Cameras in the station record full body pictures with blurred or
clear faces, gaits, heights, and behaviors of travelers for incident
detection purposes.
Stat M.1 (L) Guards monitor in real-time full body pictures with blurred faces,
gaits, heights, and behaviors of travelers in the station for incident
detection purposes.
Stat I.1 (L) Full body pictures with clear faces are stored as evidence of possible
incidents.
Stat I.2 (V) Access to stored full body pictures with clear faces is only granted
to the image processor upon request of the legal authorities.
Stat I.3 (V) Full body pictures with clear faces, gaits, heights, and behavior are
never processed for the purpose of identiﬁcation.
Stat I.4 (D) Stored images are deleted after 30 days, unless they are being used
as evidence in legal cases.
(S)ecurity Company, M(O)bile Device, Status (D)atabase Statements
Stat S.1 (D) Time and location of incidents are collected as evidence.
Stat S.2 (L) Time and location of incidents are only forwarded to legal
authorities upon request.
Stat O.1 (V) Surveillance guards collect time and location as evidence in case of
incidents.
Stat D.1 (V) Time and location of incidents are collected as evidence.
Stat D.2 (V) Access to stored time and location of incidents is granted to status
processors for gathering evidence.
Stat D.3 (V) The time and location of incidents are deleted after 90 days unless
they are being used as legal evidence.
which exist on their own, without companion evidence. Different categories
of personal data can be modeled. As a consequence, statements are fine-
grained enough to express different guarantees about various types of personal
data. The data subject is represented by a trusted auditor. This auditor
takes into account the subject’s trust perceptions. Global accountability
guarantees are automatically computed using the computation rules in the
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System Independent Part of the framework. These guarantees are described
in the Global Accountability Profile (GAP) that is automatically inferred,
using a Knowledge Base System (IDP), from the System Model and the User
Model, both part of the framework’s Input Model. The system model includes
the individual statements, the relations between the entities expressing the
statements, and the level of evidence characterizing the statements. The
user model includes the level of trust of the user. As a consequence, the
global accountability guarantees take into account both factual evidence and
subjective appreciations of privacy risks. This combination reflects the fact
that different data subjects demand different levels of proof to be satisfied. The
model provides data subjects with an overview of the accountability guarantees
resulting from a set of interacting entities. In addition, it allows them (or the
auditor, on their behalf) to check whether their personal privacy preferences
are compatible with this global accountability panorama. The remainder of
this section further details the framework’s elements.
(Naive,Regular,Privacy-Aware)
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Figure 7.1: Structure of the global accountability inference model.
7.3.1 Personal Data
Organizations collect personal data of data subjects that interact with systems
owned by these organizations. Being accountable to data subjects involves
clarifying which types of their personal data are harvested and used. These
categories are represented by the DataCategory type. All categories of collected
personal data involved in a given scenario must be spelled out in the input
model as the contents of DataCategory.
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One can define hierarchies of personal data categories. This models the fact
that categories of personal data can be subsets of other categories, e.g. the age
of an individual gives strictly more information than a predicate on whether the
individual is over 18. The data category hierarchy is represented using DataCat-
egoryOf(DataCategory,DataCategory), which deduces hierarchical knowledge
from the initial specifications. Listing 7.1 depicts the IDP input model for the
personal data and their hierarchy of the camera surveillance scenario.
IDP Listing 7.1: Partial user model representing personal data categories
and hierarchies in the video surveillance scenario.
type DataCategory = {
PersData;Face;BlurredFace;Gait;Height;Behavior ;Location;Time;
PictureIncident}
DataCategoryOf(DataCategory,DataCategory) = {
(Face,PictureIncident); (BlurredFace,PictureIncident);
(Gait ,PictureIncident); (Height,PictureIncident);
(Behavior ,PictureIncident)}
7.3.2 Entities
Data subjects and the auditors that act on their behalf are not explicitly
modeled since their point of view is external. An arbitrary number of active
entities can be modeled in the framework’s system model. Active entities
are those that handle personal data of the subjects and provide some degree
of accountability, i.e. declarations (with or without proof) about the data
processing they perform. A distinction is made between Stakeholders and
Components. A stakeholder is either an Organization, or an Operator acting
on behalf of exactly one organization. An organization can employ more than
one operator. Components are constituents of data processing systems. A
component belongs to exactly one organization, but can be used by multiple
operators.
Components process personal data under the responsibility of the organizations
that own them. Organizations or authorities may restrict access to the data cat-
egories that a given component is capable of collecting. Authorized categories
for a given component are specified using ComponentCanCollect(Component,
DataCategory). Listings 7.2 and 7.3 depict the IDP specification of the entities
involved and their relationships in the camera surveillance scenario respectively.
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IDP Listing 7.2: Partial system model representing the entities in the video
surveillance scenario.
type Entity = {
RailwayCompany;SecurityCompany;LegalAuthority;Camera;Monitor ;
MD;SurveilanceGuard; ImageProcessor ;StatusProcessor ; ImageDB;
StatusDB}
type Stakeholder isa Entity = {
RailwayCompany;SecurityCompany;LegalAuthority;SurveilanceGuard ;
ImageProcessor ;StatusProcessor}
type Component isa Entity = {
Camera;Monitor ;MD; ImageDB;StatusDB}
type Organization isa Stakeholder = {
RailwayCompany;SecurityCompany;LegalAuthority}
type Operator isa Stakeholder = {
SurveilanceGuard; ImageProcessor ;StatusProcessor}
7.3.3 Statements and Local Accountability Statements
All entities involved in data handling relevant to a given data subject are
assumed to exhibit some level of accountability of practice, i.e. they publish
precise declarations about their intended personal data handling practices. In
general, each entity publishes a different data handling statement. A one-to-
one mapping between entities and data handling statements is assumed, and
is modeled using function StatementFrom(Statement) : Entity. Listings 7.4
and 7.5 show the part of the system model that defines a subset of the
statements of the railway company listed in Table 7.11. Those statements
include the following aspects:
• Purposes of use, i.e. the list of finalities for which the collected personal
data may be used (for instance statistics or direct marketing) — this
is modeled using StatementPurpose(Statement, Purpose). Multiple
purposes can be defined for a statement.
1For the complete model of the statements, see https://github.com/
inferring-accountability/inferring-accountability/, 2014.
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IDP Listing 7.3: Partial system model representing the entity relationships
in the video surveillance scenario.
ComponentOf(Component) : Organization = {Camera → RailwayCompany ;
Monitor → RailwayCompany ; ImageDB → RailwayCompany ;
StatusDB → SecurityCompany;MD → SecurityCompany}
EmployeeOf(Operator) : Organization = {
SurveilanceGuard → SecurityCompany;
StatusProcessor → SecurityCompany;
ImageProcessor → RailwayCompany}
OperatorOf(Operator,Component) = {(SurveilanceGuard,Monitor);
(SurveilanceGuard ,MD); (ImageProcessor , ImageDB);
(StatusProcessor ,StatusDB)}
ComponentCanCollect(Component,DataCategory) = {(Camera,Face);
(Camera,BlurredFace); (Camera,PictureIncident); (Camera,Gait);
(Camera,Height); (Camera,Behavior ); (Monitor ,Face);
(Monitor ,BlurredFace); (Monitor ,PictureIncident); (Monitor ,Gait);
(Monitor ,Height); (Monitor ,Behavior ); (ImageDB,Face);
(ImageDB,BlurredFace); (ImageDB,PictureIncident); (ImageDB,Gait);
(ImageDB,Height); (ImageDB,Behavior ); (ImageDB,Time);
(ImageDB,Location); (StatusDB,Time; ); (StatusDB,Location);
(MD,Time); (MD,Location)}
• The category of personal data that is used, i.e. the collection of
personal identifiable information. Possibly, multiple subject data
categories exist for a statement — this is modeled using predicate
StatementSubject(Statement, DataCategory).
• Global retention limits, i.e. the period of time after which the personal
data will be deleted by the entity (e.g. 30 days) — this limit is expressed
using a partial function (i.e. not every statement expresses a retention
limit) StatementRetentionLimit(Statement) : Duration.
• Obligations built from a Condition and an Action. These are modeled
using partial functions StatementCondtion(Statement) : Condition and
StatementAction(Statement) : Action). Both are partial functions
because not all statements are linked to actions (e.g. retention limits),
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and unconditional obligations are modeled by only modeling the actions
of statements.
• Personal data may be forwarded to organizations. In the model,
this is expressed using StatementDestination(Statement, Organization).
Possibly, a statement has multiple destinations.
Obligations are flexible and can be used to express a variety of constraints.
Conditions are events that trigger a reaction, e.g. the personal data is accessed
or the data subject has requested an update. Actions are the resulting events,
for instance the update of his personal data or its forwarding.
Statements guaranteeing the sending of a notification (to a user) when a specific
event occurs (e.g. when a specific category of personal data is accessed by the
entity) are expressed using StatementNotificationGuarantee(Statement).
Accountability occurs at different levels. Some entities may merely declare
their intended practices, without providing any companion evidence. Other
entities provide data handling logs. In the model this is denoted using
function StatementProof(Statement) : StatementEvidence. It may not always
be possible to check the compliance of data handling logs with obligations.
Logs can be in a format which is not standardized, or semantics may not be
provided by the entity. Therefore, a distinction is made between three levels
of assurance (StatementEvidence) for data handling statements:
1. A statement is (purely) Declarative if data handling logs relevant to the
statement are not made available by the entity publishing the statement.
2. If data handling logs are provided together with the statement but
cannot be checked straight away, the statement obtains the status
LoggedUnverified.
3. If a statement is provided together with logs that have been checked for
compliance (e.g. through a trusted log analysis software), the statement
is said to be LoggedVerified. This is the highest level of accountability for
a data handling statement, since actual behavior has both been recorded
and shown to be compliant with the statement.
7.3.4 Trust Perception and Global Accountability Inference
While organizations may feature complex hierarchies with heterogeneous data
handling practices, individuals care about what happens to their personal data
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IDP Listing 7.4: Partial systemmodel containing the domains that represents
the statements of the entities involved in the video surveillance scenario.
type Statement = {StatR1 ;StatR2 ;StatR3 ;StatR4 ; . . .}
type Purpose = {Evidence;DetectIncident;Commerce; Identification}
type Condition = {RequestLegalAuthority;NoLegalInvestigation}
type Action = {Collecting;Monitoring;Storing;Forwarding;Accessing}
type Duration isa int = {30; 60; 90}
type Permission constructed from {Always;Never}
globally. A panoramic overview of the worst-case scenario in terms of data
processing (i.e. what are the weakest global guarantees) is relevant to individuals,
since they must often decide whether to interact with an entire organization.
Most of the time, they cannot cherry-pick with which subcontractors to share
their data with.
Global accountability inference is a central feature of this framework that builds
such a synthetic statement for data subjects. It deduces global guarantees from
the local accountability statements of all entities involved in the system. These
(subjective) guarantees depend on trust perceptions of data subjects.
Individuals display different levels of trust in the entities that handle their
personal data. The framework’s user model reflects this socio-technical aspect
by modeling three levels of trust, corresponding to three typical types of
individuals:
• Naive individuals always trust data handling statements, even if state-
ments are purely declarative (i.e. no evidence in the form of a log is
provided);
• Regular individuals only trust statements co-occurring with relevant data
handling logs;
• Privacy-aware individuals are most skeptical and trust only statements
for which verified logs have been provided by issuing entities.
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IDP Listing 7.5: Partial system model containing the relations that
represents the statements of the entities involved in the video surveillance
scenario.
type StatementEvidence constructed from {
Declarative;LoggedUnverified;LoggedVerified}
StatementFrom(Statement) : Entity = {
StatR1 → RailwayCompany;StatR2 → RailwayCompany;
StatR3 → RailwayCompany;StatR4 → RailwayCompany; . . .}
StatementSubject(Statement,DataCategory) = {
(StatR1 ,Face); (StatR1 ,BlurredFace); (StatR1 ,Gait); (StatR1 ,Height);
(StatR1 ,Behavior ); (StatR2 ,PictureIncident);
(StatR3 ,PictureIncident); (StatR4 ,PersData); . . .}
StatementPurpose(Statement,Purpose) = {
(StatR1 ,DetectIncident); (StatR2 ,Evidence); (StatR3 ,Commerce); . . .}
partial StatementCondtion(Statement) : Condition = {
StatR2 → RequestLegalAuthority; . . .}
StatementPermission(Statement) : Permission = {
StatR1 → Always;StatR2 → Always;StatR3 → Never ;
StatR4 → Always; . . .}
partial StatementAction(Statement) : Action = {
StatR1 → Collecting;StatR2 → Forwarding;StatR3 → Collecting; . . .}
StatementDestination(Statement,Organization) = {
(StatR2 ,LegalAuthority); . . .}
partial StatementRetentionLimit(Statement) : Duration = {
StatR4 → 60; . . .}
StatementNotificationGuarantee(Statement) = { }
StatementProof(Statement) : StatementEvidence = {
StatR1 → LoggedUnverified;StatR2 → Declarative;
StatR3 → LoggedUnverified;StatR4 → LoggedUnverified; . . .}
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Furthermore, the user model includes UserTrust(Organization), the user’s high-
level trust perception towards organizations. It represents his trust in declared
data handling practices of related organizations. This also implies that all
operators they employ and components they own are trusted by him. A more
advanced trust model could be used. For example, a more advanced trust model
could include the user’s trust towards loggings. Nevertheless, a binary trust
model is used to keep the complexity of models manageable. The modeled video
surveillance scenario features the aforementioned three user models: naive (U1 ),
regular (U2 ) and privacy-aware (U3 ). It also assumes that no organization is
trusted, i.e. UserTrust(Organization) is the empty set.
This impact of these user trust models on the perception of global accountability
guarantees is shown in Table 7.2. For instance, a naive user considers he is
guaranteed that merely declared statements of an entity E, owned or employed
by organizationO, correspond with actual data handling practices. By contrast,
a regular user only considers merely declared statements to be guaranteed if he
trusts O (i.e. UserTrust(O)), and assumes statements provided together with
logs to be guaranteed, whether these logs are checked for compliance or not.
Table 7.2: Global statement evidence deduction rules — the global evidence for
the statement S by the entity E owned by the organization O is (U)ncertain
or (G)uaranteed for the modeled user.
StatementProof(S)= Declared Logged-unveriﬁed Logged-and-veriﬁed
Naive user G G G
Regular user F (E) : {G,U}⋆ G G
Privacy-aware user F(E) : {G,U}⋆ F(E) : {G,U}⋆ G
⋆F (E) =′ G′ ⇔ UserTrust(O) ∧ (ComponentOf (E) = O ∨ EmployeeOf (E) = O)
⋆F (E) =′ U ′ ⇔ ¬UserTrust(O) ∧ (ComponentOf (E) = O ∨ EmployeeOf (E) = O)
Global statement computations are performed differently for duties (i.e. state-
ments featuring Always) and for prohibitions (i.e. statements featuring Never).
Beside these categories, models also include statements expressing notification
guarantees and global retention limits. Similar to duties, these also feature
Always. Nevertheless, these are treated differently in computations.
Global statements are expressed in terms of global data categories (i.e. users
are concerned what happens to their personal data). Let S be an individual
statement of entity E, CanCollect(E,DC) a data category DC that can be
collected by an entity E, and Sub(S,DC) representing that data category
DC is a subject of S. Table 7.3 summarizes the worst-case deduction
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rules that depend on the global statement evidence for the computation of
GlobalDataCategory(S,DC), the global data categories derived from S.
Table 7.3: Worst-case computation rules for deducing GlobalDataCate-
gory(S,DC), the global data categories DC deduced from the individual
statement S of entity E, with Sub(S,DC) the subject DC of statement S, and
CanCollect(E,DC ) the data categories collectable by E.
Global statement evidence of S: Uncertain Guaranteed
Duty(S) CanCollect(E,DC ) ψ(S,E,DC )⋆
Prohibition(S) ψ(S,E,DC )⋆ Sub(S,DC)
NotificationGuarantee(S) Sub(S,DC ) ψ(S,E,DC )⋆
RetentionLimit(S) Sub(S,DC ) ψ(S,E,DC )⋆
⋆ψ(S,E,DC ) ≡ CanCollect(E,DC ) ∧ Sub(S,DC)
Duties. Global statements using Always are built as follows:
• The global purposes of use for a global data category are constructed
from the union of all purposes of (individual) duties S, with GlobalDat-
aCategory(S,DC). These represent worst-case global purposes which are
conjunctive. For instance, personal data is collected for commercial and
statistical reasons. If no purpose is explicitly specified, then all purposes
are assumed to be permitted globally.
• The global conditions of use for a data category are constructed from the
disjunction of all conditions of duties S, with GlobalDataCategory(S,DC).
If at least one unconditional statement exists, no overall conditional
statement is generated.
• The global actions for a data category are built from the union of all
actions of individual duties S, with GlobalDataCategory(S,DC).
• The global level of assurance (i.e. global evidence) for a data category is
Uncertain if at least one uncertain statement (in the sense of Table 7.3)
exists for this data category. Else, the global statement is considered
Guaranteed.
• The global notification guarantee for events relative to a data category
is built from the conjunction of all individual notification guarantees S
relative to that data category, with GlobalDataCategory(S,DC).
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• The global retention limit for a data category is the maximum of all
retention limts S existing for the data category, with GlobalDataCate-
gory(S,DC).
Prohibitions. Global statements using Never are built as follows:
• The global purposes of use for a global data category are constructed
from the union of all purposes of individual prohibitions S, with
GlobalDataCategory(S,DC). These represent worst-case global purposes
which are disjunctive. For instance, personal data is never collected for
commercial or statistical reasons. Individual prohibitions without explicit
purpose are omitted during the deduction of global purposes (i.e. worst-
case).
• The global conditions of use for a data category are constructed from
the conjunction of all conditions of prohibitions S, with GlobalDataCate-
gory(S,DC). Unconditional statements are omitted.
• The global actions for a data category is computed as for duties, mutatis
mutandis.
• The global level of assurance for a data category is computed as for duties,
mutatis mutandis.
In global statements, trust is expressed in a binary way (i.e. GAPEvidence):
statements are, from the point of view of the data subject, either Uncertain
or Guaranteed. Both global notification guarantees and global retention limits,
part of the GAP, are expressed as duties. Global statements present guarantees
as a function of categories of personal data. Once global statements have been
computed, they are represented as in Listing 7.6. They are categorized as
follows:
• Global duties about collecting personal data — declaring actions about
the use, collection, or storage of personal data.
• Global duties about distributing personal data — declaring actions that
forward data to external organizations.
• Global prohibitions for collecting personal data — expressing that the use,
collection, or storage of personal data is forbidden.
• Global prohibitions for distributing personal data — forbidding the
forwarding of personal data to an organization.
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• Global notification guarantees — declaring the sending of a notification
upon the occurrence of a specific event.
• Global retention limits — expressing the time limit after which all
categories of personal data must be deleted.
IDP Listing 7.6: Modeling concepts representing the GAP.
type GAPEvidence constructed from { Uncertain;Guaranteed }
GAPCollectData(DataCategory)
GAPCollectDataAction(DataCategory,Action)
GAPCollectDataForPurposeOf(DataCategory,Purpose)
GAPCollectDataCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPCollectDataProof(DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPForwardDataTo(DataCategory,Organization)
GAPForwardDataAction(DataCategory,Action)
GAPForwardDataForPurposeOf(DataCategory,Purpose)
GAPForwardDataCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPForwardDataProof(DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPNeverCollectData(DataCategory)
GAPNeverCollectDataForPurposeOf(DataCategory,Purpose)
GAPNeverCollectDataCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPNeverCollectDataProof(DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPNeverForwardDataTo(DataCategory,Organization)
GAPNeverForwardDataForPurposeOf(DataCategory,Purpose)
GAPNeverForwardDataCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPNeverForwardDataProof(DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPNotificationGuarantee(DataCategory)
GAPNotificationGuaranteeCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPNotificationGuaranteeProof(DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
GAPRetentionLimit(DataCategory,Duration)
GAPRetentionLimitCondition(DataCategory,Condition)
GAPRetentionLimitProof(DataCategory,GAPEvidence)
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7.4 Computation and Evaluation
A possible use of the framework with an IDP realization2 is illustrated. The
realization infers the GAPs of the user models U1 , U2 , and U3 described
earlier, representing individuals under video surveillance in a railway station.
The model was generated in less than a second on a personal computer. First,
the resulting profiles of naive, regular, and privacy-aware data subjects are
compared. Next, the statements of the entities are discussed and users are
modeled.
7.4.1 Trust-Dependent GAP Inference
First, given the type of user and his trust perception towards organizations, the
user’s global statement evidence is deduced using the rules of Table 7.2. For
instance, U2 (i.e. regular user) is sufficiently guaranteed that data practices
comply with declared ones if they are only logged. Instead, U3 is satisfied
when statements are logged and verified by an auditor or just logged in case
organizations are trusted by him. This global evidence is then used for the
deduction of the GAP using the rules of Table 7.3. The inferred GAPs are
summarized in Table 7.4. None of these contain global prohibitions. However,
individual statements of entities include two prohibitions (i.e. R.3 and I.3 ).
The reason for this is that worst-case computation rules give priority to
global duties containing data categories that are subject of both duties and
prohibitions. Semantically, this corresponds to a user who is more concerned
about the categories of data that are used rather than about the unused ones.
Global duties for collecting data are perceived differently by U1 , U2 , and
U3 . Since U1 is satisfied with statements that are purely declarative, he
believes that data collection duties are respected by the organizations. U2
is only partially convinced with the same guarantees, since he requires at least
data handling logs while the security company’s duty S.1 is purely declarative.
Therefore, Time and Location, subjects of S.1, are considered as global duty
data categories that are uncertain. U3 needs the strongest guarantees. He is
not convinced for any of the data categories part of the GAP. He expects for all
data collection duties that logs exist and that they are verified by an auditor.
For instance, because duty R.1 is logged-unverified, the duty subjects, such as
Face and BlurredFace, are not sufficiently guaranteed for U3 . Furthermore, due
to R.1 an additional data category PictureIncident is deduced in U3 ’s GAP.
2A detailed IDP realization — together with the output containing the GAPs for the
three user models — can be found at https://github.com/inferring-accountability/
inferring-accountability/.
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This follows from the computation rule in Table 7.3 for duties with global
evidence that is uncertain for U3 , and the given railway station’s camera
capability ComponentCanCollect(Camera,PictureIncident). Also, comparing
the GAP of U3 with the others, more purposes for collecting data are deduced.
In particular, besides that BlurredFace and Gait are collected for incident
detection (i.e. DetectIncident), these are used as Evidence of incidents as well.
Global data forward duties are computed from the declarative duty R.2 and
the merely logged duty S.2. Both duties declare to forward data to other
stakeholders in the system. The results show that U1 is satisfied with the
guarantees provided that the system respects data forwarding declarations.
The same guarantees are too weak to convince U2 and U3 . Both doubt that
actual data practices correspond with declared ones. At first glance, one could
expect that U2 assumes that Time and Location, part of the GAP, are used as
declared by S.2. However, S.2 is redundant with the purely declared duty R.2
because Time and Location are subjects of R.2 as well. This can be deduced
using the computation rules of Table 7.3 and from the railway company’s
image database capabilities, namely ComponentCanCollect(ImageDB,Time)
and ComponentCanCollect(ImageDB,Location).
Global retention limits are computed from R.4, I.4, and D.3. Results show
that retention limits are conditional (i.e. NoLegalInvestigation) for all data
categories in the GAP of U1 and U2 . The GAP of U3 shows an additional
unconditional retention limit for data category PersData (i.e. personal data).
This is deduced from R.4, which provided evidence not fulfilling U3 ’s
expectations. Indeed, R.4 is just logged, and not verified. Furthermore,
U2 only has partial guarantees for Time and Location since evidence of R.3
sufficiently guarantees him. In case of U3 , R.3 provides insufficient evidence.
Hence, usage of Time and Location are not sufficiently guaranteed according
to U3 ’s GAP.
7.4.2 Statements Modeling and User Models
The statements presented in the scenario are atomic declarations, i.e. they
consist of single actions on subject data categories. Concepts in the framework
were defined for modeling atomic statements. However, statements may
contain multiple declarations. The concepts defined lack expressiveness
for modeling these. These statements must be represented by the atomic
parts from which they are composed. For instance, the image database is
associated with a declarative statement announcing the storage of personal
data of categories blurred face and gait for a maximum of 30 days and for
the purpose of statistics and marketing. This is modeled as (a) a duty
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Table 7.4: Inferred GAP synthesizing global accountability in the camera
surveillance system for user models U1 (1), U2 (2), and U3 (3). The numbers
in the table indicate the user models for which the statements in the left column,
represented relatively to the different data categories, are valid.
PictureIncident Face BlurredFace Gait Height Behavior Time Location PersData
Global Collection duties
Actions
Collecting 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Accessing 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Storing 3 1,2,3 3 3 3 3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Monitoring 3 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 3 3
Purposes
All 1,2,3
DetectIncident 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 3 3
Evidence 3 3 3 3 3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Conditions
Unconditional 3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Guaranteed 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1 1
Global Forward duties
Actions
Forwarding
to LegalAuthority 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Purposes
Evidence 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Conditions
RequestLegalAuthority 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Guaranteed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Global Retention Limits
Duration (days)
60 days 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 3
90 days 1,2 1,2
Conditions
UnConditional 3
NoLegalInvestigation 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
Guaranteed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,2 1,2
declaring that data categories blurred face and gait are stored, and (b) a
retention limit specifying that data is kept for a maximum of 30 days. In the
model, these items correspond to separate elements of the Statement domain.
Though both statements have the same purposes, these must be expressed
separately. In particular, StatementPurpose(Statement,Purpose) relates the
purposes statistics and marketing to the duty and retention limit with 2
statements × 2 purposes relations. Decomposing combined statements may
imply that statement relations grow combinatorially. Similarly, each Statement
element must be related to the Entity “ImageDatabase”, the Permission
“Always”, and to the StatementEvidence “Declarative”. Furthermore, each duty
is related to the Action “Store”.
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User model. The coarse-grained user categorization facilitates user modeling
since modelers only need to specify user types via a single constant, for instance
TypeOfUser = NaiveUser . The model’s user types intuitively represent typical
real-world users, determining how data subjects appreciate statements and
evidence from organizations. They reflect the fact that skeptical users are more
difficult to convince of the compliance of actual data handling with declared
practices. The user model also addresses the high-level trust perception of
users. Namely, UserTrust(O) expresses that a user trusts the organization O.
Reusing framework components. The framework consists of modular com-
ponents, making possible isolated changes to one part while leaving the others
intact. A given system model (e.g. the railway station camera surveillance
scenario) is unaffected when new types of users are introduced. Similarly, if an
auditor collects different samples of statement evidence, only changes to the
evidence in the statement model are required.
Detecting conflicts. The user model could be extended with user privacy
preferences containing prohibitions. This aspect could be used by auditors
wanting to verify e.g. whether a system, run by a commercial organization,
is not collecting sensitive health information. The individual statements of
system entities are another flexible facet. Typically, these statements form
a large set of opaque and potentially inconsistent declarations. Automated
verification can be added to the system-independent part of the framework for
easy conflict detection.
7.5 Conclusions
An accountability inference model is defined and realized using the IDP
knowledge base system. Trust perceptions are taken into account to compute
global accountability statements from the individual statements made by
interacting entities. Different levels of evidence of individual statements are
distinguished, influencing the resulting global accountability statements. The
approach is illustrated with a scenario involving stakeholders in a railway
surveillance infrastructure. The framework is not tied to any particular scenario
and can be extended easily. The representation of data handling evidence is
only implicit, and therefore coarse-grained. A more refined approach would
model the semantics of log compliance explicitly. This level of detail seems
difficult to implement within a first-order logic-based framework. In the current
version of the framework, the auditor acting on behalf of an individual is not
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notified of privacy policy conflicts automatically. Including this aspect would
remove the need for manual compatibility checking.

Chapter 8
General Conclusion
The scope of this dissertation is the individual’s personal information collected
in complex electronic services. The goal of this research is twofold. Firstly,
it provides end-users with meaningful feedback that clearly informs them
about the privacy impact of using the aforementioned services. Secondly, it
assists service designers by providing feedback about the impact of their design
decisions in regard to the individual’s privacy. This chapter reflects on the
research scope, the used approach and framework, followed by future research
and valorization tracks.
8.1 Reflection on the Research Scope
The class of services considered in this thesis is represented by the service
blueprint as presented in Chapter 3. The blueprint comprises a single user
who interacts with a service front-end which, in its turn, calls underlying
third-party sub-services. The scenarios discussed in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6
(i.e. respectively a travel reservation system, a web shop, loyalty systems
and a public transport system) show that the blueprint can be used to
represent services from different application domains. The considered class
of services represents a substantial group of contemporary Internet services,
such as entertainment services (e.g. Spotify and Netflix), e-Commerce services
(e.g. eBay and Amazon), search engines (e.g. Google), and e-Governance
services. The blueprint, however, is restricted to a single user interacting
with a service front-end. Extensions to the service blueprint are needed to
represent users exchanging personal information with each other via a service.
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For instance, a user sharing his personal pictures with his friends on Facebook
cannot be represented. Another example are members in a peer-to-peer network
sharing fragments of a file that another user can download via the peer-to-peer
service. To model these multi-user applications, the user trust model must be
extended with additional users (i.e. additional users must be added to the User
domain) and new trust relationships must be defined so that trust between
users can be modeled as well. For example, to capture a privacy-aware user
who shares no personal attributes with other less privacy-aware users.
The collection of personal information in electronic services is subjected
to privacy regulations. The privacy protection principles in the European
General Data Protection Regulations include data minimization and service
provider accountability. The first principle mentioned, which focuses on the
disclosure of a user’s personal attributes, is the basis for the privacy analysis
approach as presented in Part I and II of this dissertation. The second
principle mentioned, which focuses on the compliance of a service provider’s
data handling practices, is used in the approach presented in Part III. Both
approaches are complementary as services may require to reveal personal
attributes to meet the functional requirements. For example, a user must reveal
his name and address to get his purchases delivered at home. By keeping service
providers accountable for their data handling practices, service providers are
enforced to respect data protection regulations and their declarations on data
handling practices. Service providers can log their data handling activities
to prove their compliance with data handling practice declarations towards
privacy auditing authorities. However, logs are no guarantee of compliance.
As a consequence, the validity of logs depends on the perception of auditors
and individuals whether logs are trustworthy. Nevertheless, it is in the interest
of service providers to respect a user’s privacy as it is hard to acquire a good
reputation.
8.2 Reflection on the Modeling Framework
The framework presented in Part I and II analyzes the user’s privacy at service
level (i.e. application level), while the framework in Part III is used to provide
feedback on data handling practices at system level. The former framework
provides privacy-related feedback based on the user’s personal attributes
collected by services. The latter provides global feedback on a system’s data
handling practices, such as the purposes and conditions for collecting a user’s
personal attributes and the period during which personal attributes are stored.
In both frameworks, data handling practices are derived from publicly available
privacy policies. However, practical restrictions complicate the modeling of
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these policies. Typically, these policies are written in human language. The
translation into an IDP specification is difficult. One of the reasons is that
service policies can be interpreted in different ways as they are often unclear.
Privacy regulators could require to unambiguously specify service policies in
a machine interpretable format (see Section 2.2.3) so that the translation into
IDP input model specifications could be automated.
Privacy regulations, such as the EU general data protection regulation, require
that service providers integrate privacy safeguards into their design process and
that service providers can demonstrate compliance with data handling practice
declarations and privacy regulations. In this context, both frameworks are
relevant, even in cases where privacy properties of services are trivial to derive
manually. Moreover, formal modeling frameworks could become essential for
service providers, for instance, to be awarded with a privacy seal indicating
their data handling practices comply with the considered privacy protection
framework.
Appendices C and D show the IDP realization of the privacy analysis
framework as presented in Part I, the input model that represents the web
shop case of Section 4.1, and the output model containing the generated privacy
feedback of the modeled web shop. The IDP listing separates generic modeling
parts from the parts that are specific to the modeled system and user. This
supports the reusability of the framework components. This key requirement
facilitates comparing alternative systems, different credential technologies, and
users with different trust perceptions since changes specific to a modeled system
and user are isolated to only the system and user model, respectively, part of the
input model. More specifically, the framework contains a system independent
part (i.e. theory part) that describes generic properties of services. The privacy
in a system can be analyzed for different user types by only changing the
user model. This enables a modeler to easily compare the acceptance of the
modeled service for different user types. The user model represents the user’s
trust perceptions. To keep the complexity in the models manageable, trust
perceptions are represented by binary trust relations (i.e. an organization can
be trusted or untrusted) expressing the user’s trust in organizations for storing
and forwarding his personal attributes. However, binary trust relationships may
be too coarse-grained to model user types more accurately or to capture specific
situations. An example of a situation in which binary trust representations lack
expressiveness, is in the case of the QR code scanner used in the first loyalty
scheme as presented in Section 5.1. In the loyalty scheme, the cashier scans
the QR code printed on the customer’s loyalty card. Although the scanner is
only capable of reading the QR code in reality (i.e. limited by the hardware),
in the model it is implicitly assumed that all personal attributes printed on the
card are collected as well. The difference between reality and what is modeled
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leads, in case of untrusted organizations, to user profiles containing personal
attributes that in reality cannot be collected by the QR code scanner. Hence,
additional relations must be defined for capturing situations in which binary
trust relations lack expressiveness. For example, concepts must be defined to
express a component’s data collection limitations.
To guarantee the quality of output models, it must be verified how well the
privacy feedback in the output model corresponds to reality. Since output
models are inferred from an input model using logic rules that comprise the
theory, the quality of output models depend on how exact an input model and
theory are. To assure that the privacy feedback correctly represents real-world
privacy properties of a modeled system, two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly,
the input model must exactly correspond to the modeled system and user.
Secondly, the theory must correctly describe which personal attributes of the
user are collected and stored, and how they flow through the modeled system.
However, the size of the IDP listing as presented in Appendices C and D
clearly illustrate the complexity of the framework and the input and output
model. As a consequence, it is infeasible to formally proof that the privacy
feedback in the output model correctly represents real-world privacy properties.
A pragmatic model-verification based approach is used for verifying the quality
of the models. Firstly, a theory must be defined for automatically detecting
inconsistent input model specifications. However, this insufficiently guarantees
whether specifications correctly represent the modeled system. The remedy
is to enforce service providers to specify their privacy policies in a machine
interpretable policy language such as P3P. This supports to automatically
generate input models that correspond with the modeled system. Secondly,
an indirect verification approach is used for verifying the theory that describes
the generic behavior and inference strategy. A set of invariants (i.e. logic rules
that in all models are true), representing the properties inherent in composite
services, can be verified using a set of different output models to verify whether
the theory is correct. If the theory is correct, invariants will evaluate to true.
The more invariants and output models verified, the more assured a modeler
can be that the theory is correct. An invariant is given in the following example.
Given the ordered set of services s0 <G s1 <G s2 <G . . . in which the services
collect personal attributes forwarded by their predecessor. If an untrusted
organization owns a user profile Pi associated to a service si part of the above-
mentioned set, then Pj ⊆ Pi holds for all user profiles Pj associated with
services sj , with si <G sj.
The aforementioned verifications (i.e. input model consistency and output
model verification) are two examples of model-checking problems, supported
by the IDP system. Model checking is computationally feasible as it is a
polynomial problem in function of the size of the input or output model. The
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privacy analysis of a modeled system uses finite model generation. By default,
IDP generates a finite output model by expanding the input model (i.e. a
structure containing partial knowledge) so that the output model satisfies the
modeling theory. This is a NP problem in the size of the input model that
even for medium-sized systems, such as the privacy-preserving public transport
ticketing system as presented in Chapter 6, might be infeasible to compute.
The computational feasibility also depends on the information that is known
and the feedback that must be generated. If all information is known, so that
defined predicates can be pre-calculated, then IDP uses the computational
more feasible PROLOG based (i.e. XSB) technique [108, 152] to generate
privacy feedback. The following example illustrates when XSB and model
expansion is used by IDP. In the first case, a set of collaborating organizations
is known beforehand. The modeler queries the model for the user’s anonymity
level. IDP uses XSB to compute the anonymity level as all the information
of the system is given. In the second case, a set of collaborating organizations
must be found that satisfies the constraint that the user is identifiable towards
a specific organization. This is a search problem in which a set of collaborating
organizations must be found that satisfies the aforementioned constraint.
In Part II, a linear time model is added to the framework to represent a user
who interacts with multiple service front-ends. Alternatively, time can be
implicit by using predicates representing the relative order in which services
are invoked. For example, predicate ServiceInvokedNext(ServiceIdentifier,
ServiceIdentifier) expresses that the user invokes the service referred by the
second argument after he invoked the service referred by the first element.
However, this lacks expressiveness in the following situations. Firstly, a single
service front-end x can be invoked multiple times by the user. In this situation,
the predicate cannot represent a service y which is invoked by the user after
he invoked service x the first time. Secondly, credential ownership is dynamic
as credentials can be issued or revoked at specific time points as a consequence
of service invocations. Therefore, credential ownership and service invocations
must be expressed towards a shared time reference so that both can easily be
related to each other.
McCarthy and Hayes [123] showed that it is hard to represent in logic what
is not affected by an action. This is known as the frame problem for which
Reiter [149] presented a set of solutions fulfilled by the modeling decisions made
in Chapter 6. Firstly, services invoked by a user are modeled as actions that
cannot be invoked simultaneously. Secondly, the invocation of sub-services
are represented as inertial fluents (i.e. sub-services can only be invoked as a
causation of a previously invoked service). Finally, credential ownership is also
represented by inertial fluents (i.e. they are the result of services which execute).
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8.3 Reflection on the Modeling Approach
Expressiveness. A logic-based modeling approach is selected to automate
the analysis of privacy in electronic services. The IDP system is selected
for the realization of the privacy analysis framework because of its intuitive
modeling features. Since it is a declarative language based on first-order
logic, it can easily be adopted. Moreover, the IDP language enables modelers
to concentrate solely on describing services and not on how solutions are
computed. The IDP language extends its expressiveness by supporting
inductive definitions. Definitions are superior to constraint rules for expressing
composite services. The former are composed of construction rules that
describe how objects are built; the latter only describe what is excluded from
the solution. Hence, composite services can be better described by means
of construction rules rather than with constraints. This is acknowledged by
the IDP listing in Appendix C in which the theory is completely described
using inductive definitions. Moreover, inductive definitions are necessary for
expressing the transitive closure since first-order logic lacks expressiveness. The
transitive closure property is used for describing how personal attributes flow
through composite services. Although the IDP language is supposed to be
intuitive, still its expressiveness is limited as it is based on first-order logic. For
example, first-order logic cannot directly represent a set containing different
elements. A modeler must first define a reference associated with the set and
then define a predicate to relate each member element to this reference.
Capabilities. The IDP system supports non-monotonic reasoning on a
knowledge base containing incomplete knowledge (i.e. an input model in
which not all facts are given). The IDP system generates output models
(i.e. solutions) that are supersets of the input models. Besides it can be used to
extract privacy properties from a given input model that completely specifies
a modeled system, it can also solve search problems, in which parts of the
input specification is missing. Model-checking is computational more feasible
than search problems. In the former case, it is likely that the IDP system
can check models using XSB to pre-calculate definitions (see Section 8.2). In
the latter case, the IDP system uses model expansion for computing solutions
which often is infeasible. If the computation is infeasible, then the modeler can
perform the following steps. Firstly, try to pre-calculate definitions for which
all the information is known. A set of hints that describes a partial solution
can be added to the input model as well. Secondly, try to split the theory into
independent parts so that the model generation can be performed in separate
steps. The intermediate output models generated in one step, are used as input
in the next step. A step-by-step approach can reduce the number of unknown
variables so that the search space is limited and solutions can be computed
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with less memory. However, this technique cannot be used in case of search
problems, such as finding a set of collaborating organizations so that the user is
identifiable towards a specific organization. The reason is that the computation
of the set of collaborations cannot be performed without considering the user
who must be identifiable towards the specific organization. A solution is to first
generate all possible sets of collaborations and then verify for which set the user
is identifiable towards the specific organization. However, in some cases this
may be infeasible as well since there might exist too many combinations.
8.4 Future Research Tracks
The framework as presented in Part I and II supports a single user who interacts
with a service front-end. Future research can extend this to multiple users
to support the privacy analysis of users in social networks or peer-to-peer
networks. In the current framework, the user model represents the user’s
initial state (i.e. the credentials he owns) and his trust perceptions (i.e. storage
and distribution trust). The user model must be adapted to support multiple
users. The following example illustrates potential trust relationships between
users who should be considered in the user model. A privacy-aware user only
shares information with friends in his social network. His friends may be less
concerned about their privacy and possibly leak information to other parties
(e.g. organizations or persons that are not part of the social network of the
sender) that should not receive it. Hence, trust relationships between users
must be added to the user model since the user must trust that his friends will
not reveal his information to others.
The verification of compliance between the designed services and legislative
privacy frameworks is currently not supported in the modeling framework.
The IDP language, which is based on first-order logic, lacks expressiveness to
completely represent rules part of privacy regulation frameworks (e.g. HIPAA).
It is shown that formal methods [25, 72] using temporal logics (e.g. CTL)
should be used to represent the rules part of legislative privacy frameworks.
Secondly, since different privacy protection frameworks exist, for each privacy
protection framework an associated theory part should be added to the
modeling framework (i.e. the logic rules in the theory describe the rules in
the privacy protection framework).
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8.5 Future Valorization Tracks
This section presents a possible use case in which the modeling framework as
presented in Part I and II can be useful.
In case of service designers, the modeling framework is integrated in an
automated support tool to facilitate the design of electronic services. The tool
automatically warns designers if their decisions violate the designer’s predefined
privacy requirements. The designer must therefore create IDP input models of
the services they design. This is an elaborative and error-prone task. Moreover,
the output models, which contain the privacy-related feedback, are hard to
interpret by non-experts. Hence, the tool should support a more intuitive
representation, such as a graphical formalism, that can be easily interpreted by
non-expert modelers. Transformation rules must be defined that automatically
transform a graphical input model into the corresponding IDP input model
and an IDP output model into a graphical output model.
Appendix A
Inductive Definitions
A definition comprises a set of constructive rules defining a concept, e.g. a first-
order logic predicate, in terms of other concepts. Inductive definitions extend
definitions by supporting recursion. An example is given by (A.1) defining
the ancestor of a person x. The inductive definition contains two rules. The
first rule expresses that x’s parents are his ancestors. The second rule – the
recursion – specifies that the ancestors of x’ ancestors are his ancestors as well
(transitive closure).


∀x∀y
(
AncestorOf (y, x)← ParentOf(y, x)
)
.
∀x∀y
(
AncestorOf (y, x)←
∃z(AncestorOf(y, z) ∧AncestorOf(z, x)
)
.
(A.1)
Definitions and constraint rules are semantically opposites. Let P be the set of
relations represented by predicate P. A definition defining predicate P builds
the set of relations from the bottom up. More specifically, P is constructed
from the union of the results of each rule in the definition. Constraint rules, on
the contrary, restrict the possible relations represented by P ′. Each constraint
removes some relations of P ′, and finally results in P ⊆ P ′. Semantically, the
constructive property of definitions are more convenient than constraint rules
for modeling electronic services, which are systems constructed of multiple
components.
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Appendix B
Query Types
Table B.1 presents the queries for analyzing the privacy of composite services.
These queries are applied to the loyalty scheme models of Chapter 5. The
queries are classified according to multiple categories.
• Q1 queries the user’s anonymity level.
• Q2 queries the attributes that are released to organizations.
• Q3 queries the impact of underlying collaborations between organizations.
• Q4 queries the trust relationships that are required between organiza-
tions.
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Table B.1: Queries used for the privacy analysis of the loyalty schemes of
Chapter 5.
Q1. Query for linkabilities
r1.1 ∀s∀o(AnonService(s, o) ∨ PseudoService(s, o) ∨ IdentService(s, o)⇔ UserInvokable(s))
r1.2 ∀s∀o(∃id∃a(UserProfile(o, id, s, a) ∧ Identity(id))⇔ IdentService(s, o))
r1.3 ∀s∀o(∃id∃a(UserProfile(o, id, s, a) ∧ Pseudonym(id))⇐ PseudoService(s, o))
r1.4 ∀s∀o∀id∀a(UserProfile(o, id, s, a) ∧ Identity(id)⇒ ¬PseudoService(s, o))
r1.5 ∀o∀id∀s∀a(UserProfile(o, id, s, a) ∧ (Identity(id) ∨ Pseudonym(id))⇒ ¬AnonService(s, o))
Q1.1 ﬁnd AnonService, PseudoService and IdentService
Q2. Query for the presence of attributes in user profiles
r2.1 ∀o∀id∀s(UserProfileMatch(o, id, s)⇔ ∀a(¬SearchSet(a) ∨ UserProfile(o, id, s, a)))
r2.2 ∀o∀id∀s∀a(UserProfileViolation(o, id, s, a)⇔ (UserProfile(o, id, s, a) ∧ ViolationSet(o, a)))
Q2.1 ﬁnd UserProfileMatch
e.g., for SearchSet = {Address,Products,Name,CustomerID}
Q2.2 ﬁnd UserProfileViolation
e.g., for ViolationSet = {(AD,Name), (AD,Address), (AD,Email)}
Q3. Query for collaborations
r3.1 ∀ofrom∀oto∀id∀s∀a(UserProfile(ofrom , id, s, a) ∧ ShareDataWith(ofrom , oto)
⇒ UserProfile(oto, id, s, a))
Q3.1 apply Q1.1, Q2.1 or Q2.2
e.g., for ShareDataWith = {(LP,GS), . . .}
Q3.2 ﬁnd ShareDataWith, with [minimize(#{∀ofrom , oto : ShareDataWith(ofrom , oto)}]
such that ShareDataWith(om, on), . . . , ShareDataWith(or, os)
|= R ∧ ReqIdent ∧ ReqColl , with R the theory
e.g., for ReqIdent =
{
IsIdentService = {(Checkout ,GS)}
IsNotAnonService = {(Checkout ,LA)}
and for ReqColl =
{
InclDataShareWith = {(LP ,GS)}
ExclDataShareWith = {(GS ,LA), (LA,GS), (LA,LP), (LP,LA)}
Q4. Query for trust relationships
r4.1


∀oref (Trusts(oref ,User)← ∃s∃p∃a(TrustRelationShipOf(oref ) ∧ ServiceOf(s) = oref
∧ AccessPolicy(s) = p ∧ RevealAttribute(p, a)))
∀oref∀o(Trusts(oref , o)← ∃s∃p∃a(TrustRelationShipOf(oref ) ∧ ServiceOf(s) = oref
∧ AttributeDataFlow(sx, s, a) ∧ ServiceOf(sx) = o))
with AttributeDataFlow deﬁned as,
r4.2


∀sx∀sy∀a(AttributeDataFlow(sx, sy , a)← ∃px∃py(AccessPolicy(sy) = py)
∧ RevealAttribute(py, a)
∧ DistributionPolicy(sx) = px
∧ ForwardAttributeTo(px, a, sy)))
∀sx∀sy∀a(AttributeDataFlow(sx, sy , a)← ∃sz∃px∃py(AttributeDataFlow(sz, sy, a)
∧ DistributionPolicy(sx) = px
∧ ForwardAttributeTo(px, a, sz)))
Q4.1 ﬁnd Trusts
e.g., for TrustRelationshipsOf = {LP}
Appendix C
IDP realization of the Logic
Based Framework
This appendix presents the listing of the IDP realization of the framework as
presented in Part I1. The listing is structured as follows:
• The vocabulary voc_privacy (see Listing C.1) is a generic part that
contains all the symbols part of the lexicon in which models can be
expressed. The vocabulary can be subdivided into the general use symbols
section, the user model section, the identifier model section, the system
model section and the internal symbols section that contains the symbols
that are internally used in the theory part.
• The theory (see Listing C.2) is a generic part composed of multiple sub-
theories. The theory part theo_general defines the predicates that are
generally used in other theory parts. The theory part theo_behavior
contains the logic rules that describe the generic behavior of the modeled
credential technologies. For example, it contains the rule that describes
that all attributes of an X.509 certificate are revealed when showing
the certificate. The theory part theo_build_profiles describes how user
profiles are inferred.
• The structure struct_input_model (see Listing C.3) corresponds to the
input model representing the web shop case of Section 4.1 and is specific
to the modeled system and user. Hence, the structure is subdivided into
1The IDP realization of the framework is publicly available at https://github.com/
decroik/inspect-privacy-and-trust/.
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the user model section, the system model section, and the identifier model
section.
• The main procedure is a script (Lua) specifying the required steps for
generating the output models.
The aforementioned modeling parts separate the listing into a generic part
and parts that are specific to a system or user. It enables modelers
to conveniently compare alternative systems, the impact of using different
credential technologies, and users with different trust perceptions. For
instance, changes are isolated to the system model section in the structure
struct_input_model if the privacy in two alternative systems is compared. If
users with different trust perceptions must be modeled, then only the user
model section in the structure struct_input_model must be changed.
Listing C.1: Listing of the vocabulary part of the IDP realization of the
framework as presented in Part I
1 vocabulary voc_privacy {
2
3 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 // Vocabulary : General symbols
6 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
7 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8
9 type AttrSrc // The source of an personal attribute
10
11 type Stakeholder isa AttrSrc // System stakeholders
12 type User isa Stakeholder // The user
13 type Organization isa Stakeholder // The organizations
14
15 type Attribute // Personal attributes
16 type Property isa Attribute // Personal properties
17
18 type Credential isa AttrSrc // Authentication tokens ,
19 // e.g. X .509 certificates
20
21
22 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
23 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
24 // Vocabulary : Input model - User Model
25 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
26 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
27
28 // The user ’s trust perceptions
29 // (1) : The set of storage trusted organizations
30 // (2) : The set of distribution trusted organizations
31 StorageTrust ( Organization )
32 DistributionTrust ( Organization )
33
34 // The user ’s initial state
35 type X509 isa Credential
36 type Idemix isa Credential
37
38 // A credential is a container of personal attributes
39 CredAttr ( Credential , Attribute )
40
41 // A credential is issued by exactly one organization
42 CredIssuer ( Credential ) : Organization
43
44
45 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
46 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
47 // Vocabulary : Input model - Identifier Model
48 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
49 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
50
51 type Identifier // Identifiers
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52 type Identity isa Identifier // Identities
53 type Pseudonym isa Identifier // Pseudonyms
54
55 IdentifierSetAttr ( Identifier , Attribute ) // The set of attributes of
56 // an identifier is composed
57
58
59 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
60 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
61 // Vocabulary : Input model - System Model
62 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
63 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
64
65 type ServiceType // The services in the system
66 type ServiceIdentifier isa AttrSrc // The identifiers referring
67 // to the modeled services
68
69 // A service provided by an organization is referred in the model by exactly
70 // one identifier
71 partial Service ( ServiceType , Organization ) : ServiceIdentifier
72
73 // The services that are part of the same session. It is assumed that the
74 // services in a session share all the attributes they uses with all other
75 // services that are part of the same session
76 SessionMember ( SessionIdentifier , ServiceIdentifier )
77
78 // Service policies are comprised of:
79 type AccessPolicyId // The access policies
80 type StoragePolicyId // The storage policies
81 type DistributionPolicyId // The distribution policies
82 type OutputPolicyId // The output policies
83
84 // Modeling the service policy statements associated with a service
85 // (1) : The credentials necessary to access the associated services
86 // (2) : The attributes that must be revealed from the attribute source and
87 // that are asserted by a stakeholder
88 // (3) : The properties that must be revealed from the attribute source and
89 // that are asserted by a stakeholder
90 // (4) : The attributes generated by a service
91 // (5) : The attributes which are asserted by a stakeholder that are stored
92 // (6) : The attributes which are asserted by a stakeholder that are forwarded
93 // to a service
94 // (7) : The attributes that are the output of the associated service
95 // (8) : The credentials that are the output of the associated service
96 OwnCredential ( AccessPolicyId , Credential )
97 RevealAttr ( AccessPolicyId , AttrSrc , Attribute , Stakeholder )
98 ProveProperty ( AccessPolicy , Property , AttrSrc , Attribute , Stakeholder )
99 GenerateAttr ( AccessPolicyId , Attribute )
100 StoreAttr ( StoragePolicyId , Attribute , Stakeholder )
101 DistrAttrTo ( DistributionPolicyId , ServiceIdentifier , Attribute , Stakeholder )
102 OutputAttribute ( OutputPolicyId , Attribute )
103 OutputCred ( OutputPolicyId , Credential )
104
105 // A service policy is assigned to each service. Each service
106 // is associated with exactly one :
107 // (1) : access policy
108 // (2) : storage policy
109 // (3) : distribution policy
110 // (4) : output policy
111 // The representations below result in a more efficient computation than
112 // ServicePolicy ( ServiceIdentifier , AccessPolicyId , StoragePolicyId ,
113 // DistributionPolicyId , OutputPolicyId )
114 partial AccessPolicy ( ServiceIdentifier ) : AccessPolicyId
115 partial StoragePolicy ( ServiceIdentifier ) : StoragePolicyId
116 partial DistributionPolicy ( ServiceIdentifier ) : DistributionPolicyId
117 partial OutputPolicy ( ServiceIdentifier ) : OutputPolicyId
118
119
120 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
121 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
122 // Vocabulary : Internal symbols
123 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
124 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
125 // The predicates below are helper predicates and are only used internally
126 // The relations can be deduced from a set of given relations .
127
128 // An attribute that is part of the set of attributes that represent an
129 // identifier
130 IsIdentifierSetAttr ( Identifier , Attribute )
131
132 // The storage and distribution trust in services that are deduced from the
133 // set of storage and distribution trusted organizations respectively
134 StorageTrustServInstance ( ServiceIdentifier )
135 DistributionTrustServInstance ( ServiceIdentifier )
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136
137 // A service directly invoked by a user
138 ServiceInvokedByUser ( ServiceIdentifier )
139
140 // The successor of a service (1 st argument ) is the service (2 nd argument )
141 // that is invoked by it
142 Successor ( ServiceIdentifier , ServiceIdentifier )
143
144 // The service (1 st argument ) that is invoked by the service represented by
145 // the second argument
146 ServiceInvokedBy ( ServiceIdentifier , ServiceIdentifier )
147
148 // The attributes generated by a service are revealed to it
149 GeneratedByService ( ServiceIdentifier , Attribute , Stakeholder )
150
151 // The attributes revealed to a service that is invoked
152 RevealedToService ( ServiceIdentifier , Attribute , Stakeholder )
153
154 // Attributes forwarded by a service (1 st argument ) to the successor (2 nd
155 // argument ).
156 ForwardedByServiceToSucc ( ServiceIdentifier , ServiceIdentifier , Attribute ,
157 Stakeholder )
158
159 // The attributes that according to the storage policy are stored when using
160 // a service
161 ServiceStoredPolicyAttr ( ServiceIdentifier , Attribute , Stakeholder )
162
163 // The attributes that can be stored because they are revealed towards the
164 // service
165 ServiceStoredRevealAttr ( ServiceIdentifier , Attribute , Stakeholder )
166
167 // A path between two services in which no distribution trust is present
168 UntrustedPath ( ServiceIdentifier , ServiceIdentifier )
169
170 // Attributes that are distributes to a service (1st argument ) by preceding
171 // services (2 nd argument )
172 ServiceStoredForwardAttr ( ServiceIdentifier , ServiceIdentifier , Attribute ,
173 Stakeholder )
174
175 // The attributes ( asserted by a stakeholder ) of a sub - profile associated with
176 // a service (1 st argument ) that is a sub - service of the service represented
177 // by the 2nd argument
178 SubProfile ( ServiceIdentifier , ServiceIdentifier , Attribute , Stakeholder )
179
180 // The identifier to which the above - mentioned sub - profiles can be linked
181 SubProfileId ( ServiceIdentifier , ServiceIdentifier , Identifier )
182
183
184 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
185 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
186 // Vocabulary : Output symbols
187 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
188 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
189
190 // An organization ’s user profile associated with an invoked service is the
191 // collection of stored attributes that are asserted by a stakeholder and that
192 // can be linked to a common identifier .
193 UserProfile ( Organization , Identifier , ServiceIdentifier , Attribute , Stakeholder )
194 }
Listing C.2: Listing of the theory part of the IDP realization of the framework
as presented in Part I
1 theory theo_general : voc_privacy {
2
3 // The user ’s storage trust into a service is derived from the set of storage
4 // trusted organizations
5 {
6 ! si : StorageTrustServInstance (si) <- ? st[ ServiceType ] o :
7 Service(st ,o) = si &
8 StorageTrust (o).
9 }
10
11 // The user ’s distribution trust into a service is derived from the set of
12 // distribution trusted organizations
13 {
14 ! si : DistributionTrustServInstance (si ) <- ? st[ ServiceType ] o :
15 Service(st ,o) = si &
16 DistributionTrust (o).
17 }
18
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19 // The attributes that are generated by a service are revealed to it as well
20 {
21 ! si a e : GeneratedByService (si ,a,e) <- ? ap s[ ServiceType ] :
22 AccessPolicy (si) = ap &
23 GenerateAttr (ap ,a) &
24 Service(s,e) = si.
25 }
26
27 // Linkabilities
28 // (1) : Pseudonyms
29 // (2) : Identities
30 {
31 ! id a : IsIdentifierSetAttr (id ,a) <- Pseudonym (id ) &
32 IdentifierSetAttr (id ,a).
33
34 ! id a : IsIdentifierSetAttr (id ,a) <- Identity (id) &
35 IdentifierSetAttr (id ,a).
36 }
37 }
38
39 theory theo_behavior : voc_privacy {
40
41 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
42 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
43 // Theory : Generic behavior of credential technologies
44 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
45 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
46
47 // The attributes that are revealed to a service
48 {
49 // (1) : The attributes revealed to a service according to the associated
50 // access policies
51 // (2) : Attributes that are generated by the service are revealed to
52 // the service.
53 // (3) : The Session identifier is a linkable attribute that associates
54 // all the attributes that are revealed to the services that are
55 // part of the same session
56 // (4) : The properties revealed to a service according to the associated
57 // access policies
58
59 ! si a e : RevealedToService (si ,a,e) <- ? ap cred :
60 AccessPolicy (si) = ap &
61 RevealAttr (ap ,cred ,a,e).
62
63 ! si a e : RevealedToService (si ,a,e) <- GeneratedByService (si ,a,e).
64
65 ! si a e : RevealedToService (si ,a,e) <-
66 ? s[ ServiceType ] sessid[ SessionIdentifier ] :
67 SessionMember ( sessid , si) & Service (s,e) = si &
68 IdentifierSetAttr ( sessid ,a).
69
70 ! si prop e : RevealedToService (si ,prop ,e) <- ? ap sp dp op as a :
71 ServicePolicies (si ,ap ,sp ,dp ,op) &
72 ProveProperty (ap ,prop ,as ,a,e).
73
74 // Technology dependent part: certificates
75 // (1) : X .509 - all attributes are revealed when showing an X .509
76 // certificate
77 // (2) : X .509 - non - selective attribute disclosure property - redundant
78 // with (1).
79 // (3) : X .509 - all attributes are revealed when proving a property -
80 // redundant with (1)
81 ! si a e : RevealedToService (si ,a,e) <- ? cred[ X509] ap :
82 AccessPolicy (si) = ap &
83 OwnCredential (ap ,cred) &
84 CredAttr (cred ,a) &
85 CredIssuer ( cred) = e.
86
87 // Idemix - no additional rules
88 }
89
90
91 theory theo_build_profiles : voc_privacy {
92
93 // A service (2 nd argument ) is a successor if it is invoked by the preceding
94 // service (1 st argument ). The successors be deduced from the distribution
95 // policy. Multiple successors can exist for a single predecessor .
96 {
97 ! si succ : Successor (si ,succ) <- ? dp a e :
98 DistributionPolicy (si) = dp &
99 DistrAttrTo (dp ,succ ,a,e ).
100 }
101
102 // A service is invoked by a user if it is not a successor .
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103 {
104 ! si : ServiceInvokedByUser (si) <- ~(? pred : Successor (pred , si )).
105 }
106
107 // Service are invoked by a preceding service
108 // (1) : A service (2nd argument ) invokes its successor (s) (1 st argument )
109 // (2) : A service (1st arugment ) that is indirectly invoked by a preceding
110 // service.
111 {
112 ! succ si : ServiceInvokedBy ( succ ,si) <- Successor (si , succ).
113
114 ! si_2 si_0 : ServiceInvokedBy ( si_2 , si_0) <- ? si_1 :
115 ServiceInvokedBy (si_1 , si_0) &
116 ServiceInvokedBy (si_2 , si_1).
117 }
118
119 // Attributes that are stored as declared in the storage policy declarations
120 {
121 ! si a e : ServiceStoredPolicyAttr (si ,a ,e) <- ? sp :
122 StoragePolicy (si ) = sp &
123 StoreAttr (sp ,a ,e).
124 }
125
126 // In case of no storage trust , all the attributes revealed are assumed to be
127 // stored by the service .
128 {
129 ! si a e : ServiceStoredRevealAttr (si ,a ,e) <- RevealedToService (si ,a,e ).
130 }
131
132 // The attributes forwarded to a successor (2 nd argument ) by an
133 // invoked service (1 st argument ) are :
134 // (1) : the attributes that are forwarded as declared in the
135 // distribution policies
136 // (2) : the attributes that can be collected by a service are all
137 // forwarded to the successors in case the user has no distribution
138 // trust
139 {
140 ! si succ a e : ForwardedByServiceToSucc (si , succ ,a ,e) <- ? dp :
141 DistributionTrustServInstance (si) &
142 DistributionPolicy (si) = dp &
143 DistrAttrTo (dp ,succ ,a,e ).
144
145 ! si succ a e : ForwardedByServiceToSucc (si , succ ,a ,e) <- ? dp ax ex :
146 ~ DistributionTrustServInstance (si ) &
147 DistributionPolicy (si) = dp &
148 DistrAttrTo (dp ,succ ,ax , ex) &
149 RevealedToService (si ,a,e).
150 }
151
152 // A path between two services in which no distribution trust is present
153 {
154 ! start succ : UntrustedPath ( start , succ) <-
155 Successor ( start , succ) &
156 ~ DistributionTrustServInstance ( succ).
157
158 ! start si : UntrustedPath (start , si) <- ? si_x :
159 UntrustedPath ( start , si_x) & Successor ( si_x ,si) &
160 ~ DistributionTrustServInstance ( si_x).
161 }
162
163 // The attributes forwarded by sub - services as a causation of a user invoked
164 // service (2 nd argument ) to a sub - service (2 nd argument ) are stored. It is
165 // assumed that the organization is not storage trusted by the user.
166 // (1) : if the service (1 st argument ) is a successor of a user
167 // invoked service (2 nd argument )
168 // (2) : if the service (1 st argument ) is a sub - service of a user invoked
169 // service
170 // (3) : if the service (1 st argument ) is a sub - service of a user invoked
171 // service (2 nd service) that forwards attributes in the case of an
172 // untrusted path
173 // (4) : if the service (1 st argument ) is a sub - service that receives
174 // attributes from other sub - services of a common user invoked
175 // service (2 nd argument )
176 {
177 ! si su a e : ServiceStoredForwardAttr (si ,su ,a,e) <-
178 ServiceInvokedByUser ( su) &
179 ForwardedByServiceToSucc (su ,si ,a,e).
180
181 ! si su a e : ServiceStoredForwardAttr (si ,su ,a,e) <- ? src :
182 ServiceInvokedByUser ( su) &
183 ServiceInvokedBy (src , su) &
184 ForwardedByServiceToSucc (src ,si ,a ,e).
185
186 ! si su a e : ServiceStoredForwardAttr (si ,su ,a,e) <- ? succ :
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187 ServiceInvokedByUser ( su) &
188 UntrustedPath (su ,si) &
189 ServiceInvokedBy (si , succ) &
190 ForwardedByServiceToSucc (su ,succ ,a,e ).
191
192 ! si su a e : ServiceStoredForwardAttr (si ,su ,a,e) <- ? src succ :
193 ServiceInvokedByUser ( su) &
194 UntrustedPath (src ,si) &
195 ServiceInvokedBy (src , su) &
196 ServiceInvokedBy (si , succ) &
197 ForwardedByServiceToSucc (src ,succ ,a,e).
198 }
199
200 // Build sub - profiles containing the attributes collected from a sub - service
201 // (1 st argument ) of a user invoked service (2 nd argument ). Three
202 // cases are considered :
203 // (1) : the sub - profiles contain the attributes that are specified in
204 // the storage policies associated with a user invoked service
205 // (2) : the sub - profiles contain the attributes revealed by a user to a
206 // user invoked service in the case there is no storage trust
207 // (3) : the sub - profiles contain the attributes that are mentioned in
208 // the storage policy of the associated sub - service
209 // (4) : attributes revealed by the user (if no storage trust) to a
210 // sub - services
211 // (5) : attributes that are forwarded to a sub - service by a preceding
212 // sub - service in the case the user has no storage trust
213 {
214 ! su a e : SubProfile (su ,su ,a,e) <- ServiceInvokedByUser (su) &
215 ServiceStoredPolicyAttr (su ,a,e).
216
217 ! su a e : SubProfile (su ,su ,a,e) <- ~ StorageTrustServInstance (su ) &
218 ServiceInvokedByUser ( su) &
219 ServiceStoredRevealAttr (su ,a,e).
220
221 ! si su a e : SubProfile (si ,su ,a,e) <- ServiceInvokedByUser (su) &
222 ServiceInvokedBy (si ,su) &
223 ServiceStoredPolicyAttr (si ,a,e).
224
225 ! si su a e : SubProfile (si ,su ,a,e) <- ~ StorageTrustServInstance (si ) &
226 ServiceInvokedByUser ( su) &
227 ServiceInvokedBy (si ,su) &
228 ServiceStoredRevealAttr (si ,a,e).
229
230 ! si su a e : SubProfile (si ,su ,a,e) <- ~ StorageTrustServInstance (si ) &
231 ServiceInvokedByUser ( su) &
232 ServiceInvokedBy (si ,su) &
233 ServiceStoredForwardAttr (si ,su ,a,e).
234 }
235
236 // The identifiers to which a sub - profile can be linked .
237 {
238 ! si su id : SubProfileId (si ,su ,id) <- ? a e :
239 SubProfile (si ,su ,a ,e) &
240 ~(? a_x : SubProfileIdentifierSetAttr (id ,a_x ) &
241 ~(? e_x : SubProfile (si ,su ,a_x , e_x ))).
242 }
243
244 // User profiles
245 // (1) : a user profile associated with a user invoked service is the union
246 // of all sub - profiles that are associated with the same user invoked
247 // service and that can be linked to a common identifier
248 // (2) : a user profile can be merged with another user profile in case
249 // both user profiles can be linked to a common identifier
250 // (3) : a user profile can be merged with a user profile of a collaborating
251 // organization that can be linked to a common identifiers
252 {
253 ! o id a e su : UserProfile (o,id ,su ,a ,e) <- ? si s[ ServiceType ] :
254 ServiceInvokedByUser ( su) &
255 SubProfile (si ,su ,a ,e) &
256 SubProfileId (si ,su ,id) &
257 Service(s,o) = si.
258
259 ! o id a e su : UserProfile (o,id ,su ,a ,e) <- ? id_x :
260 UserProfile (o,id_x ,su ,a,e) &
261 ~(? a_x : SubProfileIdentifierSetAttr (id ,a_x ) &
262 ~(? e_x : UserProfile (o,id_x ,su ,a_x , e_x ))).
263
264 ! o id a e su : UserProfile (o,id ,su ,a ,e) <- ? o_src :
265 UserProfile ( o_src ,id ,su ,a,e) &
266 ShareDataTo ( o_src ,o).
267 }
268 }
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Listing C.3: Listing of the input model part of the IDP realization representing
the web shop case as presented in Sectioin 4.1
1 structure struct_input_model : voc_privacy {
2
3 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 // System model
6 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
7 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8
9 AttrSrc = {
10 User;
11 GroceryStore ;
12 LoyaltyProgProvider ;
13 LoyaltyAppProvider ;
14 Advertiser ;
15 MobilePlatform ;
16 MobileOperator ;
17
18 Checkout ;
19 RequestLoyaltyInfo ; ShowLoyaltyInfo ;
20 CollectLoyaltyPoints ;
21 PrintTicket ;
22 CollectDataFromLPP ;
23
24 LoyaltyCard ;
25 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider ;
26 }
27
28 Stakeholder = {
29 User;
30 GroceryStore ;
31 LoyaltyProgProvider ;
32 LoyaltyAppProvider ;
33 Advertiser ;
34 MobilePlatform ;
35 MobileOperator ;
36 }
37
38 User = {
39 User;
40 }
41
42 Organization = {
43 GroceryStore ;
44 LoyaltyProgProvider ;
45 LoyaltyAppProvider ;
46 Advertiser ;
47 MobilePlatform ;
48 MobileOperator ;
49 }
50
51 Attribute = {
52 // From user
53 Name; Address ; EMail; PhoneNumber ;
54 PersonalProp ;
55
56 // From loyalty program provider
57 QRCode; PointsToEarn ; PointsEarned ; PointBalance ;
58
59 // From the grocery store
60 Bill; Products ;
61
62 // Session specific
63 SessGroceryStore ;
64 }
65
66 Property = {
67 }
68
69 // Services & Service Policies
70 ServiceType = {
71 CheckoutType ;
72 RequestLoyaltyInfoType ; ShowLoyaltyInfoType ;
73 CollectLoyaltyPointsType ;
74 PrintTicketType ;
75 CollectDataType ;
76 }
77
78 ServiceIdentifier = {
79 Checkout ;
80 RequestLoyaltyInfo ; ShowLoyaltyInfo ;
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81 CollectLoyaltyPoints ;
82 PrintTicket ;
83 CollectDataFromLPP ;
84 }
85
86 SessionMember = {
87 NymSessGroceryStore , Checkout ;
88 NymSessGroceryStore , ShowLoyaltyInfo ;
89 NymSessGroceryStore , PrintTicket ;
90 }
91
92 Service = {
93 Checkout , CheckoutType , GroceryStore ;
94 RequestLoyaltyInfo , RequestLoyaltyInfoType , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
95 ShowLoyaltyInfo , ShowLoyaltyInfoType , GroceryStore ;
96 CollectLoyaltyPoints , CollectLoyaltyPointsType , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
97 PrintTicket , PrintTicketType , GroceryStore ;
98 CollectDataFromLPP , CollectDataType , Advertiser ;
99 }
100
101 AccessPolicy = {
102 CheckoutAP ; RequestLoyaltyInfoAP ;
103 ShowLoyaltyInfoAP ; CollectLoyaltyPointsAP ; PrintTicketAP ;
104 NoneAP;
105 }
106
107 StoragePolicy = {
108 CollectLoyaltyPointsSP ;
109 NoneSP;
110 }
111
112 DistributionPolicy = {
113 CheckoutDP ; RequestLoyaltyInfoDP ;
114 ShowLoyaltyInfoDP ; CollectLoyaltyPointsDP ;
115 NoneDP;
116 }
117
118 OutputPolicy = {
119 ShowLoyaltyInfoOP ; PrintTicketOP ;
120 NoneOP;
121 }
122
123 OwnAuthToken = {
124 CheckoutAP , LoyaltyCard ;
125 }
126
127 RevealAttr = {
128 CheckoutAP , LoyaltyCard ,QRCode , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
129 CheckoutAP ,User , Products , GroceryStore ;
130
131 RequestLoyaltyInfoAP , Checkout , QRCode , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
132 RequestLoyaltyInfoAP , Checkout ,Bill , GroceryStore ;
133
134 ShowLoyaltyInfoAP , RequestLoyaltyInfo , PointBalance , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
135 ShowLoyaltyInfoAP , RequestLoyaltyInfo , PointsToEarn , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
136
137 CollectLoyaltyPointsAP , ShowLoyaltyInfo , QRCode , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
138 CollectLoyaltyPointsAP , ShowLoyaltyInfo ,Bill , GroceryStore ;
139
140 PrintTicketAP , CollectLoyaltyPoints , PointBalance , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
141 PrintTicketAP , CollectLoyaltyPoints , PointsEarned , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
142 }
143
144 GenerateAttr = {
145 CheckoutAP , Bill;
146 RequestLoyaltyInfoAP , PointsToEarn ;
147 CollectLoyaltyPointsAP , PointsEarned ;
148 }
149
150 StoreAttr = {
151 CollectLoyaltyPointsSP ,Bill , GroceryStore ;
152 CollectLoyaltyPointsSP ,QRCode , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
153 CollectLoyaltyPointsSP , PointsEarned , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
154 CollectLoyaltyPointsSP , PointBalance , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
155 }
156
157 DistrAttrTo = {
158 CheckoutDP , RequestLoyaltyInfo , QRCode , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
159 CheckoutDP , RequestLoyaltyInfo ,Bill , GroceryStore ;
160
161 RequestLoyaltyInfoDP , ShowLoyaltyInfo , PointsToEarn , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
162 RequestLoyaltyInfoDP , ShowLoyaltyInfo , PointBalance , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
163
164 ShowLoyaltyInfoDP , CollectLoyaltyPoints , QRCode , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
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165 ShowLoyaltyInfoDP , CollectLoyaltyPoints ,Bill , GroceryStore ;
166
167 CollectLoyaltyPointsDP , PrintTicket , PointBalance , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
168 CollectLoyaltyPointsDP , PrintTicket , PointsEarned , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
169
170 CollectLoyaltyPointsDP , CollectDataFromLPP ,Bill , GroceryStore ;
171 }
172
173 OutputAttr = {
174 ShowLoyaltyInfoOP , PointsToEarn ; ShowLoyaltyInfoOP , PointBalance ;
175 PrintTicketOP , PointsEarned ; PrintTicketOP , PointBalance ; PrintTicketOP , Bill;
176 }
177
178 ServicePolicies = {
179 Checkout , CheckoutAP , NoneSP ,CheckoutDP , NoneOP;
180 RequestLoyaltyInfo , RequestLoyaltyInfoAP ,NoneSP , RequestLoyaltyInfoDP , NoneOP;
181 ShowLoyaltyInfo , ShowLoyaltyInfoAP ,NoneSP , ShowLoyaltyInfoDP ,
182 ShowLoyaltyInfoOP ;
183 CollectLoyaltyPoints , CollectLoyaltyPointsAP , CollectLoyaltyPointsSP ,
184 CollectLoyaltyPointsDP , NoneOP;
185 PrintTicket , PrintTicketAP , NoneSP , NoneDP , PrintTicketOP ;
186 CollectDataFromLPP ,NoneAP , NoneSP , NoneDP , NoneOP;
187 }
188
189
190 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
191 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
192 // User model
193 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
194 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
195
196 // Trust perception by the user
197 StorageTrust = {
198 GroceryStore ;
199 MobilePlatform ;
200 MobileOperator ;
201 }
202
203 DistributionTrust = {
204 GroceryStore ;
205 MobilePlatform ;
206 MobileOperator ;
207 }
208
209 // Initial state of the user
210 ClaimBasedTech = { PlasticCard ; X509; Idemix; }
211 X509Tech = X509
212 IdemixTech = Idemix
213 Credential = { LoyaltyCard ; }
214
215 CredAttr = {
216 LoyaltyCard , QRCode;
217 }
218
219 CredTech = {
220 LoyaltyCard , PlasticCard ;
221 }
222
223 CredIssuer = {
224 LoyaltyCard , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
225 }
226
227 ProfileAccessType = { Public ; Restricted ;}
228 PublicAccess = Public
229 RestrictedAccess = Restricted
230
231 Profile = {
232 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider ;
233 }
234
235 ProfAttr = {
236 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider ,Address , User;
237 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider ,EMail , User;
238 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider , PhoneNumber , User;
239 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider , PersonalProp ,User;
240 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider ,QRCode , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
241 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider , PointBalance , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
242 }
243
244 ProfOwner = {
245 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
246 }
247
248 ProfAccessType = {
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249 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider , Restricted ;
250 }
251
252 ProfAccess = {
253 ProfLoyaltyProgramProvider , LoyaltyProgProvider ;
254 }
255
256 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
257 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
258 // Identifier model
259 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
260 //++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
261 Identifier = {
262 Identity1 ; Identity2 ;
263 Nym1; Nym2; Nym3;
264 NymSessGroceryStore ;
265 }
266
267 Identity = { Identity1 ; Identity2 ; }
268
269 Pseudonym = { Nym1; Nym2; Nym3;
270 NymSessGroceryStore ;
271 }
272
273 IdentifierSetAttr = {
274 Identity1 ,Name; Identity2 , Address ;
275 Nym1 , PhoneNumber ; Nym2 , EMail; Nym3 , QRCode ;
276 NymSessGroceryStore , SessGroceryStore ;
277 }
278 }
279
280
281 include <mx >
282 procedure main() {
283 stdoptions . nbmodels = 1
284 stdoptions . xsb = true
285
286 theory = merge( theo_general , theo_behavior )
287 theory = merge( theory , theo_build_profiles )
288
289 models = modelexpand (theory , struct_input_model )
290
291 printmodels ( models)
292 }

Appendix D
IDP Output Model
This appendix presents the resulting IDP output model1 associated with the web
shop (see Section 4.1) input model as presented in Appendix C. It is worth mentioning
that the listing shows the partial output model only containing the user proﬁles of the
organizations in the web shop scenario. The user proﬁles are represented by relations
UserProfile(Organization, Identifier ,ServiceIdentifier ,Attribute,Stakeholder).
Listing D.1: IDP output representing the resulting user profiles of the
organizations in the web shop case of Section 4.1
1 UserProfile [ voc_privacy :: Organization , voc_privacy :: Identifier ,
2 voc_privacy :: ServiceIdentifier ,
3 voc_privacy :: Attribute , voc_privacy :: Stakeholder ] =
4 {
5 PS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ , Address ,User
6 PS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
7 PS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
8 PS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
9 PS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
10
11 PS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Address , User
12 PS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , EMail , User
13 PS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
14 PS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
15 PS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
16
17 PS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , Address , User
18 PS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , EMail , User
19 PS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , Name , User
20 PS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
21 PS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
22
23 PS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , User
24 PS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
25 PS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
26 PS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
27 PS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
28
29 PS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , User
30 PS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
31 PS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
32 PS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
1The IDP realization of the framework is publicly available at https://github.com/
decroik/inspect-privacy-and-trust/.
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33 PS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
34
35 PS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address ,User
36 PS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail ,User
37 PS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
38 PS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr ,WS
39 PS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
40
41 PS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ , Address , User
42 PS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ , EMail , User
43 PS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ ,Name , User
44 PS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
45 PS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
46
47 PS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , User
48 PS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , EMail , User
49 PS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name ,User
50 PS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
51 PS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
52
53 PS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , User
54 PS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
55 PS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
56 PS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
57 PS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
58
59 PS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address ,User
60 PS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail ,User
61 PS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
62 PS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr ,WS
63 PS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
64
65 PS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ , Address , User
66 PS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ , EMail , User
67 PS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ ,Name , User
68 PS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
69 PS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
70
71 PS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , User
72 PS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , EMail , User
73 PS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name ,User
74 PS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
75 PS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
76
77 PS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , User
78 PS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
79 PS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
80 PS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
81 PS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
82
83 PS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address ,User
84 PS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail ,User
85 PS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
86 PS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr ,WS
87 PS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
88
89 PS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ , Address , User
90 PS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ , EMail , User
91 PS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ ,Name , User
92 PS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
93 PS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
94
95 PS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , User
96 PS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , EMail , User
97 PS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name ,User
98 PS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
99 PS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
100
101 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ , Address , Government
102 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ , Address ,User
103 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
104 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
105 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
106 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
107 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
108 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
109 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
110 WS , Identity1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
111
112 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Address , Government
113 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Address , University
114 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Address , User
115 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
116 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
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117 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , EMail , User
118 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
119 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
120 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , University
121 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
122 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
123 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
124 WS , Identity1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
125
126 WS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , Address , User
127 WS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
128 WS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , EMail , User
129 WS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , Name , User
130 WS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
131 WS , Identity1 , PrivPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
132
133 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , University
134 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , User
135 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,AgeLimit , Government
136 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
137 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
138 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , University
139 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
140 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
141 WS , Identity1 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
142
143 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , Government
144 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , User
145 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,AgeLimit , Government
146 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
147 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
148 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
149 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
150 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
151 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
152 WS ,Nym1 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
153
154 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , Government
155 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , University
156 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address ,User
157 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
158 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
159 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail ,User
160 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
161 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
162 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , University
163 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
164 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr ,WS
165 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
166 WS ,Nym1 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
167
168 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , Government
169 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , User
170 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,AgeLimit , Government
171 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
172 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
173 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
174 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
175 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
176 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
177 WS ,Nym2 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
178
179 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , Government
180 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , University
181 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address ,User
182 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
183 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
184 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail ,User
185 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
186 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
187 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , University
188 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
189 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr ,WS
190 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
191 WS ,Nym2 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
192
193 WS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ , Address , User
194 WS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
195 WS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ , EMail , User
196 WS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ ,Name , User
197 WS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
198 WS ,Nym2 , PrivPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
199
200 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , University
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201 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , User
202 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
203 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , EMail , User
204 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
205 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name , University
206 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name ,User
207 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
208 WS ,Nym2 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
209
210 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , Government
211 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , User
212 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,AgeLimit , Government
213 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
214 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
215 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
216 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
217 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
218 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
219 WS ,Nym3 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
220
221 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , Government
222 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , University
223 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address ,User
224 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
225 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
226 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail ,User
227 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
228 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
229 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , University
230 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
231 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr ,WS
232 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
233 WS ,Nym3 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
234
235 WS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ , Address , User
236 WS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
237 WS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ , EMail , User
238 WS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ ,Name , User
239 WS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
240 WS ,Nym3 , PrivPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
241
242 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , University
243 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , User
244 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
245 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , EMail , User
246 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
247 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name , University
248 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name ,User
249 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
250 WS ,Nym3 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
251
252 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , Government
253 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Address , User
254 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,AgeLimit , Government
255 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
256 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,EMail , User
257 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
258 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,Name , User
259 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,OrderNr , WS
260 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
261 WS ,Nym4 , BasicPurchaseServ ,URL , PS
262
263 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , Government
264 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address , University
265 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Address ,User
266 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
267 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,DoB , Government
268 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,EMail ,User
269 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
270 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , Government
271 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , University
272 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,Name , User
273 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,OrderNr ,WS
274 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,SSN , Government
275 WS ,Nym4 , BasicReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
276
277 WS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ , Address , User
278 WS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
279 WS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ , EMail , User
280 WS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ ,Name , User
281 WS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
282 WS ,Nym4 , PrivPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
283
284 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , University
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285 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Address , User
286 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , AgeLimit , Government
287 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , EMail , User
288 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Institute , University
289 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name , University
290 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , Name ,User
291 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ , OrderNr ,WS
292 WS ,Nym4 , PrivReductionPurchaseServ ,URL ,PS
293 }
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